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Foreword
Australia’s economic infrastructure industries have experienced major structural
change over the past 10-15 years. Much of this resulted from government policy
reforms, motivated by the need to improve the performance of public utilities which
provide vital services to business and the community.
The outcomes of the reform process have been monitored in various ways
(including in the ‘Red Book’ exercise and in selected reviews). The present study
supplements that work by providing a broader overview of trends in pricing, service
quality and financial performance for key infrastructure services over the 1990s.
The findings of this study are generally consistent with the expectations and
objectives of the reform programs. While there have been transitional costs, there
have clearly also been considerable benefits to the community and the economy
from more cost-effective services, cost-reflective prices and lower burdens on
taxpayers. (A following study will analyse in more detail the income distributional
impacts of these trends.) Importantly, available indicators suggest that the efficiency
gains have not been achieved at the expense of service quality.
Research for the study was undertaken in the Economic Infrastructure Branch,
under the guidance of Commissioner Michael Woods. The research team was
assisted by many organisations and individuals, both in gathering the information
for the study and in reviewing the findings. The Commission is grateful for their
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•   Government trading enterprises (GTEs) and former GTEs that dominate economic
infrastructure industries — electricity, gas, water and sewerage, urban transport,
ports, railways and telecommunications   underwent significant reform over the
last decade.
•   Governments initiated these reforms to improve productivity, reduce financial
burdens on the community and make prices more reflective of the cost of providing
services to different customers. The underlying goal was to improve community
living standards.
•   Subsequent trends in prices and other aspects of financial performance have
generally been consistent with government objectives. Prices in some industries
have fallen. For example, electricity prices   particularly those to the business
sector   have fallen markedly. In industries where prices were too low   urban
transport, for example   they have risen, reducing the drain of poor financial
performance on taxpayers.
•   The direction and magnitude of price trends were generally similar for metropolitan
and non-metropolitan areas. Price trends were also found to be similar for
concession and non-concession customers.
•   Price reductions and other improvements in financial performance have not been
achieved at the expense of service quality, which has not changed markedly over
the study period.
•   While profitability and returns on assets generally improved, some GTEs   in the
water and sewerage sector, for example   still do not cover the cost of capital. Only
in some cases may this be a result of assets being over-valued.
•   The direct impact of price changes has been greatest in absolute terms for those on
the highest incomes. As a proportion of household expenditure, however, such price
impacts have been greatest for low income households.
•   Only direct price outcomes were examined in this study. The indirect impacts on
households of changes in the prices of final products and services will be examined
in a forthcoming study.OVERVIEW XI
Overview
Economic infrastructure industries — electricity, gas, water and sewerage, urban
transport, ports, railways and telecommunications — play a pivotal role in
Australia’s economic and social development. The efficient provision and use of
infrastructure — its location, availability, quality and pricing — contribute to living
standards of the whole community.
Although the services provided by these industries directly account for only some
5  per  cent of consumer spending, this understates the importance that the
community attaches to them —many being services that are essential to daily life.
Businesses also rely on these services to produce and market their outputs and to
innovate. Indeed, 70 per cent of the total demand for economic infrastructure
services comes from Australian businesses.
Reform of government trading enterprises (GTEs) and former GTEs that dominate
these industries began in the 1980s and accelerated during the 1990s. In this period,
governments aimed to:
•   increase productivity and pass on cost savings in the form of reduced prices and
increase shareholder returns (via commercialisation, corporatisation and
privatisation), without reducing the quality of service;
•   achieve higher levels of cost recovery by increasing prices in some industries to
reduce subsidies from the public purse (user-pays);
•   remove cross-subsidies by making prices more reflective of the relative costs of
providing the service (rebalancing tariffs);
•   impose factor market disciplines and ensure competitive neutrality by requiring
GTEs to pay dividends, tax-equivalent payments and debt guarantee fees
(competitive neutrality);
•   improve accountability for performance through the introduction of governance
arrangements for GTEs that correspond to those applying to private sector
managers; and
•   remove regulatory functions from service providers.XII INFRASTRUCTURE
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Government payments to GTEs to offset revenue short-falls in delivering
community service obligations were made explicit. Governments established
arrangements for price oversight because of the potential conflict of interest with
governments as shareholders of GTEs. Governments also improved reporting
standards to increase accountability through transparency and established a
nationally consistent performance monitoring regime.
From the mid-1990s, the Hilmer reforms served to increase competition further.
This involved ensuring competitive neutrality by removing the last vestiges of any
cost advantages enjoyed by GTEs and opening up many services to competitive
bidding. Most GTEs were financially restructured. Some integrated enterprises were
broken up into separate businesses to promote competition in at least part of the
production chain.
Outline of the study
The Commission has examined pricing and other financial performance changes
that have taken place over the last decade, to assess whether they have been
consistent with the reform objectives of governments.
Changes in the prices of, and household expenditure on, a wide range of economic
infrastructure services over the decade 1990-91 to 2000-01 were estimated in both
nominal and real terms. Real price trends reveal how prices for each infrastructure
service moved relative to the price of consumer goods and services in general.
For each infrastructure service, estimates were also made of the direct impact of
price changes on real household expenditure. Also estimated, on a limited case
study basis, were changes to business and concession holder prices. This was
undertaken to examine the consequences of tariff rebalancing.
Changes to quality of service were examined to assess whether lower prices and
higher cost recovery had been achieved by reducing service levels. Changes to
profitability were also examined to identify whether price reductions had been
achieved at the expense of dividends to the community as shareholders.
Clearly there are factors other than reform that contribute to price changes. These
factors include technological progress, changes to input costs, gains from scale
economies as demand increases and the costs of regulation.
That said, the price series in this report provide useful insights into the reform
process. In particular, they reveal whether price movements have been consistent
with the expected outcomes. For example, it was expected that electricity industryOVERVIEW XIII
reform would produce lower prices and that the internal cross-subsidies from
business to household customers would be unwound. This appears to have been the
case.
In urban transport, on the other hand, the reforms were expected to lead to higher
prices as government subsidisation was wound back. The evidence in this report
confirms that outcome. In water supply, price reform was in part motivated by
environmental concerns about over-consumption. There is evidence that per capita
consumption has fallen.
General findings
Over the study period, trends in prices and financial performance have generally
been consistent with government objectives. These trend outcomes have regard for
costs such as voluntary redundancy payments, together with higher wages
negotiated in return for improved work practices and increased productivity.
The direction and magnitude of household price trends have been generally similar
for metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas within each jurisdiction. Also, price
trends were similar for concession and non-concession customers.
Trends in business prices have often diverged markedly from those for households.
In the past, governments tended to keep prices to household customers low relative
to business prices, even when the unit cost of supplying household customers was
considerably higher. Part of the reform process has been to realign prices more
closely with costs (thus improving consumption and investment decisions) and this
has often led to rebalancing price relativities between the two customer groups.
An assessment of the distributional consequences of the price trends indicates that
the direct impact on household consumption has been greatest in absolute terms for
the highest income earners but has been greatest in proportional terms for low
income households.
Generally, quality of service outcomes have been no worse or better than before
reform. However, it should be noted that there were only a few consistent indicators
available to measure service quality changes over the period of the study.
Profitability and returns on assets improved over the study period, but comparisons
based on estimates of asset values have to be interpreted with care. For a number of
utilities, there have been significant changes in asset values as a result of capital
restructures, asset transfers, revaluations and changes in asset valuation
methodologies.XIV INFRASTRUCTURE
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Tariff ‘rebalancing,’ to reduce business prices relative to household prices, is likely
to have benefited customers indirectly. For example, business input cost savings
from lower infrastructure prices flow through to some extent as lower prices for
other products and services. Also, substantial falls in real rail and port charges
would have assisted exports (such as grain and minerals) from regional Australia.
These broader changes in prices and the distributional consequences will be
examined in a forthcoming Productivity Commission research study.
Price trends by industry
Reform outcomes could be expected to vary by industry, depending on the
circumstances of individual industries at the time. For example, the outcomes for
GTEs that had operated on a near user-pays basis were likely to be different to those
for industries that were heavily supported with large subsidies.
It should be noted that household price changes, with the exception of those for
water and sewerage, include the effect of the GST which inflated prices in the final
year of the reporting period. However, the effect of the GST has generally been
excluded from business prices reported in the study — in recognition of the tax
being rebated for inputs such as infrastructure services.
Electricity
Electricity GTEs were corporatised and placed on a commercial footing in the first
wave of governance reform. Cost structures were examined and substantial savings
were realised. Prices were rebalanced to reflect more closely the costs of supply.
Later, there were far-reaching reforms to increase competition. In most
jurisdictions, the industry was vertically disaggregated into separate generation,
transmission, distribution and retail businesses, and in some instances, horizontally
disaggregated as well. Privatisation occurred in Victoria in particular. A national
electricity market was established to encourage competition among generating
businesses in the Eastern States. The system of franchised customers was
dismantled to allow electricity to be purchased from competing wholesalers and
retailers.
Real household electricity prices fell over the study period in all capital cities,
except Hobart, Canberra and Adelaide, with falls ranging from 1  per  cent in
Melbourne to 7 per cent in Brisbane (see figure 2.1, p. 17, reproduced as figure 1
below).OVERVIEW XV
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Note For notes refer to figure 2.1.
Business prices fell even more sharply, providing second round benefits to
customers indirectly if passed on in the form of lower prices for final products andXVI INFRASTRUCTURE
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services. For example, in the two jurisdictions studied in greater detail — NSW and
WA — the business prices of the two case study utilities fell by between 30 and
60 per cent (see figures 2.4 and 2.5, p. 26 and p. 27 respectively, with the NSW
trends reproduced as figure 2 below).
Gas
Gas GTEs were corporatised and then privatised over the study period. The industry
faces significant competition from electricity, as an alternative source of energy in
many uses.
Real household gas prices rose in most capital cities over the 1990s, ranging from
3 per cent in Melbourne to 15 per cent in Adelaide and Canberra (see figure 3.1,
p.  52). The exceptions were Brisbane and Perth, where prices fell by 7 and
10 per cent respectively.
In metropolitan areas of WA and Victoria, prices to tariff customers (mainly small
business) fell by between 4 and 25 per cent (see figures 3.6 and 3.5, p. 63 and p. 62
respectively). There is some evidence that prices negotiated by large customers
have remained constant in real terms.
Financial performance has been satisfactory (see figure 3.12, p. 74) and there has
been no definite deterioration in the quality of service (see figures 3.10 and 3.11,
p. 70 and 71 respectively).
Water and sewerage
Like other GTEs, most metropolitan water and sewerage utilities were corporatised
during the study period. Pricing reforms were also introduced, often involving a
change from property-based to consumption-based charges and a rebalancing
between household and business prices.
Unlike other GTEs, the water and sewerage utilities have generally not been opened
up to competition — with the exception of SA where service provision has been
franchised. However, most are subject to price regulation. In addition, operating
licences remain a key mechanism to impose service quality requirements.
Real household prices for water and sewerage rose over the study period in all
capital cities except Melbourne and Hobart (see figure  4.1, p.  93, reproduced as
figure 3 below). These increases are consistent with the policy objective of making
charges more cost-reflective.OVERVIEW XVII
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Note  For notes refer to figure 4.1.OVERVIEW XIX
Another objective was to promote conservation through improved
demand-management. This has been achieved successfully, with per capita
consumption declining by approximately 17 per cent in major urban supply areas
over the study period. This has in turn delayed the need to augment water supplies,
producing significant capital savings as well as environmental benefits.
It was difficult to identify a consistent trend in business prices. Business charges for
water depend on the particular utility, connection features and volume consumed
(for example, see figure 4.7 p. 108, reproduced as figure 4 below).
Notwithstanding a trend toward full cost recovery, some water GTEs are still not
earning ‘commercial’ rates of return on their assets (see figure 4.13, p. 118). This
implies that the community may have to contribute to the renewal of assets through
taxes in the future, unless prices are increased further or productivity is improved.
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Urban transport
The main emphasis of urban transport reform has been to improve productivity and
cost recovery, given poor performance of the services and significant implicit
subsidies.
Governments made managers more accountable for productivity through
corporatisation, and exposed GTEs to competition in some areas by franchising
services and requiring the GTEs to bid for the contracts. GTEs in some jurisdictions
were privatised.
Real urban transport prices, averaged over public and private modes — including
trains, trams, buses, ferries and taxis — increased in all capital cities from
22  per  cent in Sydney to 43  per  cent in Perth over the decade (see figure 5.1,
p. 146).
The increases in urban transport prices were slightly higher when private taxi prices
were excluded as they generally rose by less than the other transport modes
(see figure 5.3, p. 153).
There is some evidence of enhancement of service quality, such as the introduction
of new rolling stock and air-conditioned buses. However, in Sydney and Brisbane,
punctuality and reliability remained generally unchanged (see figure 5.7 and 5.8,
p. 163 and 165 respectively).
Real price increases were not sufficient to allow ‘commercial’ financial targets to be
met in some jurisdictions.
NSW State Transit Authority implicit subsidies and explicit government funding
has declined over the study period.
Ports
Most ports in Australia have been corporatised or privatised. In the process they
have shed regulatory responsibilities and control of ancillary marine services and
cargo handling facilities, reducing them largely to landlord managers of
infrastructure.
For this study, only port authority charges were examined. These include a number
of ship-based and cargo-based charges levied by port authorities, some elements of
which include a time-in-port component. As such, they do not cover port-related
costs such as stevedoring.OVERVIEW XXI
Real port charges on container ships fell by between 62 per cent in Melbourne and
17 per cent in Burnie (see figure 6.1, p. 196). For bulk ships, price changes were
similar, with real prices falling by 52  per  cent in Melbourne and 17  per  cent in
Burnie (see figure 6.2, p. 198).
The reductions in real charges for containerised and bulk traffics do not appear to
have reduced rates of return on port assets to below ‘commercial’ levels (see figures
6.3 and 6.4, p. 201 and 203 respectively).
Rail freight
Initially, railways were corporatised to strengthen accountability for performance.
This brought about a major rationalisation of services and activities. Recent reforms
have been aimed at encouraging competition and private sector investment, by
restructuring railways into separate track infrastructure and train operation
businesses. Some railways have been privatised. Others have been franchised to the
private sector on a competitive basis.
Notwithstanding commercial-in-confidence limitations, available information
indicates that freight rates decreased significantly in real terms over the study
period, averaging around 40 per cent in all jurisdictions.
Between 1996-97 and 2000-01, average rail freight charges for the transport of
wheat to ports fell in real terms by between 22 per cent in NSW and 9 per cent in
WA (see figure 6.8, p. 211). Over the same period, average rail freight rates for the
transport of coal have fallen in real terms in NSW by 52 per cent and in Queensland
by 26 per cent (see figure 6.9, p. 212).
Most rail freight rates are negotiated and are confidential. However, a real price
index of general freight prices showed similar trends to those for wheat and coal
(see figure 6.11, p. 214, reproduced as figure 5 below).
Shareholder outcomes, as measured by return on assets, dividend payout and
dividend to equity ratios, have been variable over the study period, reflecting
significant restructuring and transition (see figures 6.12, 6.13 and 6.14, p. 216, 218
and 219 respectively). Most rail authorities earned rates of return at or slightly
above the risk free rate. Generally, rail authorities have been able to deliver real
falls in freight charges without unduly reducing profitability.XXII INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 5 Real rail freight price trends — general freight
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Note For notes refer to figure 6.11.
Telecommunications
Telstra’s predecessor, Telecom, was corporatised in the late 1980s. Limited
competition was introduced by the establishment of a duopoly, with Optus as the
alternative carrier. The market was subsequently opened up to full competition and
Telstra was partially privatised. Regulation was introduced (Parts XI A, B and C of
the Trade Practices Act 1974) to facilitate access to the incumbent’s infrastructure
by third parties.
Real household prices for a consumption basket of telecommunications services,
including rental, fixed line and mobile calls, fell by around 20 per cent over the
study period (see figure 7.1, p. 239). Changes in technology have contributed to this
trend. Since 1996-97, household and business prices decreased at broadly similar
rates (see table 7.7, p. 244).
While prices fell significantly, most aspects of service quality, except fault
clearance times, improved (see figures 7.2 to 7.8, p. 247 to 253). Fault clearance
performance deteriorated for most of the ten year period. From mid-1998, faultOVERVIEW XXIII
clearance has been improving. However, the overall trend cannot be determined
because of changes in the basis of measurement.
Telstra paid a dividend in each year over the study period (see figure 7.10, p. 256).
During the period of part private ownership (1997-98 to 2000-01), return on assets
has averaged 21 per cent, compared with 13 per cent under full public ownership
(see figure 7.9, p. 255).INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Over the last decade or so, economic infrastructure industries   electricity, gas,
water and sewerage, urban transport, ports, railways, and telecommunications 
have been reformed to strengthen competition and performance. Governments
initiated these reforms to bring about productivity improvements that would lower
prices, improve services, raise profitability in some cases and reduce reliance on
government subsidies in other cases.
This is a study of the prices charged, quality of service delivered, and financial
performance of economic infrastructure industries and the extent to which the trends
are consistent with the reform objectives.   The study period — 1990-91 to 2000-01
— spans the period in which most of the reform took place.
1.1 Study objectives
The study objectives of the project are to report on:
1.  Prices paid by household customers over the last decade and the effect of price
trends on household expenditure for a range of income groups.
2.  The extent of differences in price trends between:
(a)  metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas;
(b)  household and business customers; and
(c)  concession and non-concession customers.
3. Changes in quality of service.
4.  Returns to government (on the assets of government trading enterprises) and




The purpose of the study was to examine real changes to prices and profitability,
along with absolute changes in service indicators, to see whether the changes are
consistent with the stated aims of the reforms that were undertaken prior to and
during the study period.
The Commission recognises that there are factors other than reform measures that
will affect prices. These factors include technological progress, changes to input
costs, gains from scale economies as demand increases and the costs of regulation.
Further, the reform process is dynamic and there are ongoing implementation costs
and second round effects.
That said, the price series in this report provide useful insights about the reform
process. In particular, they reveal whether price movements have been consistent
with the expected outcomes when the reforms were implemented. The study
comprises four components that mirror the study objectives. The purpose of each of
these components is outlined below.
Price trends and their effects on household expenditure
The direct effects of infrastructure price changes on the household expenditure of
different income groups are reported, to gauge their distributional impact.
The consequences of price changes on business costs and their indirect effect on
customers is the subject of a forthcoming Productivity Commission research study.
The study will examine the distributional consequences of changes to business
prices, using a regional general equilibrium model of the economy.
Variations in price trends
Information is reported on relative price trends between metropolitan and
non-metropolitan areas to provide a basis for examining locational variations across
Australia. Price variations between concession and non-concession customers were
also examined to determine whether there had been any change in the relative prices
paid by these two groups. Variations between household and business prices were
reported to examine the consequences of tariff rebalancing.INTRODUCTION 3
Changes in quality of service
Changes in quality of service indicators are reported to reveal whether the public
interest has been protected. Of particular concern was the issue of whether price
reductions or increased profitability have been achieved by lower quality of service.
Returns to government in relation to price trends
The purpose of this component of the study was to report on the financial
performance of utilities and the relationship to price trends. The benefits of reform
can be taken in different ways   as a reduction in customer prices, or as an
improvement in financial performance and the returns made to shareholders   or
some combination of the two.
Financial performance was also examined because one thrust of the reform process
was to replicate financial market disciplines on utilities and require full cost
recovery.
1.3 Microeconomic reform of economic infrastructure
services
Microeconomic reform encompasses a range of government policies which change
the incentives facing private and public sector producers. In relation to government
trading enterprises (GTEs), microeconomic reform is intended to provide greater
customer satisfaction via an improved mix of price and service quality outcomes.




3.  Introduction of factor market disciplines; and
4.  Competition policy.
Commercialisation
In the early part of the 1990’s, governments began to place greater emphasis on
clarifying their objectives for GTEs. This was in response to ambiguities concerning
the various competing demands on GTEs — providing essential services to all,
keeping prices low, reducing their call on the budget and being good corporateINFRASTRUCTURE
PRICE TRENDS
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sponsors. In an attempt to resolve some of these ambiguities, GTEs were
encouraged to adopt a more commercial approach to service provision and pricing
decisions. User-pays policies were refocussed on requiring GTEs to achieve full
cost recovery.
Policies of competitive tendering and contracting out were introduced to expose
large areas of public provision to competition from the private sector. Capital
projects once undertaken in-house by GTEs were contracted out and subject to
competitive tender.
Governments reassessed the way in which community service obligations (CSOs)
were delivered. They introduced direct and more transparent budget funding of
CSOs.
There were also concerns that GTE control of regulatory functions could create
conflicts of interest, with the same organisations being responsible for both service
delivery and its regulation. This led to GTE regulatory functions being transferred
to independent regulators. The resulting relationships between GTEs and these
independent regulators are still evolving.
During this period, most GTEs continued to be under close government supervision
and subject to Ministerial direction in the areas of pricing and financial
management.
Corporatisation
During the 1990s, corporatisation established GTEs as more autonomous entities,
with commercially-oriented Boards, which have greater responsibility and
accountability for financial performance. Under this model, GTEs pursued
commercial objectives without ministerial interference in day-to-day management
decisions.
Regimes were established to monitor and report on their financial and non-financial
performance at the same time as new standards of performance and accountability
were introduced. Another purpose of these regimes was to foster ‘yardstick
competition’.
Governments introduced independent price regulation. This was intended to
separate price regulation from Ministerial control and avoid perceptions of a
conflict of interest whereby governments could be accused of using their power
over prices as a taxing mechanism.INTRODUCTION 5
Factor market disciplines
In the past, GTEs were able to compete unfairly because of advantages not enjoyed
by their prospective, private sector competitors   for example, not paying
dividends to their shareholders. However, government policies that seek to replicate
capital market disciplines by requiring GTEs to earn a ‘commercial’ rate of return
on their assets and pay dividends to their owner governments, are now
commonplace among GTEs.
Competition policy
Australian governments agreed to the National Competition Policy Agreement in
1995. This resulted in a more nationally focused and systematic approach to
ongoing regulation review and infrastructure reform. Electricity (through the
establishment of the national electricity market) and gas competition (through
pipeline access regimes), were areas of substantial reform.
A key thrust of competition policy reform was to facilitate the entry of new private
sector providers and replace the previous arrangements whereby GTEs were the
sole providers of infrastructure services.
Governments created new regulatory frameworks and institutions to promote and
regulate price competition. These institutions include the National Competition
Council (NCC), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC),
the New South Wales Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), and
the Victorian Office of the Regulator-General (ORG).
1.4 Study scope
Price trends and their impact on household expenditure   the first of the four
components of the study   were examined for all jurisdictions. Only the direct
effects of these trends on household expenditure were measured in this study 
sometimes referred to as first round effects. As indicated earlier, the indirect effects
will be the subject of a forthcoming study.
The remaining three components of the study   variations in prices, service quality
and financial performance   were examined as case studies within selected
jurisdictions only.
The study covered services supplied by mainly public but some private businesses.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Price trends and direct impacts on household expenditure
In this component of the study, the price trends examined were those paid by
metropolitan households in Australia’s eight capital cities, over a 10  year time
period, from 1990-91 to 2000-01. Price trends are presented as a real price index
over 11 price points, beginning with the June quarter 1991 and ending with the June
quarter of 2001.
Data published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) was primarily used for
this component of the study. Price data was extracted from the consumer price
index (CPI) collection for electricity, gas, urban transport and telecommunications.
The first component of the study also includes an evaluation of the distributional
impact of price trends on different household income groups. Households on lower
incomes tend to spend a higher proportion of their expenditure on infrastructure
services, because these services are basic necessities. Consequently, any changes in
the real price of these services can have a greater (proportional) impact on lower
income households.
Variations in price trends
The relationship between metropolitan and non-metropolitan prices, concession and
non-concession prices, and between business and household prices, were examined
for NSW or Victoria (the two largest jurisdictions), plus one other (smaller)
jurisdiction. The two jurisdictions selected were determined primarily by the
availability of data.
The prices paid by businesses of different sizes were collected. Business prices are
often confidential and the business price data presented in the study was drawn from
a number of different sources.
Household price trends were compared with price trends for business. These
comparisons enabled identification of any rebalancing between business and
household prices, designed to make prices more reflective of differences in supply
costs and demand characteristics.
Changes in quality of service
Quality of service measures were collected for most of the industries covered in the
study. The service quality measures differ according to the industry under
consideration and according to the availability of consistent and reliable dataINTRODUCTION 7
covering all or much the study period. Wherever possible, the effects that capital
investment trends may have had on service quality were considered.
Returns to government in relation to price trends
Return on assets and payments to government were examined for selected GTEs in
each of two jurisdictions. The payments reported include dividend payments and the
dividend to equity ratio, both of which are discussed in the chapters.
In certain cases, the discussions extend beyond these two measures to provide a
more comprehensive picture of the financial performance of GTEs, for instance, to
indicate whether governments are providing subsidies.
1.5 Approach
The approach taken was to report prices as indexes, together with service quality
indicators and financial measures over time.
Real price trends and impacts on household expenditure
Indexes of real prices paid by metropolitan households for utility services were
obtained by deflating nominal prices by the CPI (All groups) for each capital city,
which is indicative of trends in the general price level. ABS data were expressed as
index numbers, with the base year 1989-90=100. These index numbers were
rebased to the study base year 1990-91=100.
The price data for individual government services is collected by the ABS for
inclusion in the CPI. It reflects the prices paid by metropolitan households only. A
brief description of the procedures used in compiling the CPI is outlined below, but
a more comprehensive description is available (ABS 1996).
The CPI price data for government services is collected by the ABS at the end of
each quarter. Average prices pertaining to a quarter are calculated by collecting, at
the end of the quarter, information about the actual dates of effect for all price
changes that occurred during the quarter.
For this study, prices are reported for the June quarter of each year.
Prior to the September quarter 1998, the reference population sample used by the
ABS to compile the CPI was restricted to households of wage and salary earners.
Expansion of the population coverage at that time to include all households, drew inINFRASTRUCTURE
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social security beneficiaries and superannuants, and increased the coverage from
29 per cent to 64 per cent of all Australian private households. Within this expanded
coverage, the prices collected for the CPI included a greater proportion of
households that were eligible for concessions.
In compiling the CPI, price trends for the different components are combined using
weights representing the relative importance of each of the components in the total
expenditure of the CPI population group. The CPI is compiled using expenditure
weights (ABS 1996).
The CPI is a Laspeyres index, compiled using price trends with a fixed consumption
assumption. For a Laspeyres index, it is assumed that the levels of consumption are
the same at the end of the period as at the beginning. The CPI is constructed as a
series of short-term Laspeyres indexes, that are each chained together into one
long-term index, by adjusting weights every few years to allow for changes in
expenditure patterns (ABS 1996).
Some of these expenditure weight changes have been significant during the study
period (see table 1.1). The changes incorporated by the ABS using chain linking,
maintain the CPI as a continuous index.
Table 1.1 Expenditure weights in the CPI
Contribution to the CPI (All groups), per cent





 June quarter 2000
Electricity 1.75 1.66
Gas 0.53 0.70
Other household fuela 0.06 n.r.
Water and sewerageb 2.19 0.87
Urban transport fares 1.21 0.85
Telecommunicationsc 1.55 2.73
a This category was combined with gas for the 14
th CPI series. b For the earlier 12
th CPI series, water and
sewerage was included in the broader category known as ‘local government rates and charges’. c This
expenditure category was known as ‘Telephone services’ in the 12
th CPI series. n.r. Not relevant.
Sources: ABS (Information paper: Introduction to the 14th series Australian Consumer Price Index,
Cat. no. 6456.0); ABS (The Australian Consumer Price Index: Concepts, Sources and Methods, 12th Series,
Cat. no. 6461.0).
Taxes and GST
The Goods and Services Tax (GST), introduced in July 2000, was included in the
nominal price series for household customers with the exception of water andINTRODUCTION 9
sewerage services. This tax is embodied in the CPI (All groups) index used to
deflate nominal prices to real prices.
The ABS has concluded that it is impossible to systematically quantify the effects of
the GST on CPI prices (ABS 2000b). Accordingly, the GST effect cannot be netted
out of household price trends to obtain a ‘net of GST’ price series.
In contrast with household prices, the effect of the GST was generally excluded
from the nominal price series for business customers, because businesses are able to
claim a GST rebate on their inputs. Business prices were collected directly from
utility tariff schedules, which are net of GST.
Direct effects of price trends on household expenditure
For each infrastructure service, estimates were also made of the direct impact of
changes in its price over the decade on real household expenditure. Actual
expenditure on the service in 2000-01 was multiplied by the difference between the
change in its nominal price and the change in CPI between 1990-91 and 2000-01.
Actual household expenditure in 2000-01 was derived by taking the proportion of
total household expenditure that was spent on an infrastructure service by
households in the 1998-99 Household Expenditure Survey (ABS 2000a). This
proportion or expenditure weight was then multiplied by total household
expenditure on the service in 1998-99 and inflated to 2000-01 prices using the CPI
deflator, to obtain an estimate of actual household expenditure on the service in
2000-01. For this calculation, the effects of price changes on consumption (such as
reducing demand, in favour of substitute services, if prices have risen) were
ignored.
Measuring the distributional impact of utility price changes
The impact of infrastructure price changes on average household expenditure in
2000-01 was estimated as the average effect in dollars per household for each
household expenditure quintile. This was done for each capital city where
appropriate.
Variations in price trends
Price indexes were constructed using representative baskets of consumption. The
consumption baskets represent typical consumption patterns by household andINFRASTRUCTURE
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business customers. For each infrastructure industry, the reasons for selecting
particular baskets are discussed in the relevant chapter of this report.
Information on the prices paid by those eligible for concessions was usually
obtained from the State government department responsible for administering the
concession scheme. Business price trends were obtained from published sources
where possible, or from businesses using infrastructure services. For example, rail
freight rates were obtained from the Wheat Board.
Changes in quality of service
Quality of service data was mostly obtained from publications issued by regulators
and by the relevant utilities. The general approach was to select recognised service
quality measures, for which data was available over all or much of the study period.
Returns to government in relation to price trends
Data on returns to government were drawn from the database compiled by the
Productivity Commission as part of its ongoing program of monitoring the
performance of GTEs.
Implicit subsidies, organisational restructuring and different approaches to the
valuation of assets were examined to determine whether they had a significant
impact on the return on assets. The relationship between prices and return on assets
is also discussed.
1.6 Report  Outline
Each of the industry chapters, beginning with electricity in chapter 2, contains a
discussion of price, service quality and financial outcomes, as well as an
introductory section on the history of economic reform in the relevant industry.
The infrastructure industries covered are, in order   electricity, gas, water and
sewerage, urban transport, ports and rail freight and telecommunications. The




•   In most capital cities, real metropolitan household electricity prices were lower in
2000-01 than they were in 1990-91. The exceptions to this were Adelaide, Hobart
and Canberra.
•   Declines in real electricity prices represent real savings on household expenditure.
As a proportion of total household expenditure, the savings were most significant for
those households in the lowest income bracket. Total savings made by all
households  across all capital cities in the last financial year approximated
$70 million dollars.
•   In NSW and WA (examined as case studies), declines in real household prices
occurred in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. In NSW, the fall in real
household prices was larger in non-metropolitan areas than in metropolitan areas.
•   In both States, the real price change for concession households was the same as
for non-concession households.
•   Falls in real business prices have been larger than the declines in real household
prices. Real business electricity prices in NSW and WA declined by 30 to
50 per cent.
•   These was no evidence to suggest that the falls in real household and business
prices in NSW and WA have come at the expense of declining quality of service or
inadequate rates of return on assets.
The Australian electricity industry has undergone extensive reform since 1990-91.
The reforms have included the corporatisation or privatisation of utilities and the
restructuring of the industry to increase competition.
Reforms can influence the prices paid by household customers for electricity
services, and the amounts that different household income classes spend on those
services. Further, as tariff rates are rebalanced to be more reflective of the costs of
supplying customers, observed price trends may vary between households situated
in different areas, and between household and business customers.
In this chapter, trends in real prices paid by household customers for electricity
services are presented for the period 1990-91 to 2000-01. The impact of these realINFRASTRUCTURE
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price trends on household expenditure for a range of income groups is also
examined.
Using a case study approach, differences in price trends between metropolitan and
non-metropolitan customers, between household and different-sized business
customers, and between concession and non-concession customers are presented.
Quality of service measures were examined to determine whether any declines in
real prices over the period have been associated with lower service quality. Finally,
the financial performance of the case study utilities was examined to see if price
declines have been associated with falling rates of return.
2.1 Industry reforms
Reform of Government Trading Enterprises (GTEs) generally was described in
chapter 1. The major reforms in the electricity industry over the last ten years have
included:
•   changes to the governance structures of electricity utilities;
•   the introduction of competitive neutrality measures;
•   changes to the market structure; and
•   reform of tariff structures.
The combination of these reforms led to reduced employment levels and more
flexible work practices within the industry. Changes in costs brought about by
downsizing and contracting out affects the final prices paid by customers.
The fundamental change to governance structures was to corporatise electricity
utilities to make managers accountable for performance. The utilities were given
clear and non-conflicting objectives so that they could operate at arms-length from
government.
Competitive neutrality measures required that governments directly fund utilities for
the provision of community service obligations (CSOs). Utilities were also required
to make dividend and tax-equivalent payments and pay debt guarantee fees.
Market reforms
Market structure reforms had the purpose of improving the efficiency and
cost-competitiveness of the electricity industry through the introduction of
competitive disciplines.ELECTRICITY 13
The reforms primarily consisted of the separation of the contestable elements of the
market — generation and retailing — from the non-contestable elements —
transmission and distribution. The contestable elements were then exposed to
competition.
The outcome was the introduction of a market for electrical energy, where prices
are determined by demand and supply conditions, while the prices charged for the
delivery of that energy across the monopoly elements of the network remained
regulated.
Governments introduced competition into the supply and retailing of electrical
energy in stages, starting with the largest users and progressively deregulating the
prices paid by users with smaller loads.
By June 2001, the end of the study period, each State was at a different stage of
deregulation. Businesses in NSW and Victoria that purchased 100 MWh or more
annually have had their electricity prices determined in the National Electricity
Market (NEM). The threshold in Queensland was 200 MWh, while in the ACT and
SA, the threshold was 100 MWh and 160 MWh respectively.1
In WA, businesses that purchased 8760 MWh or more annually could choose their
own retailer, while, in the NT, the threshold was 2  GWh. Tasmanian electricity
retailing had not been deregulated at June 2001.
The NEM is operated as a trading pool linking generators, retail authorities and
wholesale end use customers.2 Energy is traded in a spot market, where generators
bid to supply electricity at half-hourly intervals and purchasers buy the energy at the
spot price.
The prices paid by customers with annual loads of less than the deregulation
threshold (principally small business and household customers) remained subject to
regulation by State and Territory governments or State-based independent
regulators over the period.
Under arrangements established to assist in the transition to a fully competitive
market, distributor–retailers purchased the proportion of their load still subject to
retail price controls through vesting contracts with generators. Vesting contracts —
                                             
1  Very large business users — usually those customers taking supply at the transmission or
subtransmission level of the network — often buy their supply directly from generators. The
price is negotiated between the parties and settled through contracts.
2  The NEM is administered by the National Electricity Code Administrator and operated by the
National Electricity Market Management Company. The National Electricity Code sets out the
market rules, procedures and information systems which support them.INFRASTRUCTURE
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later replaced by hedging contracts in Victoria and the Electricity Tariff
Equalisation Fund in NSW — were designed to minimise the financial risk to the
distributor–retailer of fluctuating wholesale prices (Victorian Department of
Treasury 1994).
With structural reform, regulation of transmission and distribution service charges
was introduced to ensure non-discriminatory access to the existing network and to
facilitate competition between generators. Within the NEM, the prices charged for
transmission services are regulated by the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC), while those charged by distributors for use of their
distribution networks are regulated by State regulators.
The extent to which these reforms have been implemented varies among States and
Territories. Structural reforms have been implemented in NSW, Victoria,
Queensland and SA, and the utilities in these States now function as part of the
NEM. While structural reform has also occurred in Tasmania, the utilities in this
State will not trade in the NEM until the completion of BassLink.
WA and the NT are not party to the NEM because of the large distances and lack of
a physical interconnection link between these jurisdictions and the eastern and
southern States where the NEM functions. However, WA has introduced choice in
electricity supplier for large users and provided for third party access to Western
Power’s transmission network under its commitments to National Competition
Policy.
Tariff reforms
With the introduction of full cost recovery requirements, some restructuring of retail
electricity tariffs has occurred for the purpose of realigning retail prices with the
true cost of supply.
Electricity utilities are sometimes required to fulfil certain CSOs because of the
essential service nature of electricity. Generally, CSOs require the utilities to supply
electricity to certain customer classes at prices that are below their direct (short-run
marginal) cost of supply. In order to meet the costs of these CSOs, utilities often
increased prices to other customer classes above their direct (short-run marginal)
cost of supply.
Electricity tariff structures are typically made up of access charges and usage
charges. The access charge, which is independent of the amount of electricity used,
covers the cost of connecting a customer to the electricity network and maintainingELECTRICITY 15
the network. Usage charges cover the amount of electrical energy used by the
customer and are accrued on a kWh basis.
In some jurisdictions, rebalancing of the relative weights given to access and usage
charges within a tariff has occurred. For example, a restructure of Victorian retail
tariffs in 1992 increased the access charge for households and reduced the usage
charge (Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Melbourne, pers.
comm., 18 September 2001).
Another reform to tariff structures has been the introduction of time-of-use tariffs.
Time-of-use tariffs consist of an access charge and a usage charge that varies with
the time of day. Under these tariffs, the usage charge — and less frequently the
access charge — is set higher during those times of the day when demand is
greatest. By charging higher prices during peak times, time-of-use tariffs are used to
moderate demand peaks by encouraging customers to reduce their peak time
consumption.
To a varying degree, time-of-use tariffs have an indirect effect on consumption
patterns and supply decisions at any point in time. Most customers, particularly
households and small businesses, do not observe the price they pay until they
receive their periodic electricity bill. In the longer term, households make decisions
to change their usage patterns in order to minimise costs. This has been encouraged
by the wide-spread availability of off-peak hot water tariffs.
Large businesses, particularly large scale manufacturing or industrial operations,
may be more aware of price changes because of the affect that electricity prices may
have on their cost base.
A further reform has been the creation of independent price regulators in some
States and Territories. This has subjected the tariff rates set by utilities to price or
revenue controls imposed by the regulator, whereas previously, rates had been
subject to the approval of the responsible Minister.
2.2 Price outcomes for metropolitan households
In constructing its capital city price series for electricity, the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS) develops a household price using the retail prices charged by the
incumbent supplier. In most capital cities, there is only one supplier to household
customers, although additional suppliers are included by the ABS if they supply a
significant quantity of electricity.INFRASTRUCTURE
PRICE TRENDS
16
The Goods and Services Tax (GST), introduced in July 2000, was included in the
nominal household price series for 2000-01 because households incur the full cost
of this tax.
In most capital cities, average real electricity prices paid were lower in 2000-01
than they were in 1990-91 (see figure 2.1). Real prices fell by 5 per cent in Sydney,
1 per cent in Melbourne, 7 per cent in Brisbane, 6 per cent in Perth and 2 per cent in
Darwin. Between 1999-2000 and 2000-01, real prices trended upwards in all capital
cities largely because of the introduction of the GST.
The fluctuations in Melbourne’s real price index were caused by changes in the
structure of household tariffs and retail price controls. Real prices rose in 1992-93
following a restructure of domestic tariff rates that increased access charges,
reduced usage charges and had the impact of increasing average prices. Domestic
prices were then frozen between July 1993 and 30 June 1996, representing a
reduction in real terms of around 9 per cent relative to 1992-93 (Department of
Natural Resources and Environment, Melbourne, pers. comm., 18 September 2001).
The sudden decrease in the Melbourne electricity price index in 1998-99 was a
result of the introduction of the Winter Power Bonus3 and the Winter Energy
Concession4 (Australian Bureaus of Statistics, Melbourne, pers. comm.,
18 September 2001).
Real prices increased by around 9 per cent in Adelaide, 19 per cent in Hobart and
8 per cent in Canberra. In Hobart and Canberra, real household prices increased due
to a rebalancing of tariff rates between household and business customers
(Government Prices Oversight Commission, Hobart, pers. comm., 26 September
2001 and ACT Energy and Water Charges Commission 1997).
                                             
3  The Winter Power Bonus was introduced in 1998 and applied in each year between 1998-99 and
2000-01. The effect of its introduction was that a fall of $60 was recorded between the June and
September quarters of 1998 in the annual cost of electricity for Melbourne households. Its
removal in the September quarter of 2001 will result in a rise of $60 between the June and
September quarters of 2001.
4  The Winter Energy Concession has applied in Victoria for a number of years. However, it was
not until the September quarter of 1998 that its impact was measured in the CPI. This
corresponded with the introduction of the 13th series CPI when the population coverage was
expanded beyond just wage and salary earning households to include all private households.
This meant that concession card holders were now included in the CPI target population and the
effects of the Winter Energy Concession had to be factored into the CPI.ELECTRICITY 17





























































Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
Note The real price index for each capital city was obtained by rebasing the CPI (electricity) price indexes to a
base year of 1990-91 and then deflating the rebased indexes by the rebased CPI (All groups) price index for
each capital city. The CPI (electricity) price indexes for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Real prices rose in Adelaide between 1995-96 and 1998-99 for a number of reasons.
Contributing factors were a rebalancing of tariff structures between access and
usage, and changes in the price escalation methodologies resulting in overestimates
of the consumer price index (CPI) upon which household price increases were
based. In 1999-2000, a below CPI price increase resulted in a decline in the real
price index (Department of Treasury and Finance, Adelaide, pers. comm., 4 October
2001).
Implications for household expenditure
Electricity prices have a direct effect on household expenditure. They also have an
indirect effect when changes in electricity prices paid by businesses, are passed on
to customers in the form of higher or lower prices for final products and services.
These indirect effects will be examined in a forthcoming Productivity Commission
research study.
The direct impact of changes in the price of electricity over the decade on real
household expenditure in 2000-01, was estimated. This was done by multiplying the
actual household expenditure on electricity in 2000-01, by the difference between
the movement in its price over the ten years to 2000-01 and the movement in the
CPI over the same ten year period. For this calculation, the impact of price changes
on consumption was ignored.
In 2000-01, total expenditure by capital city households on electricity was around
$3.3 billion.5
Electricity price trends were such that prices generally declined faster than the CPI
(All groups) in most capital cities. Accordingly, household expenditure decreased
relative to the expenditure that would have occurred, if prices had changed by the
CPI (All groups) (see table 2.1).
The expenditure changes, arising from price changes over the previous decade and
measured in dollars per year per household, were largest for households in the
highest income quintile (see table 2.1). However, the changes were more
significant, when measured as a percentage of household expenditure per year, for
those households in the lowest income quintile (see table 2.2).
                                             
5 Actual household expenditure in 2000-01 was derived by taking the proportion of total
household expenditure that was spent on electricity in the 1998-99 Household Expenditure
Survey (ABS 2000a). The proportion or expenditure weight from the survey was then multiplied
by total household expenditure in 1998-99 and inflated to 2000-01 prices using the CPI deflator,
to obtain an estimate of actual household expenditure on electricity in 2000-01.ELECTRICITY 19
Table 2.1 Real changes to household electricity expenditure arising from
price changes over the previous decade, by income quintile
$ per capital city household, 2000-01
Income
quintile
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
Lowest 20% -30.21 -4.42 -35.72 43.57 -29.39 125.69 -16.72 32.75
Second -39.10 -5.27 -39.69 50.71 -41.23 148.39 -17.56 51.79
Third -41.32 -5.71 -44.96 68.97 -43.38 163.01 -19.84 47.18
Fourth -45.19 -6.16 -54.70 72.52 -48.13 187.42 -23.32 59.31
Highest 20% -53.57 -6.76 -58.62 90.46 -63.08 209.58 -28.09 82.26
All households -43.29 -5.78 -46.60 63.30 -45.01 162.83 -23.00 60.19
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease in electricity expenditure because real
prices declined over the period.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0).
Table 2.2 Real changes to household electricity expenditure arising from
price changes over the previous decade, as a proportion of
total expenditure
Per cent per capital city household, 2000-01
Income
quintile
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
Lowest 20% -0.15 -0.02 -0.20 0.27 -0.15 0.68 -0.06 0.21
Second -0.13 -0.02 -0.15 0.21 -0.15 0.57 -0.06 0.19
Third -0.11 -0.02 -0.12 0.20 -0.11 0.48 -0.05 0.12
Fourth -0.09 -0.01 -0.12 0.16 -0.10 0.40 -0.05 0.12
Highest 20% -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 0.14 -0.10 0.31 -0.04 0.11
All households -0.09 -0.01 -0.12 0.18 -0.12 0.45 -0.05 0.12
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease in electricity expenditure because real
prices declined over the period.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0).
The real decrease in household electricity expenditure across all capitals was
approximately $70 million in 2000-01 (see table 2.3). The largest decrease was for
households in Sydney (approximately $65 million per year) and the largest increase
was for households in Adelaide (approximately $27 million per year).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table 2.3 Total change to household electricity expenditure arising from
price changes over the previous decade
Capital city households, 2000-01
Householdsa Change per household Total change
No. $ $
Sydney 1 507 189 -43.29 -65 239 918
Melbourne 1 330 406 -5.78 -7 692 005
Brisbane 549 387 -46.60 -25 602 724
Adelaide 436 065 63.30 27 603 341
Perth 456 010 -45.01 -20 524 973
Hobart 89 751 162.83 14 614 495
Darwin 38 530 -23.00 -886 217
Canberra 125 561 60.19 7 557 066
Total 4 532 899 -70 170 935
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease on electricity expenditure because real
prices declined over the period. a Household numbers in each capital city were calculated by multiplying the
proportion of households in each capital city as reported in ABS (1996) by the total number of capital city
households reported in ABS (2000a).
Sources: ABS (The Australian Consumer Price Index-Concepts, Sources and Methods, Cat. no. 6461.0); ABS
(Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0).
2.3 Price variations
Selected utilities in NSW and WA were used as case studies to examine whether
prices have varied according to customer location and eligibility for concessions,
and also how business prices have trended over the period. Specifically, the utilities
included were EnergyAustralia and Great Southern Energy in NSW, and Western
Power in WA.6
The different environments in which these three utilities operate, mean that price
trends over the period are not directly comparable between utilities. There are a
range of cost factors over which utilities have no control, for example the number of
customers per kilometre of line and the density of load, that can limit reductions in
prices relative to other utilities (Sayers and Shields 2001).
                                             
6  EnergyAustralia and Great Southern Energy were formed in 1995 following the amalgamation
of 25 NSW distribution businesses into 6 distribution businesses. Orion Energy and Sydney
Electricity were amalgamated to form EnergyAustralia, and Great Southern Energy evolved
from an amalgamation of a number of non-metropolitan businesses, including Southern
Riverina. In order to present prices over a ten year period, Sydney Electricity’s prices and
Southern Riverina’s prices were used for the period prior to 1995. In July 2001, Great Southern
Energy amalgamated with NorthPower and Advance Energy to form Country Energy. The new
entity’s prices were not included in the calculation of the price index as it falls outside the study
period.ELECTRICITY 21
Location
Real household price indexes for metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas of NSW
and WA were constructed using a representative household consumption bundle for
each jurisdiction. The price indexes for NSW were constructed using an average
annual household consumption of 7048 kWh, while an annual average household
consumption of 4938 kWh was used for WA.
These consumption bundles are the geometric mean of the level of household
consumption in NSW and WA near the beginning and end of the study period.7 In
NSW, average annual household consumption rose from 6900 kWh in 1991-92 to
7200 kWh in 2000-01, while, in WA, consumption increased from 4600 kWh in
1991-92 to 5300 kWh in 2000-01 (see figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2 Average annual household electricity consumption



















































Data sources: ESAA (2001 and previous issues).
Real household prices in metropolitan and non-metropolitan NSW have fallen over
the period (see figure 2.3).
The trend in WA’s real household prices is the same as that observed for Perth
using the ABS CPI series (see figure 2.1). The concordance between the two series
                                             
7  The geometric mean is known as the Fisher ratio. It is calculated by taking the square root of the
product of the consumption levels in 1991-92 and 2000-01. Data on average annual residential
electricity consumption in 1990-91 was unavailable.INFRASTRUCTURE
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arises for two reasons. First, Western Power is the only supplier of electricity to
WA household customers. Therefore, the ABS electricity CPI series will replicate
variations in Western Power’s household tariffs. Second, there is no locational
variation in household prices in WA as household customers pay uniform tariff
rates.

































Note Real price indexes were calculated using the standard domestic tariff applicable to the customer’s
location upon a total annual consumption of 7048  kWh. Prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for
Sydney. The nominal price series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax. EnergyAustralia and
Sydney Electricity’s tariff schedules were used to calculate metropolitan household prices, while non-
metropolitan prices were calculated using Great Southern Energy, Energy South and Southern Riverina’s
urban household tariff schedules.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Department of
Energy and Utilities NSW, pers. comm., 2 October, 2001; ESAA (2000 and previous issues); Great Southern
Energy, Sydney, pers. comm., 2 October 2001.
Concessions
Pensioner concessions account for most of the electricity concessions available in
NSW and WA in terms of the amount of electricity supplied. Other concessions,
such as life support rebates, are available, but are not considered here because of the
small amount of electricity consumption they represent.ELECTRICITY 23
In NSW and WA, pensioners receive a dollar amount as a rebate on their total
electricity supply bill. In both States, the adjustment to this dollar amount over time
has been such that the real price change for pensioners is the same as for non-
concession households.
Business prices
Real business price changes are presented for a range of different business
consumption patterns representing small, medium and large businesses. Five
business bundles with varying annual consumption were used — one for small
business, three for medium business and one for large business (see table 2.4). The
bundles are a subset of those used by the Electricity Supply Association of Australia
Limited (ESAA) in the calculation of its price comparisons.
The GST was excluded from the nominal price series for business customers
because businesses are able to claim a GST rebate on their inputs. However, GST is
included in the CPI (All groups) index used to deflate nominal prices to real prices.
Business types represented by bundle SB1 include small retailers and councils.
Bundles MB1 and MB2 are representative of supermarket chains, hospitals, small
and large food processors and universities. While MB3 and LB1 are likely to be
representative of medium and large scale industrial operations, such as cement
manufacturers and engineering firms.
Table 2.4 Business consumption bundles
Bundle Annual
consumption
Off-peak usage Load factor Peak demand
MWh Per cent Per cent kW
SB1 526 46.5 60 100
MB1 1314 46.5 60 250
MB2 5256 46.5 60 1000
MB3 13 140 46.5 60 2500
LB1 52 560 46.5 60 10 000
Source: ESAA (2000).
In NSW, businesses with consumption patterns similar to MB1, MB2, MB3 and
LB1 became contestable in 1996-97, while businesses represented by SB1 becameINFRASTRUCTURE
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contestable in 2000-01.8 In WA, only bundles LB1 and MB3 became contestable
over the period at 1 July 1998 and at 1 January 2000 respectively.
For each bundle, the tariff that minimised the cost of the bundle to the customer was
used to determine average prices paid. Following the introduction of contestability,
indicative contestable retail prices as reported by the ESAA in its publication
Electricity Prices in Australia (ESAA 2000 and previous issues) were used for each
of the bundles. These contestable prices were used where they were lower than the
average price calculated using the tariff schedule that the customer would have
remained on had contestability not been introduced. Average prices were converted
into a price index and deflated by the ABS CPI (All groups) price index for Sydney
and Perth.
Contestable prices comprise network charges and energy charges. The ESAA uses
the tariff schedule for each utility to calculate the network charge component,
whereas the energy charge is estimated.9
The ESAA estimates the energy charge for different distribution regions based upon
specific assumptions about load profile, consumption levels, pool prices and retail
margins. Consequently, the prices presented may not necessarily reflect the actual
prices paid in the market. The retail price paid by a contestable customer is a result
of contractual negotiations and prices can vary significantly between customers,
depending on the terms and conditions of the contract.
The assumptions made in regard to a customer’s load profile and consumption level
are those that define the parameters of the consumption bundles used (see table 2.4).
The pool price used by the ESAA is the 12 month average pool price for each State
in each financial year, while a 5 per cent retail margin on the overall charge is
assumed.
A price trend for LB1 in non-metropolitan areas of NSW could not be constructed.
This was because Great Southern Energy does not publish tariff rates, and nor does
the ESAA publish contestable prices, for businesses the size of LB1 — no such
large businesses operated within Great Southern Energy’s service territory over the
study period.
                                             
8  Contestable means that customers have a choice over which electricity supplier they use, or
alternatively they may purchase their supply directly from a generator. In NSW, customers also
have the option of purchasing their supply on the NEM spot market.
9  Within a utility’s service territory, the total cost of using the network may vary with customer
size as low voltage customers (typically small businesses) use more of the network than high
voltage (medium businesses) or subtransmission customers (large business).ELECTRICITY 25
Further, the ESAA did not publish indicative contestable prices for Western Power.
The average price for MB3 in 2000-01 was calculated using the existing tariff, and
therefore may be the maximum price that a contestable customer would pay. The
average price paid by businesses characterised by LB1 in 1999-2000 and 2000-01
could not be calculated as the associated tariff had been abolished.
The real prices paid by small, medium and large businesses in NSW have fallen by
between 30 and 60 per cent in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas between
1990-91 and 2000-01 (see figure 2.4).
Real prices declined markedly in 1997-98 because retailers aggressively marketed
themselves in this year, in preparation for the start of the NEM. Many of these
retailers offered unsustainably low prices to their customers in order to establish
themselves in the market. The increase in real prices in the year 1999-2000
followed moves by NSW retailers to increase prices to more sustainable levels
(EnergyAustralia, Sydney, pers. comm., 25 September 2001).
In WA, real business prices fell by between 30 and 50 per cent over the period
(see  figure 2.5). The decline in real prices for MB3 may be understated as the



































































SB1 MB1 MB2 MB3
Note Price indexes were calculated using the tariff that minimised the cost of the representative business
bundles. The nominal price series for 2000-01 exclude the Goods and Services Tax. Prices include the NSW
Distribution Levy where applicable. a The trend line for MB3 is not visible as it follows the same trend as MB2.
b There is no price trend for LB1 as there are no customers of this size in Great Southern Energy’s service
territory. Consequently, Great Southern Energy does not publish tariffs for customers of this size.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Department of
Energy and Utilities NSW, pers. comm., 2 October, 2001; ESAA (2000 and previous issues); Great Southern
Energy, Sydney, pers. comm., 2 October 2001.ELECTRICITY 27






























SB1 MB1 MB2 MB3 LB1
Note Price indexes were calculated using the tariff that minimised the cost of the bundle. Retail prices for
businesses of the size of LB1 became contestable in 1999-2000, while MB3 became contestable in 2000-01.
Indicative contestable prices for both bundles were unavailable. The average price for MB3 in 2000-01 was
calculated using the existing tariff, while the average price paid by businesses characterised by LB1 in
1999-2000 and 2000-01 could not be calculated as the associated tariff had been abolished. The nominal
price series for 2000-01 exclude the Goods and Services Tax.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).; Western
Power, Perth, pers. comm., 27 August 2001.
Estimating the effect of price changes on business costs
As with households, trends in real electricity prices indicate whether expenditure on
electricity as a business input cost is greater or less than it would have been if
electricity prices had increased at the same rate as general inflation.
Trends in the price of electricity purchased by businesses have been such that
electricity prices have declined in nominal terms in most jurisdictions, with an even
greater decline in real terms.
An approximation of the real change in business costs in 2000-01 was derived for
the case study utilities (see  box  2.1). For this calculation, the impact of price
changes on consumption of port authority services was ignored.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Box 2.1 Estimating the gains to business of electricity price changes
Calculating the change in business costs is equivalent to calculating the change in
electricity revenues earnt from the utilities’ business customers.
An approximation of the real change in business costs was obtained by multiplying
current utility revenues from business customers by the ratio of the CPI (All groups)
index number and the real price index number for electricity in the relevant capital city.
There are a number of simplifications in the calculations, such as overlooking the
effects of changes in demand. Therefore, the estimate is indicative only of the general
magnitude of the change in business costs that would have occurred if electricity prices
rose not as they did, but by a rate equal to the CPI (All groups).a
The utilities take different approaches to identifying their revenues from business and
non-business customers. Western Power supplied the Commission with business
revenue figures for 1999-2000. For EnergyAustralia and Great Southern Energy
however, estimates of total business revenues were derived as outlined below (these
estimates were also for 1999-2000 — the latest year for which some of the necessary
data were available).
In 1999-2000, total sales revenue (TSR) included revenues earned from franchised
customers (Rf) — residents and small businesses — and those earned from
contestable customers (Rc) — medium and large businesses. Hence:
TSR = Rf + Rc
Rc included revenue earned from the sale of electrical energy, the sale of network
services, and the collection of the NSW Distribution Levy.b,c
To calculate total business revenue (TBR), the revenue earned from franchised
customers, as reported by the New South Wales Independent Pricing and Regulatory
Tribunal (IPART), was deducted from total sales revenue to derive an estimate of the
total revenue earned from contestable customers:
Rc = TSR – Rf
Only business customers were contestable in 1999-2000, consequently, it is assumed
that total contestable revenue comprises only that revenue earned from business.
IPART also published revenue figures for urban and rural franchised businesses (Rfb).
These amounts were added to the revenues from contestable customers to give a
combined total business revenue (TBR) figure. Hence:
TBR = Rc + Rfb
Total business revenue was then multiplied by the difference between the price index
number for each of the four business consumption bundles and the CPI (All groups)
Groups index number in 1999-2000 and an unweighted average taken.
a This calculated change in expenditure, is predicated on the assumption that consumption would be the
same for prices equal to the CPI (All groups). b Contestable customers are able to choose who they
purchase their electricity from. The electricity prices paid by contestable customers are determined as a
result of negotiation with their supplier. c The NSW Distribution Levy is paid by the six State-owned
licensed distributors to protect the State-owned generators from losses resulting from any substantial
falls in electricity prices.ELECTRICITY 29
In NSW, the business revenues earned by the two case study utilities in 1999-2000
would have been approximately $1  billion higher if business prices, rather than
falling, had risen in line with inflation. It appears that businesses supplied by
EnergyAustralia accrued most of this saving (approximately  $800  million)
(PC estimate).
In WA, the decline in business costs approximated $550 million (PC estimate).
For the NSW utilities, the preceding estimates of business cost reductions in
1999-2000 suggest that costs were around 55 per cent lower than if prices had risen
at the general inflation rate. In WA, costs were around 40  per  cent lower for
Western Power in the same year.
There was insufficient data to estimate how the reductions in business costs were
distributed across different-sized businesses.
2.4 Service quality
Quality of service was examined to see if price trends might be explained by
changes in the quality and reliability of services. Lower prices can be achieved by
lowering expenditure below that required to maintain service standards. However,
lower service standards may take some time to manifest themselves.
Poor quality of service may impose costs on customers as it can result in lost
production or damaged equipment. The majority of supply reliability problems are
associated with the distribution network. Statistics indicate that over 85 per cent of
supply interruptions occur because of distribution system outages (Sanghvi 1990).
Quality of service measures tend to focus upon the reliability of service — that is,
the ability of a distribution network to deliver electric power to all points of
consumption. Measures of the reliability of distribution services are only available
on the frequency and duration of power interruptions.
The following indexes are the most commonly used for reliability measurement:
•   System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) — the average duration a
customer is without power in a year, expressed in minutes.
•   System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) — indicates the average
number of interruptions that customers experience in a year.
•   Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI) — the average duration
of outage for customers who experience an interruption.INFRASTRUCTURE
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The SAIDI, SAIFI and CAIDI values for the case study utilities in NSW and WA
indicate that there has been no marked decline in service quality over the period
(see figures 2.6 and 2.7). This suggests that for these utilities the declines in real
electricity prices over the period have not been at the expense of quality of service.
That said, there may be a lag before discernible declines in quality of service
become apparent. Quality of service problems sometimes only begin to manifest
themselves as assets age and poor maintenance leads to deterioration in these assets.
Consequently, investments in the maintenance and upgrading of supply systems
must be made to maintain, or improve upon, existing quality of service levels.
The values of SAIDI, SAIFI and CAIDI for the three case study utilities fluctuated
from year to year. Reliability, and thus the values of SAIDI, SAIFI and CAIDI, are
affected by factors, such as the weather and motor vehicle accidents, that are
intermittent and beyond the control of the utilities.
To some extent, utilities can control the average duration of any particular outage
(CAIDI) as it partly depends on a utility’s supply restoration procedures. However,
they do not possess the same degree of control over the frequency of outages
(SAIFI).
In NSW, the values of SAIDI, SAIFI and CAIDI were higher in non-metropolitan
areas than in metropolitan areas. The frequency of outages is usually higher in
non-metropolitan areas because longer lengths of above-ground cabling is often
used. This increases the risk that motor vehicle accidents or severe weather
conditions will damage power lines.
Further, the duration of outages may be longer because it takes a longer period of
time to locate faults that occur in the network. On the other hand, outage duration
times can also be lengthened by the understaffing of maintenance services, reducing
the response times of maintenance crew.
For these reasons, it is expected that the values for SAIDI, SAIFI and CAIDI would
also vary between the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas of Western Power’s
supply areas. However, only one value for each measure is published, disguising
any locational variation.ELECTRICITY 31
















































Note SAIDI is the total number of customers affected, multiplied by duration of outage, divided by total number
of customers served. SAIFI is the number of customers interrupted, multiplied by the number of interruptions,
divided by the total number of customers served. CAIDI is the sum of customer interruption duration, divided
by total number of customers interrupted. The indexes exclude interruptions caused by storms. Figures were
unavailable for the Southern Riverina district. Consequently, data for non-metropolitan areas prior to 1994-95
were unavailable.













































































Note SAIDI is the total number of customers affected, multiplied by duration of outage, divided by total number
of customers served. SAIFI is the number of customers interrupted, multiplied by the number of interruptions,
divided by the total number of customers served. CAIDI is the sum of customer interruption duration, divided
by total number of customers interrupted. The indexes exclude interruptions caused by storms.





The financial performance of the case study utilities was examined to provide
information on the relationship between price trends and financial outcomes, such
as the return on assets.
Low prices relative to costs may not achieve a satisfactory return on assets, nor
provide sufficient revenue to maintain and replace long-lived infrastructure assets.
If services are to be maintained, the community, as owners of the utility, will have
to provide financial support in the form of subsidies. Further, low prices may affect
the viability of the business and possibly expose the community to financial risks.
The data used in calculating the shareholder outcomes presented in this section were
generally taken from two sources:
•   Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government
Trading Enterprises; and
•   Productivity Commission reports on Financial Performance of Government
Trading Enterprises.
There may be inconsistencies between these two data sets and the information
published in the annual reports of electricity utilities. These inconsistencies arise
because of definitional differences.
In addition, there have been changes in accounting policies over the study period. In
particular, there were changes in how contributed assets were recognised in
financial statements.
Profitability
EnergyAustralia, Great Southern Energy and Western Power have earned a return
on assets of around 10 per cent since the mid-1990s (see figure 2.8). This suggests
that declining real prices have not come at the expense of returns on government
assets.
Comparisons of performance over time that are based on indicators that include an
estimate of asset values, have to be interpreted with care. Differences in asset
valuation procedures and changes in the size of the asset base can affect the return
on assets. Over the study period, there have been significant changes in asset values























a EnergyAustralia Great Southern Energy Western Power b c
Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a Data for EnergyAustralia prior to the year 1994-95 were only an estimate of the returns that
EnergyAustralia may have earned had it been in existence. The figures were calculated using the earnings
and total assets values of Sydney Electricity and Shortland/Orion Energy. b An estimate of returns to assets
could not be made for Great Southern Energy in the years prior to 1995-96 as data for its predecessor
organisations were unavailable. Data for the year 2000-01 were unavailable. c Returns on assets prior to
1994-95 were unavailable because SECWA, Western Power’s predecessor organisation, did not publish
separate data for its electricity and gas services.
Data sources: EnergyAustralia (2001); PC (2000; 2001a); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); Western
Power (2001).
Payments to government
Publicly-owned electricity utilities are often required to return some of their
earnings to their owner-governments in the form of dividend payments. This is
justified on competitive neutrality and cost recovery grounds.
Where a utility is not required to pay dividends, it has proportionately more funds
available for re-investment into its business, either for the development of new
services or the improvement of existing ones. Further, a utility need not rely on
debt-financing to the extent that its rivals must, and thus incurs lower overall
operating costs.ELECTRICITY 35
The case study utilities have been required to pay dividends since at least 1995-96
(see figures 2.9 and 2.10). In most years, the dividend payout ratios of the three
utilities examined have corresponded with the payout rates of the private sector
utility firms. In 1999-2000, the dividend payout ratios of private sector utility firms
averaged around 47 per cent, and ranged between around 27 and 56 per cent
(PC 2001a).





















EnergyAustralia Great Southern Energy Western Power
b
a c d
Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. a Data for EnergyAustralia prior to the year 1994-95 were only an estimate of the returns that
EnergyAustralia may have earned had it been in existence. The figures were calculated using the earnings
and total asset values of Sydney Electricity and Shortland/Orion Energy. b EnergyAustralia incurred a large
abnormal expense in 1995-96 associated with the restructuring of the NSW distribution businesses. Abnormal
expenses are included in the calculation of dividend payout ratios, creating a large negative dividend payout
ratio in 1995-96. c Estimates of dividend payout ratios for Great Southern Energy in the years prior to 1995-96
could not be made as data for its predecessor organisations were unavailable. d Data prior to 1994-95 were
unavailable because SECWA, Western Power’s predecessor organisation, did not publish separate data for its
electricity and gas services.
Data sources: EnergyAustralia (2001); PC (2000; 2001a); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); Western
Power (2001).
The level of dividends paid — broadly in the 5 to 10 per cent range since 1995-96
— appears similar to that of private companies operating in the utilities market. In
1999-2000, for example, the dividend to equity ratio of private sector utility firmsINFRASTRUCTURE
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averaged around 5 per cent, but ranged between around 2  and 10 per cent
(PC 2001a).


















EnergyAustralia Great Southern Energy Western Power b c a
Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. a Data for EnergyAustralia prior to the year 1994-95
were only an estimate of the returns that EnergyAustralia may have earned had it been in existence. The
figures were calculated using the earnings and total asset values of Sydney Electricity and Shortland/Orion
Energy. b Estimates of dividend to equity ratios for Great Southern Energy in the years prior to 1995-96 could
not be made as data for its predecessor organisations were unavailable. c Data prior to 1994-95 were
unavailable because SECWA, Western Power’s predecessor organisation, did not publish separate data for its
electricity and gas services.
Data sources: EnergyAustralia (2001); PC (2000; 2001a); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); Western
Power (2001).
Although there are limitations in valuing assets, the indicators presented here
suggest that the substantial real price reductions over the last ten years have been
achieved without affecting financial performance.ELECTRICITY 37
Attachment A — Data tables
Table A2.1 Real electricity price trends — metropolitan households
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 103.4 104.3 100.0 103.0 101.2 103.3 101.0 100.8
1992-93 105.1 116.7 99.4 103.3 100.9 106.4 101.9 104.2
1993-94 103.6 118.3 98.4 102.9 98.8 107.1 100.1 102.4
1994-95 100.1 115.2 94.9 98.7 95.4 105.0 97.3 99.3
1995-96 95.3 111.1 91.4 97.0 91.8 102.2 93.4 97.4
1996-97 95.6 110.7 90.0 100.4 90.6 107.5 91.8 96.7
1997-98 95.5 111.2 89.5 102.3 94.2 107.2 92.0 98.8
1998-99 93.9 95.5 88.6 103.1 92.5 108.0 96.1 100.8
1999-00 92.3 93.2 87.1 102.4 90.4 109.5 94.7 101.7
2000-01 94.7 99.2 93.0 108.9 93.8 119.1 98.1 107.9
Note  The real price index for each capital city was obtained by rebasing the CPI (electricity) price indexes to
a base year of 1990-91 and then deflating the rebased indexes by the rebased CPI (All groups) price index for
each capital city. The CPI (electricity) price indexes for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).
Table A2.2 Average annual household electricity consumption
1990-91 to 2000-01 (kWh)
Year Australia NSW WA
1990-91 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1991-92 6100 6900 4600
1992-93 6200 7000 4500
1993-94 6000 6800 4500
1994-95 6100 6900 4800
1995-96 6200 7000 4700
1996-97 6350 7100 4800
1997-98 6500 7200 4900
1998-99 6550 7200 5100
1999-00 6600 7200 5300
2000-01 n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. Not available.
Sources: ESAA (2001 and previous issues).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A2.3 Real electricity price trends — households, selected NSW
retailers













Note  Real price indexes were calculated using the standard domestic tariff applicable to the customer’s
location upon a total annual consumption of 7 048 kWh. Prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for
Sydney. The nominal price series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax. a EnergyAustralia and
Sydney Electricity’s tariff schedules were used to calculate metropolitan household prices. b Non-metropolitan
prices were calculated using Great Southern Energy, Energy South and Southern Riverina’s urban residential
tariff schedules.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Department of
Energy and Utilities NSW, pers. comm., 2 October, 2001; ESAA (2000 and previous issues); Great Southern
Energy, Sydney, pers. comm., 2 October 2001.
Table A2.4 Real electricity price trends — pensioner concessions, selected
NSW retailers













Note Real price indexes were calculated using the standard domestic tariff and pensioner rebates available
upon a total annual consumption of 7 048 kWh. Prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Sydney. The
nominal price series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax. a EnergyAustralia and Sydney
Electricity’s tariff schedules were used to calculate metropolitan prices. b Non-metropolitan prices were
calculated using Great Southern Energy, Energy South and Southern Riverina’s urban residential tariff
schedules.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Department of
Energy and Utilities NSW, pers. comm., 2 October, 2001; ESAA (2000 and previous issues); Great Southern
Energy, Sydney, pers. comm., 2 October 2001.ELECTRICITY 39
Table A2.5 Real electricity price trends — business, selected NSW retailers
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
SB1 MB1 MB2 MB3 LB1
Metropolitan
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 91.7 103.5 103.4 103.4 103.5
1992-93 90.8 102.6 102.5 102.5 102.6
1993-94 81.7 98.0 98.5 98.5 99.0
1994-95 70.8 88.7 89.6 89.5 90.9
1995-96 67.4 78.6 77.3 77.2 76.8
1996-97 61.2 77.5 76.2 76.1 75.7
1997-98 56.7 53.7 53.6 53.6 50.6
1998-99 42.2 52.6 52.3 52.3 48.9
1999-00 47.4 64.0 61.8 61.7 58.2
2000-01 43.3 59.9 58.2 58.1 56.1
Non-metropolitan
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n.a.
1991-92 99.0 106.2 99.7 108.0 n.a.
1992-93 98.1 105.2 98.6 106.8 n.a.
1993-94 91.8 98.3 95.3 103.1 n.a.
1994-95 79.1 84.4 83.6 90.5 n.a.
1995-96 65.1 80.4 79.5 86.1 n.a.
1996-97 62.0 81.2 72.5 66.6 n.a.
1997-98 63.4 77.8 67.2 72.1 n.a.
1998-99 51.6 62.4 57.3 61.7 n.a.
1999-00 58.2 71.2 65.0 70.0 n.a.
2000-01 61.1 68.5 63.6 67.4 n.a.
Note  Price indexes were calculated using the tariff that minimised the cost of the representative business
bundles. The nominal price series for 2000-01 exclude the Goods and Services Tax. Prices include the NSW
Distribution Levy where applicable. n.a. Not available.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Department of
Energy and Utilities NSW, pers. comm., 2 October, 2001; ESAA (2000 and previous issues); Great Southern
Energy, Sydney, pers. comm., 2 October 2001.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A2.6 Real electricity price trends — business, Western Power (WA)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
SB1 MB1 MB2 MB3 LB1
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 101.2 101.2 77.2 81.3 101.2
1992-93 89.0 83.5 70.8 77.8 101.4
1993-94 83.3 81.7 69.3 76.1 99.3
1994-95 73.6 75.7 65.9 72.4 95.2
1995-96 70.8 72.8 63.4 69.7 91.6
1996-97 69.9 71.8 62.6 68.7 90.3
1997-98 70.0 72.0 62.7 68.9 90.6
1998-99 68.8 70.8 61.6 67.7 89.0
1999-00 67.3 69.1 60.2 66.1 n.a.
2000-01 63.4 65.1 56.8 62.4 n.a.
Note  Price indexes were calculated using the tariff that minimised the cost of the bundle. Retail prices for
businesses of the size of LB1 became contestable in 1999-2000, while MB3 became contestable in 2000-01.
Indicative contestable prices for both bundles were unavailable. The average price for MB3 in 2000-01 was
calculated using the existing tariff, while the average price paid by businesses characterised by LB1 in
1999-2000 and 2000-01 could not be calculated as the associated tariff had been abolished. n.a. Not
available.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Western Power,
Perth, pers. comm., 27 August 2001.ELECTRICITY 41





1990-91 268 1.41 190
1991-92 83 1.03 80
1992-93 77 0.92 84
1993-94 122 1.32 92
1994-95 84 1.24 68
1995-96 85 1.10 78
1996-97 72 1.01 72
1997-98 101 1.24 81
1998-99 97 1.30 75
1999-00 88 1.28 69
2000-01 101 1.25 81
Non-metropolitan
1990-91 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1991-92 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1992-93 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1993-94 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1994-95 236 2.06 114
1995-96 186 1.97 95
1996-97 134 1.58 85
1997-98 158 1.43 113
1998-99 173 1.68 95
1999-00 221 2.29 96
2000-01 181 1.40 125
Note  SAIDI is the total number of customers affected, multiplied by duration of outage, divided by total
number of customers served. SAIFI is the number of customers interrupted, multiplied by the number of
interruptions, divided by the total number of customers served. CAIDI is the sum of customer interruption
duration, divided by total number of customers interrupted. The indexes exclude interruptions caused by
storms. Figures were unavailable for the Southern Riverina district. Consequently, data for non-metropolitan
areas prior to 1994-95 were unavailable. n.a. Not available.








1990-91 244 3.40 72
1991-92 181 2.60 71
1992-93 110 1.50 74
1993-94 133 1.70 80
1994-95 146 1.70 88
1995-96 159 1.80 87
1996-97 208 2.30 92
1997-98 149 1.50 102
1998-99 134 1.60 79
1999-00 228 3.16 73
2000-01 133 1.55 86
Note  SAIDI is the total number of customers affected, multiplied by duration of outage, divided by total
number of customers served. SAIFI is the number of customers interrupted, multiplied by the number of
interruptions, divided by the total number of customers served. CAIDI is the sum of customer interruption
duration, divided by total number of customers interrupted. The indexes exclude interruptions caused by
storms.
Sources: Western Power (2001 and previous issues).ELECTRICITY 43
Table A2.9 Return on assets — selected NSW retailers and Western Power
(WA)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
NSWa
EnergyAustralia Great Southern Energy Western Powerb
1990-91 12.6 n.a. n.a.
1991-92 7.4 n.a. n.a.
1992-93 5.0 n.a. n.a.
1993-94 4.2 n.a. n.a.
1994-95 2.8 n.a. 6.0
1995-96 1.5 -3.2 10.8
1996-97 12.2 8.9 10.0
1997-98 12.8 16.9 10.2
1998-99 9.9 13.0 9.9
1999-00 12.4 13.9 11.0
2000-01 10.4 n.a. 11.0
Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a Data for EnergyAustralia prior to the year 1994-95 were only an estimate of the returns that
EnergyAustralia may have earned had it been in existence. The figures were calculated using the earnings
and total assets values of Sydney Electricity and Shortland/Orion Energy. A similar estimate of returns to
assets could not be made for Great Southern Energy in the years prior to 1995-96 as data on its predecessor
organisations were unavailable. Data for both organisations for the year 2000-01 were unavailable. Returns on
assets prior to 1994-95 were unavailable because SECWA, Western Power’s predecessor organisation, did
not publish separate data for its electricity and gas services. n.a. Not available.




Table A2.10 Dividend payout ratio — selected NSW retailers and Western
Power (WA)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
NSW
EnergyAustraliaa Great Southern Energyc Western Powerd
1990-91 212.9 n.a. n.a.
1991-92 77.6 n.a. n.a.
1992-93 73.8 n.a. n.a.
1993-94 66.0 n.a. n.a.
1994-95 61.1 n.a. 0.0
1995-96 -184.3b -16.4 29.0
1996-97 100.4 115.4 30.4
1997-98 76.6 72.8 21.2
1998-99 76.5 83.8 30.0
1999-00 56.0 60.8 31.5
2000-01 56.0 n.a. 39.0
Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues a Data for EnergyAustralia prior to the year 1994-95 were only an estimate of the returns that
EnergyAustralia may have earned had it been in existence. The figures were calculated using the earnings
and total asset values of Sydney Electricity and Shortland/Orion Energy. b EnergyAustralia incurred a large
abnormal expense in 1995-96 associated with the restructuring of the NSW distribution businesses. Abnormal
expenses are included in the calculation of dividend payout ratios, creating a large negative dividend payout
ratio in 1995-96. c Estimates of dividend payout ratios for Great Southern Energy in the years prior to 1995-96
could not be made as data for its predecessor organisations were unavailable. d Data prior to 1994-95 were
unavailable because SECWA, Western Power’s predecessor organisation, did not publish separate data for its
electricity and gas services. n.a. Not available.
Sources: EnergyAustralia (2001); PC (2000; 2001a); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); Western Power
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Table A2.11 Dividend to equity ratio — selected NSW retailers and Western
Power (WA)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
NSW
EnergyAustraliaa Great Southern Energyb Western Powerc
1990-91 20.9 n.a. n.a.
1991-92 6.0 n.a. n.a.
1992-93 3.1 n.a. n.a.
1993-94 2.2 n.a. n.a.
1994-95 2.1 n.a. 0.0
1995-96 2.1 1.0 4.0
1996-97 13.1 7.8 4.3
1997-98 11.5 11.6 3.8
1998-99 8.7 10.9 4.5
1999-00 10.9 9 4.1
2000-01 10.9 n.a. 6.1
Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. a Data for EnergyAustralia prior to the year 1994-95
were only an estimate of the returns that EnergyAustralia may have earned had it been in existence. The
figures were calculated using the earnings and total asset values of Sydney Electricity and Shortland/Orion
Energy. b Estimates of dividend to equity ratios for Great Southern Energy in the years prior to 1995-96 could
not be made as data for its predecessor organisations were unavailable. c Data prior to 1994-95 were
unavailable because SECWA, Western Power’s predecessor organisation, did not publish separate data for its
electricity and gas services. n.a. Not available.




•   In most capital cities, real average metropolitan household gas prices were higher in
2000-01 than they were in 1990-91. The exceptions were Perth and Brisbane.
•   Increases in real gas prices added to overall household expenditure. As a
proportion of total household expenditure, the increases were most significant for
those households in the lowest income bracket. The real increase in household
expenditure across all capital cities where natural gas was available in 2000-01 was
about $36 million.
•   Victoria and WA were examined as case studies. In WA, real household prices
declined in metropolitan areas but rose elsewhere. In Victoria, real household prices
were higher in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in 2000-01 compared with
1990-91.
•   In Victoria, where pensioners receive a concession on gas bills, real price trends
were similar for both concession and non-concession households.
•   Real prices for business tariff customers in Victoria and WA have declined by
between 4 per cent and 25 per cent. Prices for small business in non-metropolitan
WA, increased by around 5 per cent over the study period.
•   Real average prices for (mainly large) business contract customers, also appear to
have declined in Victoria and WA. The trends for individual contract customers will
depend on the extent of their unique transmission, distribution and retail charges.
•   In the case studies, there was no clear evidence to suggest that changes in real
household and business prices have been influenced by changes to quality of
service. Nor was there evidence of unsatisfactory financial performance by gas
utilities.
Not all households in Australia are connected to natural gas. This reflects the
historical development of transmission and distribution networks in each State and
cost factors that work against gas distribution in less densely populated areas. By
1999-2000, around 47 per cent of Australian households were connected to natural
gas. The proportion of households connected and the consumption of natural gas perINFRASTRUCTURE
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household varies between jurisdictions.1 For example, in 1999-2000, about 85 per
cent of households in Victoria were connected to natural gas and consumed on
average 60 GJ per year. In Queensland, around 10 per cent of households were
connected and consumed on average 13 GJ per year (AGA 2001).
In this chapter, trends in real prices paid by household customers for gas services
are presented for the period 1990-91 to 2000-01. Their impact on household
expenditure for a range of income groups is also examined.
Price trends were compared for metropolitan and non-metropolitan customers,
households and different-sized business customers, and for concession and
non-concession customers.
Quality of service measures were examined to determine whether any declines in
real prices over the study period have been associated with lower service quality.
Finally, the financial performance of the case study utilities was examined to see if
price declines have been associated with falling rates of return.
3.1 Industry  reforms
Historically, natural gas has been produced by private businesses and supplied by
geographically based, vertically integrated utilities, with little interstate trading.
Governments have been involved in regulating all parts of the gas supply chain in
all jurisdictions (IC 1995).
In the past, government ownership of gas assets has varied across jurisdictions. In
some jurisdictions, government-owned utilities controlled transmission pipelines,
distribution networks and retail businesses. In others, governments had no direct
involvement.
Reform of the gas industry was initiated by the Council of Australian Governments
(CoAG) in 1994. The CoAG members made a commitment to ‘free and fair trade in
natural gas’ with three specific objectives:
•   remove policy and regulatory impediments to retail competition;
•   remove restrictions on interstate trade; and
                                             
1 There is no natural gas distribution system in Tasmania, and gas consumption is from bottled
liquefied petroleum gas. In the Northern Territory, a small number of household customers in
Alice Springs and business customers in Alice Springs and Darwin are supplied by natural gas.GAS 49
•   develop a nationally integrated and competitive natural gas market by
establishing a national regulatory framework for third party access to natural gas
pipelines and facilitating the interconnection of pipeline systems (Calvert 1998).
The CoAG commitment included an agreement to corporatise government-owned
gas utilities. Where government-owned transmission and distribution activities were
vertically integrated, these were to be separated with the introduction of legislation
to ‘ring fence’ transmission and distribution activities.2
An outcome of gas reforms has been the accelerated expansion of natural gas
networks into non-metropolitan areas (PC 1999a). For example, the Mildura region
in north-west Victoria was connected to natural gas transported from SA in 1999
(ORG 2000a).
Structural reforms have resulted in changes in employment levels and work
practices in the industry. Between 1992 and 1997, the six major gas distributors
reduced their workforce by more than 3400 employees (PC 1999a). The loss of
direct employment in the industry was offset to some extent by greater contracting
out of services by the gas utilities. Cost savings brought about by downsizing and
contracting out reduce the final prices paid by customers.
Market reforms
Following on from the 1994 CoAG agreement, a further agreement in 1997 set out:
•   a uniform national framework (national access code) for access to natural gas
transmission and distribution pipelines;
•   timetables for the phase-in of competition, and other transitional arrangements
and derogations agreed among jurisdictions; and
•   agreed franchising and licensing principles (NCC 2001a).
Legislation giving effect to the nationalaccess code has been passed in each of the
States and Territories that have reticulated natural gas.
Structural reform and ownership changes in each jurisdiction have varied,
depending in part on the initial extent of government involvement. In the last
decade, several transmission pipelines have been sold by governments to the private
sector and distribution activities have been either ‘ring fenced’ from retail
businesses or operated as separate businesses.
                                             
2 ‘Ring fencing’ involves separating the elements or activities of an integrated business that are




Governments have phased in competition in the retailing of gas, starting with the
largest businesses. By December 2001, only large consumers of gas could choose
their retailer in most jurisdictions.3
The prices paid by customers not able to choose their retailer (principally small
business and household customers), have remained subject to regulation by State
and Territory Governments, or State-based independent regulators.
In 1990-91, increases in the price of natural gas to customers generally required
government approval. For example, price increases for gas customers in Queensland
required ministerial approval (Gas Industry Act 1965 (Qld)). An exception was
NSW, where the Gas Council used a price control formula based on changes in the
consumer price index (CPI) and efficiency incentives to limit price increases (Gas
Council of New South Wales 1995).
In 2000-01, ministerial approval for gas price increases was still required in SA,
WA and Queensland. However, State-based independent price regulators have set
maximum prices for customers in NSW since 1997, in Victoria since 1999 and in
the ACT since 2001.
The prices charged for the use of transmission pipelines are now mostly regulated
by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Prices charged
for access to distribution networks are mainly regulated by State-based regulators
(AGA 2001).4
Tariff reforms
Gas tariffs are typically made up of access charges and usage charges. In 1990-91,
there were no fixed access charges, although in some jurisdictions a minimum
charge was levied. However, by 2000-01, natural gas retailers in NSW, WA,
Victoria and Queensland had replaced minimum charges and introduced fixed
access charges.
The access charge covers the cost of connecting and maintaining a customer’s
connection to the gas network. The access charge is independent of the amount of
gas used.
                                             
3 At 1 July 2001, the threshold annual level of consumption for retail choice was 1 TJ in Victoria
and the ACT, 10 TJ in NSW and 100 TJ in WA. All non household customers in SA were able
to choose their retailer in July 2000. No customers in Queensland could choose their retailer
(AGA 2001).
4 Transmission pipelines in WA are regulated by the Office of Gas Access Regulation. The
distribution network in the Northern Territory is regulated by the ACCC.GAS 51
Over the study period, all household and business tariffs incorporated ‘block tariff’
usage charges. Generally, under a block tariff, unit charges for amounts consumed
above a threshold level (or levels) fall. In Victoria in 1998-99, a seasonal
component to unit charges was introduced, with higher unit charges applying
between June and September.
There have also been several reforms to the structure of usage charges in most
jurisdictions since 1990-91. Some of these reforms reflect a rebalancing of tariffs
between different types of customers. Tariff rebalancing between customer classes
has been undertaken so that tariffs are more reflective of the costs of supplying
different customer types and the price sensitivity of their demand.
3.2  Price outcomes for metropolitan households
In constructing its capital city price series for gas, the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS) developed a household price index using the retail prices charged
by the incumbent supplier. In most capital cities, there is only one supplier to
household users. However, additional suppliers are included by the ABS if they
supply a significant quantity of gas.5
The Goods and Services Tax (GST) introduced in July 2000 was included in the
nominal household price series for 2000-01 because households incur the full cost
of this tax.
Real gas prices increased in most Australian capital cities over the study period
(see figure 3.1).6 In Adelaide and Canberra, they increased by 15 per cent. Real
prices increased by 5 per cent in Sydney and 3 per cent in Melbourne. Metropolitan
prices in Perth and Brisbane decreased in real terms, falling by 10 and 7 per cent
respectively.
                                             
5 In Melbourne, gas is supplied to household customers by TXU Retail, Origin Energy and Pulse
Energy. Each utility supplies a separate geographical area. The ABS may use prices applying to
different consumption levels in capital cities where several tariffs are offered or where there are
different usage patterns.
6 The ABS CPI index for gas includes changes in the price of natural gas and bottled gas. In
2000-01, the composition of the CPI was revised and ‘other household fuels’, such as wood and
kerosene were combined with gas (ABS 2000c). However, this change is likely to have a small
effect on the price series as gas accounts for around 80 per cent of the combined category.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
Note The real price index for each capital city was obtained by rebasing the CPI (gas) price indexes to a base
year of 1990-91 and then deflating the rebased indexes by the rebased CPI (All groups) price index for each
capital city. The CPI (gas) price indexes for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services and Tax. Other
household fuels (such as wood and kerosene) were included in the gas CPI index with the introduction of the
14
th CPI series in September 2000. As a result, prices for 2000-01 are not directly comparable with previous
years.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).GAS 53
Real prices trended up in all capital cities between 1999-2000 and 2000-01, largely
because the introduction of the GST increased the price of gas by more than the
CPI.7
In Hobart and Darwin, where gas consumption is drawn from bottled rather than
reticulated natural gas, the increases in real gas prices reflect an increase in world
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) prices.8
The sharp rise in gas prices in Melbourne in 1993-94 was the result of a 10 per cent
increase in gas tariff unit prices. The rate of increase of gas prices in Melbourne
declined after 1997-98 following the January 1999 Victorian Gas Industry Tariff
Order. Part of the decline may also be due to changes implemented by the ABS in
conducting the CPI survey.9
Increases in the rate of price rises in Canberra and Sydney since 1994-95 are due to
a change in the price regulation formula used in both jurisdictions. Under the
changes, a higher proportion of CPI increases were passed through into gas prices.
The decline in the rate of real price increases in both cities in 1999-2000 was due to
a 15 per cent reduction in unit charges.
Implications for household expenditure
Gas prices have a direct effect on household expenditure. They also have an indirect
effect when changes in gas prices paid by businesses, are passed on to customers in
the form of higher or lower prices for final products and services. These indirect
effects will be examined in a forthcoming Productivity Commission research study.
The direct impact of changes in the price of gas over the decade on real household
expenditure in 2000-01, was estimated. This was done by multiplying the actual
                                             
7 Gas utilities passed on to customers part of the GST from July 2000, depending on the extent of
cost savings, additional expenditure and cash flow benefits associated with the introduction of
the new tax system. In all jurisdictions, gas charges increased by almost 10  per  cent. For
example, in Victoria, the Office of the Regulator-General determined that gas prices would
increase by between 9.86 per cent and 10 per cent (ORG 2000b). The increase in the CPI from
June 2000 to June 2001, was 6.1 per cent (ABS 2001a).
8 LPG is a traded good and its price is based on supply and demand conditions in foreign
markets. Over the period 1996-97 to 2000-01, the world LPG price increased by over
200 per cent (APL 2001).
9 The introduction of the 13th series CPI by the ABS expanded population coverage beyond
wage and salary earners to include all private households. As a result, an energy concession
paid to eligible pensioners (the Winter Energy Concession) had to be factored into the CPI. The
effect was an apparent fall in the average price of gas paid by Victorian households (ABS,
Melbourne, pers. comm., 18 September 2001).INFRASTRUCTURE
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household expenditure on gas in 2000-01, by the difference between the movement
in its price over the ten years to 2000-01 and the movement in the CPI over the
same ten year period. For this calculation, the impact of price changes on
consumption was ignored.
In 2000-01, total expenditure by capital city households on gas was around
$1.2 billion.10
Gas price changes were such that prices generally increased faster than the CPI (All
groups) in all capital cities except Perth and Brisbane.
The expenditure change in 2000-01 arising from price changes over the previous
decade and measured in dollars per household, was largest for households in the
highest income quintile (see table 3.1). However, the changes were more
significant, when measured as a percentage of household expenditure per year, for
most households in the lowest income quintile (see table 3.2).
Table 3.1 Real changes to household gas expenditure arising from price
changes over the previous decade, by income quintile
$ per capital city household, 2000-01
Income
quintile
Sydney Melbourne Brisbanea Adelaide Perth Canberraa
Lowest 20% 3.48 11.70 -3.09 24.72 -22.53 28.69
Second 4.70 13.14 -1.78 36.36 -23.71 30.93
Third 6.31 15.06 -2.67 41.89 -25.95 43.47
Fourth 6.91 15.50 -2.71 42.71 -34.20 29.12
Highest 20% 7.28 19.08 -3.87 38.90 -35.38 59.98
All households 5.96 15.28 -2.78 36.07 -28.42 40.37
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease in gas expenditure because real prices
declined over the period. Gas expenditure relates to mains gas consumption only. As a result, Hobart and
Darwin are excluded. a The expenditure changes for some income quintiles in Brisbane and Canberra, include
calculations using estimates that are statistically unreliable and should be interpreted with care.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat no. 6535.0).
                                             
10 Actual household expenditure in 2000-01 was derived by taking the proportion of total
household expenditure that was spent on gas by households in the 1998-99 Household
Expenditure Survey (ABS 2000a). That proportion or expenditure weight was then multiplied
by total household expenditure in 1998-99 and inflated to 2000-01 prices using the CPI
deflator, to obtain an estimate of actual household expenditure on gas in 2000-01.GAS 55
Table 3.2 Real changes to household gas expenditure arising from price
changes over the previous decade, as a proportion of total
expenditure
Per cent per capital city household, 2000-01
Income
quintile
Sydney Melbourne Brisbanea Adelaide Perth Canberraa
Lowest 20% 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.15 -0.11 0.18
Second 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.15 -0.09 0.11
Third 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.11
Fourth 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.09 -0.07 0.06
Highest 20% 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.08
All households 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.10 -0.07 0.08
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease in gas expenditure because real prices
declined over the period. Gas expenditure relates to mains gas consumption only. As a result, Hobart and
Darwin are excluded. a The expenditure changes for some income quintiles in Brisbane and Canberra, include
calculations using estimates that are statistically unreliable and should be interpreted with care.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat no. 6535.0).
The real increase in household gas expenditure across all capitals was
approximately $36 million in 2000-01 (see table 3.3). The largest decrease was for
households in Perth (approximately $13 million per year) and the largest increase
for households in Melbourne (approximately $20 million).
Table 3.3 Total change to household gas expenditure arising from price
changes over the previous decade
Capital city households, 2000-01
Households Change per household Total change
No. $ $
Sydney   1 507 189 5.96 8 986 933
Melbourne   1 330 406 15.28 20 334 201
Brisbane      549 387 -2.78 -1 529 344
Adelaide      436 065 36.07 15 726 892
Perth      456 010 -28.42 -12 961 160
Hobart        89 751 n.r. n.r.
Darwin        38 530 n.r. n.r.
Canberra      125 561 40.37 5 068 838
Totala   4 532 899 35 626 360
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease in gas expenditure because real prices
declined over the period. Household numbers in each capital city were calculated by multiplying the proportion
of households in each capital city as reported in the ABS (1996) by the total number of capital city households
reported ABS (2000a). a Excludes Hobart and Darwin. n.r. Not relevant.
Sources: ABS (The Australian Consumer Price Index: Concepts, Sources and Methods, Cat no. 6461.0);
ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat no. 6535.0).INFRASTRUCTURE
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3.3 Price  variations
Utilities in Victoria and WA were selected as case studies to illustrate how prices
have varied according to customer location and eligibility for concessions, and also
how business prices have trended over the study period. The utilities examined were
TXU Retail in Victoria and AlintaGas in WA.
In Victoria, TXU Retail supplied gas to around 423 000 household customers and
13 000 business customers in 2000. The other gas retailers, Origin Energy and Pulse
Energy, supply the remaining 993 000 household customers and 26 000 business
customers in the State (ORG 2001). Household consumption accounts for around
half of total sales in Victoria (AGA 2001). Business gas consumption is dominated
by a relatively small number of customers, with around 145 businesses in Victoria
accounting for around 37 per cent of total gas sales (ORG 2001).
In WA, AlintaGas supplied gas to around 416 000 households and 7800 business
customers in 1999-2000. Household consumption accounts for a relatively small
share of sales, with the largest 250 business contract customers consuming around
82 per cent of total sales, with the remaining business tariff customers accounting
for 3 per cent (AlintaGas 2000).11
In order to present prices over a 10 year period, prices for predecessor utilities were
used. Until 1997 in Victoria, the operations of TXU Retail were part of Gascor, a
government-owned utility that distributed and retailed natural gas.12 Gascor’s prices
were used between 1990-91 and 1997-98. In WA, the gas operations of the State
Energy Commission of Western Australia (SECWA) were assumed by AlintaGas in
1995. The prices charged by SECWA were used between the period 1990-91 to
1995-96.
Price trends over the study period are not directly comparable between utilities
because of the different environments in which gas utilities operate. There are a
range of cost factors that affects costs and, hence, prices, over which utilities have
little control. For example, the length of gas transmission pipeline, the number of
customers per kilometre of gas distribution mains and the density of consumption
that can affect prices relative to other utilities.
                                             
11 AlintaGas sales account for around 22 per cent of gas sold to domestic customers in the State
(PC estimates based on AGA 2001 and AlintaGas 2000). The remaining share is sold directly
by producers to customers, with around 42 per cent of gas being used in the generation of
electricity (Office of Energy 2001).
12 The Gas and Fuel Corporation was disaggregated in December 1994. Transmission activities
were undertaken by the Gas Transmission Corporation. Gascor was responsible for the
distribution and retail of natural gas.GAS 57
Location
Real household price indexes for metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas of
Victoria and WA were constructed using a representative household consumption
bundle for each jurisdiction. The level of consumption differs, reflecting the higher
average household consumption in Victoria because of the climate and higher
penetration of gas space heating and water heating compared with
WA (AGO 2001).
The price indexes for Victoria were based on an average annual consumption of
57.8  GJ, while 18.4  GJ was used in WA. These consumption quantities are the
geometric mean of the level of household consumption in Victoria and WA at the
beginning and end of the study period.13 In Victoria, average annual household
consumption increased from 55.6 GJ in 1990-91 to 60.0 GJ in 2000-01, while, in
WA, consumption remained stable around 18 GJ.
In both cases it was assumed that 55 per cent of annual gas consumption occurred
during the period June to September.14
Price trends for metropolitan household consumers were calculated using published
tariff schedules and the consumption bundles described above. The calculated
trends may differ from the real price trends for the gas component of the CPI as
reported in figure 3.1. For reasons of confidentiality, the ABS does not reveal all the
data used in its calculations.
Differences between the ABS and the approach used in this section would be due to
the ABS sampling methodology used for the CPI. This may result in several
scenarios of consumption being included in estimates for one utility or, where a city
is serviced by more than one utility, the inclusion of prices for several utilities in the
sample.15 Timing differences between the two series may also explain part of the
difference, because prices are recorded in June each year for the CPI (see
figure 3.1), whereas prices calculated using tariff rates incorporate price changes as
they occurred through each year in calculating an annual price change.16
                                             
13 Due to the widespread use of gas for heating appliances, consumption can vary from
year-to-year depending on weather conditions.
14 This is consistent with methodology used by the Office of the Regulator-General in its analysis
of household prices in Victoria (ORG 2001).
15 For example, since 1996-97 gas customers in Melbourne have been served by three gas retailers
operating in separate geographic areas of the city.
16 The ABS CPI survey is conducted quarterly. In this study, only price index observations for
each June quarter were used.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Household customers serviced by TXU Retail pay uniform tariff rates, and
therefore, prices do not vary between metropolitan and non-metropolitan locations.
Real household prices charged by TXU Retail and its predecessors have increased
by around 5 per cent over the ten year study period (see figure 3.2).
































Note Real price indexes were calculated using the tariff applicable to average annual consumption of 57.8 GJ.
Consumption during the winter months June to September was assumed to be 55 per cent of annual
consumption. Tariffs were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Melbourne. The nominal price series for
2000-01 includes the Goods and Services Tax. Prior to January 1999, prices were based on Gas and Fuel
Corporation tariffs.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index,  Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Victoria
Government Gazette (1997 and previous issues); Victoria Government Gazette (1998).
In WA, real prices for metropolitan customers declined by 7 per cent over the study
period. Pricing policies differed between regions.17 In Albany (non-metropolitan),
real prices in 2000-01 were similar to those paid in 1990-91 (see figure 3.3). The
real price trend for metropolitan households was similar to that observed for Perth
using the ABS CPI series (see figure 3.1).
                                             
17 Non-metropolitan prices apply to customers in Albany and in Kalgoorlie-Boulder. Supply of
natural gas to Kalgoorlie-Boulder commenced in 1997. Customers in other non-metropolitan
areas such as Geraldton and Bunbury are charged the same rates as customers in Perth.GAS 59
































Note Real price indexes were calculated using the tariff applicable to the customer’s location and an average
annual consumption of 18.4 GJ. Consumption during the months June to September was assumed to be
55 per cent of annual consumption. Prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Perth. The nominal price
series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax. Prior to 1996-97, prices were based on State Energy
Commission of Western Australia tariffs. Separate prices apply to customers in Albany and
Kalgoorlie-Boulder. Supply of natural gas to Kalgoorlie-Boulder commenced in 1997. Customers in other
non-metropolitan areas such as Geraldton and Bunbury are charged the same rates as customers in Perth.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index,  Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); WA
Government Gazette (2000 and previous issues); Western Power Perth, pers. comm., 7 August 2001.
Concessions
In WA, there is no tariff concession available for household gas customers.
In Victoria, the Department of Human Services (DHS) administers a gas concession
program. The concession provides eligible customers with a discount of
17.5 per cent for three gas bills and two electricity bills issued between mid-May
and mid-November (DHS 2001). Eligibility for the concession is restricted to
holders of Pensioner Concession Cards, Health Care Cards and Gold Cards.
Since 1990-91, real price changes experienced by concession holders in Victoria
have been similar to non-concession holders. The real value of the concession wasINFRASTRUCTURE
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around $41 per year in 1990-91, based on annual gas consumption of 57.8 GJ.18 A
rise in the rebate from 15 per cent to 17.5 per cent in 1993-94 increased the real
value of the rebate to $53 per year. Since then, the real value of the rebate steadily
declined to $45 per year in 2000-01.
Business prices
Natural gas in Australia is used for the generation of electricity, in petroleum
refining and as an energy source for business and household customers. In
1999-2000, around 40 per cent of gas available for domestic consumption was used
in electricity generation (Dickson et al 2001). The share of gas as a fuel in
electricity generation in each jurisdiction varied from 1  per  cent in NSW to
51 per cent in WA (Office of Energy 2001).
Business customers consume around 78 per cent of domestic gas not consumed in
electricity generation. Household customers account for most of the remainder.
However, within each State and Territory, the share of gas sold to business
(commercial and industrial) customers varies. For example, business customers in
WA account for a greater share of gas consumed than in Victoria (see figure 3.4).
Historically, gas prices for businesses using relatively small quantities of gas, were
determined by published tariffs. Larger businesses negotiated prices under
long-term contracts with utilities.19 The largest industrial gas consumers have been
able to purchase gas directly from producers and may not be gas utility customers.
In 1999-2000, direct purchases of gas by businesses (including electricity
generation) from producers, accounted for around 11 per cent of total gas sales in
Victoria and 78 per cent in WA (AGA 2001).20
                                             
18 The real value of the concession changes in direct proportion to the quantity of gas consumed.
For example, if concession holders consume 46.2  GJ, or 20 per cent less than average
consumption, the real value of the concession is 20 per cent less than its value at the average
consumption level of 57.8 GJ.
19 In Victoria, customers using more than 10 000 GJ per year were typically ‘contract’ customers,
that negotiated prices with Gascor rather than paying tariff rates (SCNPMGTE 1993).
20 In 1990-91, direct sales accounted for 19 per cent of total sales in Victoria and 20 per cent in
WA. The increase to 78 per cent in WA by 1999-2000, is largely due to the unbundling of gas
supply contracts in 1995, following the disaggregation of SECWA, and the choice of supplier
that large gas business customers have had since 1997 (ACIL Consulting 1999). The decrease
to 11 per cent in the direct sales share of total sales in Victoria, is due to limited opportunities
for the main producer to sell directly to businesses (VAGO 1997).GAS 61
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Data source: PC estimates based on Office of Energy (2001) and AGA (2001).
Business tariff customers
Two levels of gas consumption were used to construct real price indexes over the
study period for business tariff customers in Victoria and WA. Annual consumption
of 500 GJ was used to construct an index of prices for small business customers,
and 10 000 GJ for medium sized businesses.21
The GST was excluded from the nominal price series for business customers
because businesses are able to claim a GST rebate on their inputs. However, GST is
included in the CPI (All groups) index used to deflate nominal prices to real prices.
In Victoria, real prices for small businesses fell by around 25 per cent over the study
period (see figure 3.5). Medium sized business prices declined by 20 per cent.
                                             
21 These two consumption levels equate to average annual gas bills in Victoria in 2000-01 of
around $4 500 for a small business such as a small restaurant, and $50 000 for a medium sized
business such as a bakery (ISR 2001 and ORG 2001). In Victoria, there were approximately
39 000 non household customers in 1999 (ORG 2000a). Around 30 000 consumed less than
500  GJ per year, and around 8  000 consumed between 500 GJ and 10  000 GJ per year
(ORG 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Metropolitan and non-metropolitan medium business Metropolitan and non-metropolitan small business
Note Price indexes were calculated using an annual consumption level of 500 GJ for a small business and
10 000 GJ for a medium sized business. The pattern of consumption is assumed to be uniform throughout the
year. Prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Melbourne. The nominal price series for 2000-01
exclude the Goods and Services Tax. Business prices do not vary between metropolitan and non-metropolitan
areas because uniform tariffs apply throughout TXU Retail’s franchise area. Prior to January 1999, prices
were based on Gas and Fuel Corporation tariffs.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index,  Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Victoria
Government Gazette (1997 and previous issues); Victoria Government Gazette (1998).
Victorian business prices did not vary between metropolitan and non-metropolitan
areas because uniform business tariffs apply across all of TXU Retail’s service area.
The decline in prices since 1997-98 was mainly due to lower gas usage charges
under the Victorian Gas Industry Tariff Order from January 1999.
In WA, real prices for metropolitan small and medium sized businesses fell by
4 per cent and 10 per cent respectively over the study period (see figure 3.6). In
contrast, real prices for non-metropolitan small and medium sized business in
Albany increased 6 per cent and 9 per cent respectively.22
                                             
22 Non-metropolitan prices apply to customers in Albany and Kalgoorlie-Boulder. Customers in
other non-metropolitan areas such as Geraldton and Bunbury, are charged the same rates as
customers in Perth.GAS 63































Metropolitan medium business Metropolitan small business
Non-metropolitan medium business Non-metropolitan small business
Note Price indexes were calculated using an annual consumption level of 500 GJ for a small business and
10 000 GJ for a medium sized business. The pattern of consumption is assumed to be uniform throughout the
year. Prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Perth. The nominal price series for 2000-01 exclude the
Goods and Services Tax. Prior to 1996-97, prices were based on State Energy Commission of Western
Australia tariffs. Non-metropolitan prices apply to customers in Albany. Customers in other areas such as
Geraldton and Bunbury are charged the same rates as customers in Perth.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index,  Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); WA
Government Gazette (2000 and previous issues); Western Power Perth, pers. comm., 7 August 2001.
For business tariff customers in Victoria, real price falls over the period since
1990-91 resulted in a decline in 2000-01 business costs of around $1000 on an
annual bill of $4400 for customers consuming 500 GJ. For a business consuming
10  000 GJ, the real price reduction is equal to a reduction in business costs of
around $11 000 on an annual bill of $51 000.
The reductions in costs for business tariff customers was estimated to be in the
order of $51  million in 2000-01. This estimate involved multiplying the cost
reduction per GJ by the quantity of gas consumed. Average levels of consumption
and unit tariff schedule prices for five consumption ranges up to annual gas
consumption of 10  000 GJ were used. For this calculation, the impact of price
changes on consumption was ignored.
In WA, the real price changes for business tariff customers were smaller than for
Victoria, and equated to a business cost saving of around $460 on an annual bill ofINFRASTRUCTURE
PRICE TRENDS
64
$7800 for a business consuming 500  GJ in 2000-01. For a business consuming
10 000 GJ, the annual real price reduction was equal to a business cost reduction of
around $13 000 on an annual bill of $148 000.
Business contract customers
The prices paid by gas customers typically comprise of several components related
to the activities undertaken to deliver gas to a customer’s premises. These include
charges for the extraction and processing of gas, transmission at high pressure from
processing plants to distribution points, distribution at lower pressures to a
customer’s premises, and retail charges.
For household and business tariff customers, these separate components are
generally combined. However, for most business contract customers they are
separately identified. Transmission and distribution prices are mostly regulated and
based on the supply characteristics of each business, including location and peak
demand. Prices for the other components — extraction, processing and retail — are
negotiated.
Information on the components and overall level of contract gas prices is
commercially sensitive and was unavailable. However, it is possible to derive
information on price trends to metropolitan distribution points, which includes
prices for production, processing and transmission charges. Distribution and retail
charges are however, excluded from these (city-gate) prices.
Trends in average real city-gate gas prices, suggest that on average, real prices have
fallen significantly in WA since 1990-91 and declined in Victoria after 1993-94
(see figure 3.7).
In WA, where transmission charges account for around 30 per cent of the average
city-gate price of gas, around 70 per cent of the reduction in average real city-gate
prices between 1990-91 and 1998-99 was due to a fall in transmission charges. The
remainder was due to a reduction in production and processing charges (AGA 2001
and previous issues).
In Victoria, where transmission charges account for around 15 per cent of the
average city-gate price of gas, an increase in transmission charges between 1993-94
and 1998-99 was more than offset by a fall in production and processing charges
since 1991-92 (AGA 2001 and previous issues).23
                                             
23 Production and processing charges in Victoria for most of the study period included a
component that was returned to the Government. Under the Public Authorities Contributions
Act 1966, Gascor was required to contribute a proportion of revenue to the VictorianGAS 65































Note Data for the years 1994-95 to 1997-98, 1999-2000 and 2000-01 were not published. Nominal city-gate
prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for each capital city. Transmission prices for Perth were assumed
to be constant in nominal terms over the period 1990-91 to 1993-94. a City-gate prices include the price of gas
from producers and the transmission price for transporting gas to the capital city distribution points. The
city-gate price excludes distribution and retail charges.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); AGA (2001 and
previous issues).
The final prices paid by contract customers varies from the city-gate price,
depending on the extent of distribution and retail charges. Some customers may also
pay different transmission charges depending on the extent to which transmission
pipelines are used to transport gas to each customer. For example, in WA, gas prices
paid by mining companies surveyed in 2001 ranged between $1.90 per GJ to $7.00
per GJ, with an average price of $4.05 per GJ (Clements and Qiang 2001).24
                                                                       
Government. This was largely due to the negotiation of low prices by the Victorian
Government under long-term contracts with gas producers (ANZ McCaughan 1992). In
1990-91, the contribution rate was equal to around $1.50 per GJ — over 60 per cent of the
city-gate price. Following the renegotiation of these supply contracts and restructuring of the
gas industry in Victoria, higher gas prices paid to producers resulted in the public authority
contribution being discontinued.
24 Distance from processing facilities is a major determinant of transport charges for transmission




Based on the trend of average city-gate prices in figure 3.7, contract customers
received significant price decreases over the study period. However, where
transmission and distribution and retail charges are significant, and these are not
reflected in figure 3.7, it may be the case that prices have increased over the study
period.
There is a further source of data that is indicative of prices paid by Victorian
contract customers. This data was collected by the Steering Committee on National
Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises until it was disbanded.
For the period 1990-91 to 1996-97, there was a significant fall in real average prices
for Victorian contract customers (see figure 3.8). Inflation accounted for most of the
fall as prices remained roughly constant in nominal terms. Since 1996-97, it is
unlikely that real prices for Victorian contract business customers have increased,
because the gas price for contract customers was adjusted annually for movements
in the CPI (VAGO 1997).































Commercial contract Industrial contract
Note  Data after 1996-97 are unavailable. Nominal average prices for commercial contract and industrial
contract customers collected by the Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government
Trading Enterprises (SCNPMGTE) were deflated by the CPI (All groups) index for Melbourne. Information
provided to the SCNPMGTE did not disclose the definition of commercial or industrial customers.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); SCNPMGTE
(1998 and previous issues).GAS 67
The ABS collected real gas price trends for manufacturers around Australia for the
study period. This data indicates that real prices remained stable over most of the
period (see figure 3.9). There were significant price increases to several
manufacturers included in the ABS survey upon the renegotiation of supply
contracts in 1999-2000, when real prices increased by around 12 per cent compared
to the previous year (ABS pers. comm., 9 October 2001). By 2000-01, real gas
prices were 20 per cent higher than 1990-91 (ABS 2001b).
































Note The real gas price index for manufacturing businesses is calculated by dividing the nominal index for gas
prices by the nominal index of the weighted average of all prices for materials used by manufacturing
businesses. The nominal index for 2000-01 excludes the Goods and Services Tax.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); ABS (Price
Index of Materials Used in the Manufacturing Industry, Cat. no. 6411.0).
The trend in natural gas prices for manufacturers is different to trends calculated for
tariff customers and those presented for contract customers. The ABS uses
‘judgement samples’ to select respondents to the survey (ABS 1995). As a result,
price trends may not be representative of all businesses. Price movements for




The value of changes to real prices for business tariff customers is difficult to
determine because the price paid by customers varies depending on location and, for
the largest industrial customers, consumption characteristics.
Electricity generation customers
In WA, gas accounts for around 50 per cent of fuel used in electricity generation.
This represented over 40 per cent of gas sold for domestic consumption in WA in
1999-2000 (see figure 3.4) (Office of Energy 2001). In Victoria, gas is less
significant as a fuel for electricity generation, accounting for 2 per cent of fuel used
in electricity generation, and equal to around 15 per cent of State gas production in
1999-2000 (AGA 2001).
Price trends for natural gas used in electricity generation may affect the price of
electricity. Information on these price trends was not available. The long-term
nature of gas supply contracts for electricity generators (and also other large
contract customers), means that price trends faced by individual customers may be
different to the trend in average city-gate prices discussed previously and which
other contract customers appear to have experienced over the study period.
Factors affecting price trends
Price trends may not solely reflect performance within gas utilities. There are
factors outside the control of utilities affecting prices. These include production and
processing charges from gas producers, royalties to government on revenue earned
by producers, and transmission and distribution charges where these activities are
not part of a utility’s operations.
In Victoria, part of the increase in real gas prices to households in the early 1990s
was related to a 20  per cent increase in producer prices under a renegotiated
contract with suppliers (Gas and Fuel 1993).
In WA, changes to production charges and royalties had only a small effect on
prices. Production and processing charges account for around 15 per cent of the
final prices charged by AlintaGas to household and business tariff customers.
Royalties on gas produced comprise less than 1 per cent.
Governments have also directly intervened to influence prices charged to customers
in some years over the study period. For example, real prices to household and
business tariff customers in Victoria increased in the early 1990s as a result of
government approved increases in nominal tariff prices. Subsequent price capsGAS 69
imposed by the Victorian Government on tariff rates in January 1999 resulted in
real prices to household and business tariff customers declining.
In WA, the government fixed prices for the main transmission pipeline at a
declining rate following the sale of the pipeline to the private sector in 1998.
Between 1998 and 2000, transmission prices to Perth declined by 20 per cent in real
terms (AlintaGas 2001a), contributing to the 4 per cent real decline in household
prices over this time.
3.4 Service  quality
Quality of service was examined to see if price trends might be explained by
changes in the quality and reliability of services. Lower prices can be achieved by
lowering expenditure below that required to maintain service standards. However,
lower service standards may take some time to manifest themselves.
Poor quality of service may impose costs on customers as it can result in lost
production, damaged equipment, unreliability of supply or inconvenience.
Reliability of service is the primary focus of quality of service monitoring — that is,
the ability of a distribution network to deliver natural gas to all points of
consumption. Common indicators used to measure supply reliability for customers
include the average number of interruptions per customer and the average duration
of interruptions per customer. These indicators relate to the average level of
reliability for the network overall and may not reflect the number and duration of
interruptions in particular parts of the gas distribution network.
Supply reliability for the case study utilities is expressed as unplanned interruptions
per 1 000 customers and average duration of interruptions. The data indicate that
supply reliability varied from year-to-year over the study period for gas utilities in
Victoria and WA (see figures 3.10 and 3.11).25 There is no clear evidence to
suggest that changes in real household and business prices have been influenced by
changes to quality of service.
                                             
25 A continuous series for reliability of service for customers now served by TXU Retail in
Victoria was unavailable. Since 1999, the Office of the Regulator-General has monitored the
reliability of Victorian distributors using different indicators. These suggest that the reliability
of supply in the TXU service territory in terms of frequency of interruptions and duration of
interruptions remained stable in 1999 and 2000 (ORG 2001).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Note Data for the years 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-01 is unavailable as Gascor was separated into three
separate distribution businesses. Since 1999, the Office of the Regulator-General has monitored the reliability
of Victorian distributors using different indicators. These suggest that reliability of supply in the TXU service
territory in terms of frequency of interruptions and duration of interruptions remained stable in 1999 and 2000.
Data sources: AGA (2001); ORG (2001); SCNPMGTE(1998 and previous issues).GAS 71























































Note Average duration in 1995-96 was significantly affected by a major incident, causing water to enter the
gas system. If this interruption is excluded, average duration falls to 36 seconds. Data prior to 1995-96 relate
to the gas operations of the State Energy Commission of Western Australia, assumed by AlintaGas in January
1995. Data for 1990-91 and 1991-92 (for interruptions per ‘000 customers) was not collected by the Steering
Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises. Data for 1999-2000 (for
average duration of interruptions) and 2000-01 was unavailable.
Data sources: AGA (2001); AlintaGas (2001b and previous issues); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).INFRASTRUCTURE
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There may be a lag before discernible declines in quality of service become
apparent. Quality of service problems sometimes only begin to manifest themselves
as assets age and poor maintenance leads to deterioration in these assets.
Consequently, investments in the maintenance and upgrading of supply systems
must be made to maintain, or improve upon, existing quality of service levels.
In those years where there were sharp variations in supply reliability, short-term
trends may not be indicative of changes in the condition of the gas supply network.
This is because interruptions can be the result of factors beyond a utility’s
immediate control, including third party damage to gas mains or water entering
mains due to the condition of the mains. In Victoria in 2000, the Office of Gas
Safety reported that of outages affecting more than five customers, 68 per cent were
due to third party damage and 14 per cent were the result of water entering mains
(ORG 2001).
To some extent, utilities can control the average duration of any particular
interruption because it partially depends on a utility’s response capability. This
includes the ability to isolate sections, operate and locate valves, control pressures
and the level of emergency preparedness generally (ORG 2001).
3.5 Shareholder outcomes
Each of the case study utilities — TXU Retail and AlintaGas — is now
wholly-owned by the private sector.26 As a result, the Victorian and Western
Australian Governments no longer obtain the benefits of dividend payments from
utilities, but are also not exposed to the financial risks involved in operating these
businesses.
The financial performance of the case study utilities over the period when they were
government-owned was examined to provide information on the relationship
between price trends and financial outcomes, such as the return on assets. Low
prices relative to costs may not achieve a satisfactory return on assets nor provide
sufficient revenue to maintain and replace long-lived infrastructure assets. If
services are to be maintained, the community, as owners of the utility, will have to
provide financial support in the form of subsidies. Further, low prices may affect the
viability of the business and possibly expose the community to financial risks.
The data used in calculating the shareholder outcomes presented in this section were
generally taken from two sources:
                                             
26 TXU Retail (then Kinetik Energy) was sold to Texas Utilities of Australia Pty Ltd in January
1999. The sale of AlintaGas to the private sector was finalised in October 2000.GAS 73
•   Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government
Trading Enterprises; and
•   Productivity Commission reports on Financial Performance of Government
Trading Enterprises.
There may be inconsistencies between these two data sets and the information
published in the annual reports of gas utilities. These inconsistencies arise because
of definitional differences.
Profitability
In Western Australia, as a result of structural changes following the disaggregation
of SECWA in 1995, time series data for the gas business over the whole period is
unavailable. Nevertheless, trends in return on assets over part of the study period
may indicate if real prices were set at a sufficient level to recover the full cost of the
assets used to deliver gas to customers.
During the period of government ownership of gas assets, Gascor and AlintaGas
earned a return on assets of over 10 per cent in most years (see figure 3.12). This
suggests that declining real prices for business customers and household customers
in WA, did not come at the expense of an inadequate return on assets.
Comparisons of performance over time based on indicators that include an estimate
of asset values, have to be interpreted with care. Differences in asset valuation
procedures and changes in the size of the asset base can affect the return on assets.
Over the study period, there have been significant changes in the asset values of






















Gascor AlintaGas a b
1990-91-1996-97 1994-95-2000-01
Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a Data prior to December 1994 include the transmission activities of the Gas and Fuel
Corporation. These were transferred to the Gas Transmission Corporation. In July 1997, Gascor was
disaggregated into three separate distribution businesses and three retail businesses. The last of these
businesses was sold to the private sector in March 1999. b AlintaGas was formed in 1995 after the separation
of gas and electricity businesses previously undertaken by the State Energy Commission of Western Australia
(SECWA). SECWA did not publish separate financial accounts for each business. In October 2000, the sale of
AlintaGas to the private sector was completed.
Data sources: AlintaGas (2001b and previous issues); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).
Payments to government
Publicly-owned gas utilities were often required to return some of their earnings to
their owner-governments in the form of dividend payments. This is justified on
competitive neutrality and cost recovery grounds.
Where a utility is not required to pay dividends, it has proportionately more funds
available for re-investment into its business, either for the development of new
services or the improvement of existing ones. Further, a utility need not rely on
debt-financing to the extent that its rivals must, and thus incurs lower overall
operating costs.
Each of the case study utilities was required to pay dividends to its shareholder
government. However, AlintaGas did not pay a dividend for the years 1994-95,GAS 75
1995-96 and 1996-97.27 The relative size of dividend payments is represented by
the dividend payout ratio (dividends as a proportion of profit after tax) and the
dividend to equity ratio (dividends as a proportion of average total equity).
The proportion of dividends paid by Gascor and AlintaGas under government
ownership — generally greater than 80 per cent of profit after tax and more than
20 per cent of equity (see figures 3.13 and 3.14) — appears higher than that paid by
private companies operating in the utilities sector (PC 2001a).























Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. a   Data prior to December 1994 include the transmission activities of the Gas and Fuel
Corporation. These were transferred to the Gas Transmission Corporation. In July 1997, Gascor was
disaggregated into three separate distribution businesses and three retail businesses. The last of these
businesses was sold to the private sector in March 1999. Gascor did not pay a dividend in 1996-97.
b AlintaGas did not pay a dividend in 1995-96, the first full year of operation after it was separated from the
State Energy Commission of Western Australia in January 1995. AlintaGas was sold to the private sector in
October 2000. c In 1997-98, AlintaGas’s dividend payout ratio was 5814 per cent. This reflects the payment of
a special dividend of $1 206 million following the sale of a major gas transmission pipeline to the private
sector. d In 1999-2000, AlintaGas’s dividend payout ratio was 650 per cent.
Data sources: AlintaGas (2001b and previous issues); PC (2000); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).
                                             
27 AlintaGas was formed in January 1995 following the disaggregation of SECWA.INFRASTRUCTURE
PRICE TRENDS
76
In 1999-2000, the dividend payout ratios of private sector utilities averaged around
47 per cent, and ranged between 27 to 56 per cent. The dividend to equity ratios
averaged around 5 per cent and ranged between 2 and 10 per cent.
Changes in the dividend payout ratio and dividend to equity ratios from year-to-year
may reflect the profitability of a utility. However, changes may also be due to the
effect of changes in asset values, liabilities and decisions to fund investment using
retained earnings rather than through additional shareholder equity or borrowings.























Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. a  Data prior to December 1994 include the
transmission activities of the Gas and Fuel Corporation. These were transferred to the Gas Transmission
Corporation. In July 1997, Gascor was disaggregated into three separate distribution businesses and three
retail businesses. The last of these businesses was sold to the private sector in March 1999. Gascor did not
pay a dividend in 1996-97. b AlintaGas did not pay a dividend in 1995-96, the first full year of operation after it
was separated from the State Energy Commission of Western Australia in January 1995. AlintaGas was sold
to the private sector in October 2000. c In 1997-98, AlintaGas’s dividend to equity ratio was 867 per cent. This
reflects the payment of a special dividend of $1 206 million following the sale of a major gas transmission
pipeline to the private sector.
Data sources: AlintaGas (2001b and previous issues); PC (2000); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).GAS 77
Attachment A — Data tables
Table A3.1 Real gas price trends — metropolitan households
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 100.7 103.6 98.0 101.5 101.2 99.0 100.4 97.7
1992-93 100.1 116.0 98.0 99.4 100.9 94.0 99.7 97.9
1993-94 96.2 114.0 96.1 98.9 98.8 94.6 98.4 95.9
1994-95 94.8 115.7 94.5 100.5 95.4 94.0 102.3 103.2
1995-96 96.2 111.5 91.0 98.9 91.8 97.7 100.5 103.5
1996-97 97.9 112.3 89.6 102.5 90.7 109.0 103.8 108.0
1997-98 102.6 113.9 89.1 106.3 91.0 109.7 108.3 110.5
1998-99 104.2 104.4 88.2 106.9 89.4 115.5 112.0 111.2
1999-00 99.4 98.8 86.7 108.5 87.3 139.1 117.8 108.8
2000-01 104.6 103.0 93.5 115.3 90.5 148.9 130.6 114.6
Note The real price index for each capital city was obtained by rebasing the CPI (gas) price indexes to a base
year of 1990-91 and then deflating the rebased indexes by the rebased CPI (All groups) price index for each
capital city. The CPI (gas) price indexes for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services and Tax. Other
household fuels (such as wood and kerosene) were included in the gas CPI index with the introduction of the
14
th CPI series in September 2000. As a result, prices for 2000-01 are not directly comparable with previous
years.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).
Table A3.2 Real gas price trends — households, TXU Retail (Victoria)













Note Real price indexes were calculated using the tariff applicable to average annual consumption of 57.8 GJ.
Consumption during the winter months June to September was assumed to be 55 per cent of annual
consumption. Tariffs were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Melbourne. The nominal price series for
2000-01 includes the Goods and Services Tax. Prior to January 1999, prices were based on Gas and Fuel
Corporation tariffs.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Victoria Government
Gazette (1997 and previous issues); Victoria Government Gazette (1998).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A3.3 Real gas price trends — households, AlintaGas (WA)













Note Real price indexes were calculated using the tariff applicable to the customer’s location and an average
annual consumption of 18.4 GJ. Consumption during the months June to September was assumed to be
55 per cent of annual consumption. Prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Perth. The nominal price
series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax. Prior to 1996-97, prices were based on State Energy
Commission of Western Australia tariffs. Separate prices apply to customers in Albany and
Kalgoorlie-Boulder. Supply of natural gas to Kalgoorlie-Boulder commenced in 1997. Customers in other
non-metropolitan areas such as Geraldton and Bunbury are charged the same rates as customers in Perth.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); WA Government
Gazette (2000 and previous issues); Western Power Perth, pers. comm., 7 August 2001.
Table A3.4 Natural gas consumption by sector — Victoria and WA
1999-2000 (per cent)
Sector Victoria WA
Per cent Per cent
Residential 46.7 3.3
Commercial and industrial 47.1 54.7
Electricity Generation 6.3 42.0
a Includes household consumption.
Source: PC estimates based on Office of Energy (2001) and AGA (2001).GAS 79
Table A3.5 Real price trends — business, TXU Retail (Victoria)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)















Note Price indexes were calculated using an annual consumption level of 500 GJ for a small business and
10 000 GJ for a medium sized business. The pattern of consumption is assumed to be uniform throughout the
year. Prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Melbourne. The nominal price series for 2000-01
exclude the Goods and Services Tax. Business prices do not vary between metropolitan and non-metropolitan
areas because uniform tariffs apply throughout TXU Retail’s franchise area. Prior to January 1999, prices
were based on Gas and Fuel Corporation tariffs.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Victoria Government
Gazette (1997 and previous issues); Victoria Government Gazette (1998).
Table A3.6 Real gas price trends — business, AlintaGas (WA)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Small business Medium business
Metropolitan Non-metropolitan Metropolitan Non-metropolitan
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 99.3 106.1 99.2 108.3
1992-93 99.0 105.8 99.0 108.0
1993-94 96.9 103.6 96.9 105.7
1994-95 103.7 101.5 104.3 104.3
1995-96 99.8 97.7 100.3 100.3
1996-97 98.4 96.4 99.0 99.0
1997-98 98.7 96.6 99.2 99.2
1998-99 97.0 104.7 97.5 107.6
1999-00 94.7 102.3 95.3 105.1
2000-01 96.2 106.0 99.1 108.9
Note Price indexes were calculated using an annual consumption level of 500 GJ for a small business and
10 000 GJ for a medium sized business. The pattern of consumption is assumed to be uniform throughout the
year. Prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Perth. The nominal price series for 2000-01 exclude the
Goods and Services Tax. Prior to 1996-97, prices were based on State Energy Commission of Western
Australia tariffs. Non-metropolitan prices apply to customers in Albany. Customers in other areas such as
Geraldton and Bunbury are charged the same rates as customers in Perth.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); WA Government
Gazette (2000 and previous issues); Western Power Perth, pers. comm., 7 August 2001.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A3.7 Average real city-gate gas prices — Melbourne and Perth













Note Nominal city-gate prices were deflated by the CPI (All groups) for each capital city. Transmission prices
for Perth were assumed to be constant in nominal terms over the period 1990-91 to 1993-94. City-gate prices
include the price of gas from producers and the transmission price for transporting gas to the capital city
distribution points. The city-gate price excludes distribution and retail charges. n.a. Not available.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); AGA (2001 and
previous issues).
Table A3.8 Real gas price trends — contract customers, Victoria













Note  Data after 1996-97 are unavailable. Nominal average prices for commercial contract and industrial
contract customers collected by the Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government
Trading Enterprises (SCNPMGTE) were deflated by the CPI (All groups) index for Melbourne. Information
provided to the SCNPMGTE did not disclose the definition of commercial or industrial customers. n.a. Not
available.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); SCNPMGTE (1998
and previous issues).GAS 81
Table A3.9 Real gas prices trends — manufacturing businesses, Australia













Note The real gas price index for manufacturing businesses is calculated by dividing the nominal index for gas
prices by the nominal index of the weighted average of all prices for materials used by manufacturing
businesses. The nominal price index for 2000-01 excludes the Goods and Services Tax.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); ABS (Price Index of
Materials Used in the Manufacturing Industry, Cat. no. 6411.0).
Table A3.10 Quality of service measures — Gascor (Victoria)
1990-91 to 2000-01
Average frequency of interruption Average duration of interruption












Note Data for the years 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-01 is unavailable as Gascor was separated into three
separate distribution businesses. Since 1999, the Office of the Regulator-General has monitored the reliability
of Victorian distributors using different indicators. These suggest that reliability of supply in the TXU service
territory in terms of frequency of interruptions and duration of interruptions remained stable in 1999 and 2000.
n.a. Not available.
Sources: AGA (2001); ORG (2001); SCNPMGTE(1998 and previous issues).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A3.11 Quality of service measures — AlintaGas (WA)
1990-91 to 2000-01
Average frequency of interruption Average duration of interruption












Note Average duration in 1995-96 was significantly affected by a major incident, causing water to enter the
gas system. If this interruption is excluded, average duration falls to 36 seconds. Data prior to 1995-96 relate
to the gas operations of the State Energy Commission of Western Australia, assumed by AlintaGas in January
1995. Data for 1990-91 and 1991-92 (for interruptions per ‘000 customers) was not collected by the Steering
Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises. n.a. Not available.
Sources: AGA (2001); AlintaGas (2001b and previous issues); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).
Table A3.12 Return on assets — Gascor (Victoria) and AlintaGas (WA)













Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a Data prior to December 1994 include the transmission activities of the Gas and Fuel
Corporation. These were transferred to the Gas Transmission Corporation. In July 1997, Gascor was
disaggregated into three separate distribution businesses and three retail businesses. The last of these
businesses was sold to the private sector in March 1999. b AlintaGas was formed in 1995 after the separation
of gas and electricity businesses previously undertaken by the State Energy Commission of Western Australia
(SECWA). SECWA did not publish separate financial accounts for each business. In October 2000, the sale of
AlintaGas to the private sector was completed. n.a. Not available.
Sources: AlintaGas (2001b and previous issues); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).GAS 83
Table A3.13 Dividend payout ratio — Gascor (Victoria) and AlintaGas (WA)













Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. a Data prior to December 1994 include the transmission activities of the Gas and Fuel
Corporation. These were transferred to the Gas Transmission Corporation. In July 1997, Gascor was
disaggregated into three separate distribution businesses and three retail businesses. The last of these
businesses was sold to the private sector in March 1999. b AlintaGas did not pay a dividend in 1995-96, the
first full year of operation after it was separated from the State Energy Commission of Western Australia in
January 1995. AlintaGas was sold to the private sector in October 2000. c The high payout ratio reflects the
payment of a special dividend of $1 206 million following the sale of a major gas transmission pipeline to the
private sector. n.a. Not available.
Sources: AlintaGas (2001); AlintaGas (2000); PC (2000); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A3.14 Dividend to equity ratio — Gascor (Victoria) and AlintaGas (WA)













Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. a  Data prior to December 1994 include the
transmission activities of the Gas and Fuel Corporation. These were transferred to the Gas Transmission
Corporation. In July 1997, Gascor was disaggregated into three separate distribution businesses and three
retail businesses. The last of these businesses was sold to the private sector in March 1999. Gascor did not
pay a dividend in 1996-97. b AlintaGas did not pay a dividend in 1995-96, the first full year of operation after it
was separated from the State Energy Commission of Western Australia in January 1995. AlintaGas was sold
to the private sector in October 2000. c  The high ratio reflects the payment of a special dividend of
$1 206 million following the sale of a major gas transmission pipeline to the private sector. n.a. Not available.
Sources: AlintaGas (2001b and previous issues); PC (2000); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).WATER AND
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4 Water and sewerage
Key outcomes
•   In most capital cities, real average metropolitan household water and sewerage
prices were higher in 2000-01 than they were in 1990-91. The exceptions to this
were Melbourne and Hobart.
•   Overall, there was a net decline in direct household expenditure of $48 million in
2000-01 for Australian capital cities.
•   In NSW and SA (examined as case studies), real household prices increased by
7 per cent in Sydney, decreased by 19 per cent in the Hunter region, and increased
by 16 per cent in Adelaide and the non-metropolitan areas of SA.
•   In Sydney, the relative price trend for concession holders varied according to
consumption level. In the Hunter region, prices to concession holders decreased
relative to non-concession holders. In SA, the real price increase was higher for
concession holders than for non-concession holders.
•   Low and medium water use business customers in Sydney have benefited from real
price reductions of 75 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. Similarly, low, medium,
medium to high, and high use business customers in the Hunter region have
benefited from real price reductions ranging from 3 per cent to 66 per cent. Real
business prices have declined for commercial and industrial customers in Adelaide.
In non-metropolitan areas of SA, real prices for commercial customers have
increased significantly and remained relatively unchanged for industrial customers.
•   There was no evidence to suggest that service delivery and reliability of supply (as
indicators of quality) have deteriorated in NSW and SA.
•   Notwithstanding mixed price trends and rebalancing between customer classes, real
revenues have fallen in NSW for both case study utilities (largely due to reduced
consumption) and the returns on assets are below the risk free rate. Despite real
revenue increases in SA, the return on assets is lower than the risk free rate.
•   The continuing introduction of consumption-based pricing has contributed to a
17 per cent reduction in per capita consumption for a selection of major Australian
water utilities over the study period.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Since 1990-91, Australian governments have continued to reform water utilities to
achieve efficient and sustainable water use. There has been significant progress in
implementing consumption-based pricing, reducing cross-subsidies, and in
recognising community service obligations (CSOs).
Reforms were specifically aimed at making prices more reflective of the costs of
supplying water and sewerage services. Specifically, there was a change from
property-based to consumption-based prices and a rebalancing of tariffs between
household and business customers.
In this chapter, trends in real prices paid by household customers for water and
sewerage services are presented for the period 1990-91 to 2000-01. The impact of
these real price trends on household expenditure for a range of income groups is
also reported.
Using a case study approach, differences in price trends between metropolitan and
non-metropolitan customers, between household and different-sized business
customers, and between concession and non-concession customers are presented.
Quality of service measures were examined to determine whether any declines in
real prices over the period have been associated with lower service quality. Finally,
the financial performance of the case study utilities was examined to see if price
declines have been associated with falling rates of return.
4.1 Industry reforms
The development of a national approach to water policy over the last decade has
had a significant impact on water industry reform in Australia.
In 1994, the Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) endorsed a national water
reform framework to cover both surface and groundwater, as well as the rural, urban
and bulk water sectors of the industry. The reforms of particular interest for this
study are:
•   Institutional reform — adoption of an integrated catchment management
approach, separating the roles of water resource management, standard setting
and regulatory enforcement (so that a water utility does not set its own prices or
environmental standards), and further development of inter-agency performance
comparisons; and
•   Pricing reform — including consumption-based pricing, full cost recovery and
the elimination or reduction of cross-subsidies.WATER AND
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In April  1995, it was decided that the water reform framework would be
implemented under the umbrella of National Competition Policy (NCP) and linked
to NCP payments. States and Territories are required to achieve satisfactory
progress against their NCP reform commitments — of which water reform is a
significant component — to receive a per capita share of around $6  billion in
transfers from the Commonwealth over the period 1997-98 to 2005-06 (National
Competition Council, Melbourne, pers. comm., 12 February 2002).
In addition to the water specific reforms endorsed by CoAG, there are a set of
agreed principles which also apply to the water sector under the NCP. These
principles include:
•   pricing oversight of water businesses;
•   the introduction of competitive neutrality measures such as tax-equivalent
regimes and removal of anti-competitive practices as defined in the Trade
Practices Act 1974;
•   structural reform of public monopolies to conform with Corporations Law;
•   review of legislation to identify anti-competitive elements; and
•   access to services requiring nationally significant infrastructure, as provided for
under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974.
Institutional reforms
Over the study period, institutional reform has been aimed at improving the
efficiency of service delivery by making water utilities more commercially focused
and accountable for financial and operational performance.
Most metropolitan water utilities have been corporatised. In NSW, the government
changed the status of some utilities to regain control over an essential service.1
Some state governments have contracted out input services — for example, in 1996,
the South Australian Government contracted out the management and operation of
Adelaide’s water supply and wastewater treatment to United Water.
In Victoria, a different approach was adopted — in January 1995, the Melbourne
Water Corporation was disaggregated into three water retail businesses (City West
Water, Yarra Valley Water and South East Water) and a wholesale water and
sewerage business.
                                             
1 For example, in 1999, the status of Sydney Water Corporation was changed from a company to




In most jurisdictions, one or more of the standard setting, resource management and
pricing functions have been separated out from service provision. Examples
include:
•   In NSW, regulatory functions, including prices oversight, are performed by the
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART). The Independent
Competition and Regulatory Commission in the ACT provides similar functions
to those of IPART.
•   Resource management functions were transferred from the Sydney Water
Corporation to the newly created Sydney Catchment Authority (SCA) in July
1999. The SCA is required to manage and protect catchment areas, water storage
dams and major water pipelines, and to supply bulk water to Sydney Water,
other water supply authorities and direct customers.
•   In Victoria, the Office of the Regulator-General (ORG) has legislated regulatory
responsibilities for the three metropolitan retail utilities. However, these utilities
were not subject to independent prices oversight over the study period.2 Price
control remained the responsibility of the Victorian Government.3
•   In WA, the Water Authority of Western Australia became the Water Corporation
in 1996. The Water and Rivers Commission was established at this time to
manage and protect Western Australia’s water resources. The Office of Water
Regulation was also established to administer a licensing scheme that set
standards of service for the Water Corporation and other water service providers.
•    In Tasmania, the Minister for Local Government sets prices for bulk water after
considering recommendations from the Government Prices Oversight
Commission. The Commission was established in 1995 and may make
recommendations on the basis of maximum revenues, maximum prices and or
pricing principles for bulk water suppliers. In the Northern Territory,
independent regulatory advice, including price regulation, has been provided by
the Utilities Commission since March 2000.
                                             
2 Similarly, metropolitan water utilities in SA and WA were not subject to independent prices
oversight over the study period.
3 It has subsequently been proposed that from 1 January 2003, the Essential Services Commission
(the successor to the ORG) will become the independent economic regulator for Victoria’s




Water is a scarce resource in Australia, with the minority of its limited resources
devoted to urban water and sewerage services.4 A growing demand for water, and
the need to allocate it more efficiently has led to a restructuring of water tariffs over
the study period.
The extent to which pricing reforms have been implemented varies between and
within jurisdictions. NSW in particular, has been at the forefront.
Consumption-based pricing was first introduced by the Hunter Water Corporation
in 1982. Since then, consumption-based pricing for major urban water utilities has
been introduced in all jurisdictions except Tasmania.5
For the non-major urban water utilities (NMUs), owned and operated by local
government, pricing reform has been slower to occur. NMUs are smaller in size and
their organisational structure and demographic characteristics are quite different
from the major urban water utilities typically found in Australia’s capital cities.
Local government plays a significant role in urban water supply in Queensland and
Tasmania in particular. However, local governments are not guaranteed a share of
competition payments in return for reform, with the exception of Queensland
(NCC 1998).
Consumption-based pricing
Historically, water and sewerage charges were based on property values,
accompanied by a free allowance of water which could be consumed without any
charge. This free water allowance offered no financial incentive to customers to
conserve water.
                                             
4 Australians use around 24 000 GL of water per year. Around 80 per cent comes from surface
water and 20  per  cent from groundwater. Surface water predominates in all States and
Territories except WA and the Northern Territory. Some 75 per cent of water is used in irrigated
agriculture, a further 20 per cent is used by the urban and industrial sectors, and the remaining
5 per cent is used for other rural uses such as stock and domestic purposes (National Land and
Water Resources Audit 2001).
5 Access and volumetric charges for water services have been implemented in all capital cities in
Australia with the exception of Hobart. Urban water reform in Tasmania has been delayed by a
local council amalgamation program. However, the State Government has undertaken to put in
place consumption-based pricing where cost effective. Property-based sewerage charges have
been replaced with a cost reflective charge in most capital cities. Perth, Adelaide and Hobart
have retained property-based charges for sewerage services (NCC 1999).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Property-based charging rarely reflected the actual cost of providing water and
sewerage services. It also resulted in cross-subsidisation between different customer
classes because property values bear little relationship to the quantity of water used.
Consumption-based charges comprise a fixed access charge for water and sewerage,
plus a volumetric charge based on water use. In some capital cities, a volumetric
charge for sewerage use has also been introduced.
Stepped volumetric (block) tariffs, based on amounts consumed above a threshold
level, have been implemented in some jurisdictions. Under this tariff option,
successive blocks of water consumption may be charged at a higher or lower unit
price. For example:
•   A two stepped decreasing block tariff applied to all customers, including
household customers, in the Hunter region of NSW between 1992-93 and
2000-01. However, 98 per cent of household consumption is charged at the first
step.
•   A single, two stepped and three stepped increasing block tariff, with changing
threshold levels, applied to most customers in SA at various times over the study
period.
The access charge is intended to reflect the fixed costs of supplying the customer,
for example the cost of maintaining the system and environmental costs.6 The
volumetric charge is intended to reflect the long-run cost to the business of
supplying additional units of water.
The introduction of a volumetric charge for water was intended to encourage water
conservation, thereby deferring investment in new water storages and benefiting the
environment.
The Water Services Association of Australia (WSAA) suggested that the
introduction of consumption-based pricing contributed to a 17 per cent reduction in
per capita consumption for a selection of major Australian water utilities over the
study period (WSAA 2001 and previous issues).7
                                             
6 The collection of water in catchments, its transportation to homes and its use and disposal to the
sewerage system affects the environment, other water users and the community generally. These
‘external’ effects could be described as ‘costs’ borne by the community. If these costs are
unaccounted for, water charges may be too low with consumption higher than it might
otherwise be if the full cost of service provision were passed on to customers.
7 Community education programs, use of water saving devices and a general increase in
environmental awareness in the community are other factors which may have contributed to the




Most urban water utilities have achieved full cost recovery over the study period
(NCC 2001b).
Under the CoAG water reform framework, a set of cost recovery guidelines provide
jurisdictional regulators with a framework for interpreting the requirements for full
cost recovery. Regulators are required to ensure that a water utility sets prices
between avoidable costs, to ensure commercial viability,8 and stand alone costs, to
avoid monopoly rents.9
4.2 Price outcomes for metropolitan households
In the absence of a complete Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) consumer price
index (CPI) series for water and sewerage,10 the Productivity Commission
constructed a household real price index for each Australian capital city for the
period 1990-91 to 2000-01.
Most of the indexes were constructed by deriving a consumption basket for water
and sewerage. The value of the basket was calculated using published tariff
schedule information.11 Different levels of consumption were assumed in each
capital city (see attachment A).
Unlike the other industry household price trends reported in this study, the Goods
and Services Tax (GST) introduced in July 2000 was not included in the nominal
price index series for 2000-01 because household water and sewerage customers are
exempt from this tax. However, GST is included in the CPI (All groups) index used
to deflate nominal prices to real prices.
                                             
8 The CoAG 1997 pricing principles state that to be viable, a water business should recover at
least the operations, maintenance and administrative costs, externalities (that is, natural resource
management costs attributable and incurred by a water business), taxes or tax-equivalents (not
including income tax), the interest cost on debt, dividends (if any) and make provision for future
asset refurbishment or replacement using an annuity approach.
9 To avoid monopoly rents, the CoAG 1997 pricing principles state that a water business should
not recover more than operations, maintenance and administrative costs, externalities, taxes or
tax-equivalents, and the provision for the cost of asset consumption and cost of capital, the latter
using a weighted average cost of capital.
10 The ABS real price index series for water and sewerage was first published in 1998 and does
not cover the entire study period.
11 The resulting value takes account of any changes in tariff structure during the study period.INFRASTRUCTURE
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In most capital cities, there is only one supplier of water and sewerage services to
households. Where there was more than one supplier, only one was chosen. For
example, in Hobart up to eight councils are responsible for the delivery of these
services. Hobart City Council was chosen as it is the largest supplier.
Since 1995, three water utilities provide water and sewerage services to household
customers in Melbourne. The tariff schedules for each of these utilities are similar,
and City West Water was chosen as the representative utility for Melbourne
households.
In most capital cities, average real metropolitan household water and sewerage
prices were higher in 2000-01 then they were in 1990-91 (see figure  4.1). Real
prices increased by 34 per cent in Darwin, 22 per cent in Brisbane, 16 per cent in
Adelaide, 12 per cent in Canberra, 10 per cent in Perth and 7 per cent in Sydney. In
contrast, real prices fell by 34 per cent in Hobart and 21 per cent in Melbourne.
The sharp rise in water and sewerage prices in Darwin in 1998-99 was largely a
result of the introduction of a fixed charge for water services, consistent with the
CoAG framework.12 The impact of this change, combined with an increase in the
volumetric charge for water use, resulted in a 26 per cent increase in real prices.
In contrast, real household prices in Melbourne fell by 48 per cent between 1993-94
and 2000-01. This reflected a policy to freeze tariff rates for water and sewerage
between January  1995 and June  2001, combined with the announcement of a
package of water reforms in October 1997. These water reforms comprised a price
and debt restructuring package, that resulted in an 18 per cent nominal reduction in
water and sewerage bills for around 85  per  cent of households in Melbourne
in 1998.
                                             
12 This fixed charge is based on a daily rate and linked to the customer’s meter size. It is intended
to reflect the customer’s impact on infrastructure costs.WATER AND
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Note For details on the construction of the household real price indexes refer to attachment A.
Data source: Table B4.1.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Implications for household expenditure
Water and sewerage prices have a direct effect on household expenditure. They also
have an indirect effect when changes in water and sewerage prices paid by
businesses are passed on to customers in the form of higher or lower prices for final
products and services. These indirect effects will be examined in a forthcoming
Productivity Commission research study.
The direct impact of changes in the price of water and sewerage over the decade on
real household expenditure in 2000-01 was estimated for each household income
quintile. This was done by multiplying the actual household expenditure on water
and sewerage in 2000-01, by the difference between the movement in its price over
the ten years to 2000-01 and the movement in the CPI (All groups) over the same
ten year period.
In 2000-01, total expenditure by capital city households on water and sewerage was
around $1.7 billion.13
The impact of price changes on the level of consumption and changes to the basis
for charging were ignored. In the case of the latter, the change from property-based
to consumption-based charges may have significant implications. For example, it
was assumed that the change in unit price was uniform across all income quintiles.
However, the change from property-based charges is likely to have resulted in unit
price changes that differ across and within income quintiles.14 Consequently, the
average changes reported in tables 4.1 to 4.3, should be regarded as indicative only.
While changes in the basis for charging complicate calculations of a consistent price
series, water and sewerage price changes overall appear to have increased faster
than the CPI (All groups) in all capital cities, except Melbourne and Hobart.
Further, subject to the qualification in the preceding paragraph, the expenditure
changes in 2000-01, arising from price changes over the previous decade and
measured in dollars per household, appear to have been largest for households in the
highest income quintile (see table 4.1). However, when measured as a percentage of
household expenditure per year, the changes appear to be more significant for
households in the lowest income quintile (see table 4.2).
                                             
13 Actual household expenditure in 2000-01 was derived by taking the proportion of total
household expenditure that was spent on water and sewerage in the 1998-99 Household
Expenditure Survey (ABS 2000a). The expenditure weight from the survey was then multiplied
by total household expenditure in 1998-99 and inflated to 2000-01 prices using the CPI (All
groups) deflator, to obtain an estimate of actual household expenditure on water and sewerage
in 2000-01.
14 For example, households on the same income level, but with different property values, would
have experienced different changes in their bills.WATER AND
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Table 4.1 Real changes to household water and sewerage expenditure
arising from price changes over the previous decade, by
income quintile
$ per capital city household, 2000-01
Income
quintile
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwina Canberrab
Lowest 20% 16.03 -64.74 40.48 31.43 16.26 -91.20 34.43 20.17
Second 17.85 -98.23 40.38 39.96 21.24 -91.50 40.83 30.51
Third 21.16 -104.92 47.23 61.48 26.61 -175.64 55.77 40.25
Fourth 26.95 -119.36 61.83 64.78 31.35 -162.40 84.37 44.12
Highest 20% 32.43 -147.79 79.15 97.52 40.39 -162.11 148.82 58.18
All households 24.09 -111.03 53.37 56.25 27.20 -131.51 91.34 45.12
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease in water and sewerage expenditure
because real prices declined over the period. a The expenditure changes for households in the lowest three
income quintiles, should be interpreted with care as the underlying data is associated with relatively high
standard errors. b The expenditure change for households in the lowest income quintile should be interpreted
with care as the underlying data is associated with a relatively high standard error.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0).
Table 4.2 Real changes to household water and sewerage expenditure
arising from price changes over the previous decade, as a
proportion of total expenditure
Per cent per capital city households, 2000-01
Income
quintile
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart DarwinaCanberrab
Lowest 20% 0.08 -0.31 0.23 0.19 0.08 -0.49 0.13 0.13
Second 0.06 -0.36 0.15 0.17 0.08 -0.35 0.15 0.11
Third 0.06 -0.28 0.13 0.18 0.07 -0.52 0.15 0.10
Fourth 0.05 -0.24 0.13 0.14 0.07 -0.35 0.17 0.09
Highest 20% 0.05 -0.22 0.12 0.15 0.06 -0.24 0.21 0.08
All households 0.05 -0.26 0.14 0.16 0.07 -0.36 0.18 0.09
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease in water and sewerage expenditure
because real prices declined over the period. a The expenditure changes for households in the lowest three
income quintiles, should be interpreted with care as the underlying data is associated with relatively high
standard errors. b The expenditure change for households in the lowest income quintile should be interpreted
with care as the underlying data is associated with a relatively high standard error.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0).
As previously indicated, the changes in table 4.1 are average expenditure changes
for capital city households in each household income quintile. Subject to that
qualification, the aggregate change in real household water and sewerage
expenditure for all capitals appears to be a decrease of about $48 million in 2000-01
(see table 4.3). The largest decrease in total expenditure for capital city households
was in Melbourne (about $148 million per year), and the largest increase was in
Sydney (about $36 million per year).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table 4.3 Total change to household water and sewerage expenditure
arising from price changes over the previous decade
Capital city households, 2000-01
Householdsa Change per household Total change
No. $ $
Sydney 1 507 189 24.09 36 315 398
Melbourne 1 330 406 -111.03 -147 709 011
Brisbane 549 387 53.37 29 322 493
Adelaide 436 065 56.25 24 530 319
Perth 456 010 27.20 12 403 803
Hobart 89 751 -131.51 -11 803 188
Darwin 38 530 91.34 3 519 404
Canberra 125 561 45.12 5 665 176
Total 4 532 900 -47 755 605
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease in water and sewerage expenditure
because real prices declined over the period. a Household numbers in each capital city were calculated by
multiplying the proportion of households in each capital city as reported in (ABS 1996) by the total number of
capital city households reported in (ABS 2000a).
Sources: ABS (The Australian Consumer Price Index-Concepts, Sources and Methods, Cat. no. 6461.0); ABS
(Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0).
4.3 Price  variations
Selected utilities in NSW and SA were used as case studies to examine whether
prices varied according to customer location and eligibility for concessions. Trends
in business prices were also examined. The utilities examined were Sydney Water
Corporation and Hunter Water Corporation in NSW, and SA Water in SA.
In NSW, the Sydney Water Corporation delivers water to an estimated 1.6 million
properties within Sydney, the Blue Mountains and the Illawarra. It also provides
sewerage services to an estimated 1.5  million properties. In 2000-01, around
$1.2 billion in revenue was generated from use and service charges (SWC 2001a).
In 2000-01, the Hunter Water Corporation provided water and sewerage services to
around 200 000 properties in the five local government areas in the lower Hunter
region — Newcastle, Lake Macquarie, Maitland, Cessnock and Port Stephens.
Of the 200  000  properties, there are around 185  000  household properties,
8300  business properties and 5900  other properties. Household customers
accounted for $82.2  million (72  per  cent) of total revenue, business customers
$22.8 million (20 per cent), and other customers accounted for $8.5 million (around
7 per cent) in 2000-01 (HWC 2001).WATER AND
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SA Water delivers water to about one million people in metropolitan Adelaide and
about 416 000 people in non-metropolitan areas. It also provides sewerage services
to around one million people in metropolitan Adelaide and around 142 000 people
in non-metropolitan areas. SA Water generated $460 million in revenue from rates
and charges in 2000-01 (SA Water 2001).
The different environments in which the case study utilities operate mean that price
trends over the period are not directly comparable. There are cost factors that affect
price trends that, in some circumstances, are unique to each water utility
(see box 4.1).
Box 4.1 Cost factors affecting price trends
Like gas and electricity supply, the low density of some urban and non-urban
development has led to high costs of water transport infrastructure. This can limit
reductions in prices relative to water utilities with higher development densities.
Over the study period, health and environmental standards for drinking water and
effluent discharge have become increasingly stringent. The cost of compliance can
vary between utilities depending on whether additional treatment processes are
required.
The quality of source water can also have significant implications for the cost of
meeting drinking water standards. SA relies on the River Murray to supply 40 per cent
of its urban water. This can increase to 90 per cent during extreme drought conditions
(SA Water 2001). The declining condition of this water supply has a significant impact
on the cost of providing high quality drinking water to urban customers.
Government policies can also impact on water utility costs. For example, following the
Sydney water incident in 1998, the NSW Government imposed more stringent
monitoring and reporting requirements on the Sydney Water Corporation. Although
there were increased costs associated with these requirements, SWC (1999) indicated
that these costs were not reflected in the real price trends, but were offset by forecast
efficiency gains.
Each utility may be at a different stage in its asset life cycle. Compared with older
systems, recently constructed distribution systems require less expenditure on asset
maintenance and replacement.
Location
Real household price indexes for Sydney and the Hunter region of NSW and
Adelaide and non-metropolitan areas of SA were constructed using a representative
consumption bundle for each utility (see attachment A). For example, the price
index for Sydney was constructed using average annual household consumption ofINFRASTRUCTURE
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240 kl whereas an average annual household consumption level of 210 kl was used
for the Hunter region. The consumption bundles chosen for the NSW case studies
were based on information published by IPART and following consultation with the
respective water utilities (IPART 2000b and 2000c).
In SA, the price indexes for Adelaide and the non-metropolitan areas were based on
average annual household consumption of 250  kl. This figure was chosen in
consultation with SA Water.
NSW case studies
In Sydney (examined as a metropolitan NSW case study), real household prices
increased by 7  per  cent over the study period (see figure  4.2).15 This increase
reflects the implementation of new pricing arrangements, combined with a
rebalancing of tariff rates between household and business customers.16
Between 1990-91 and 1994-95, property-based charges for water and sewerage
applied to household customers in Sydney who had a land value greater than
$33 000. However, these charges were excluded in the calculation of the real price
index because less than 50  per  cent of household customers paid property-based
charges during this period (Sydney Water Corporation, pers. comm., 7  March
2002). If property-based charges for water and sewerage had been included in the
calculation, the real price change for Sydney households would have been less than
the 7 per cent increase referred to above.
In the Hunter region, real household prices decreased by 19 per cent over the study
period (see figure 4.2).
                                             
15 This price trend is the same as that reported for Sydney in figure 4.1.
16 Since 1993-94, there has been much greater reliance on charges that reflect actual water use and
much less reliance on property-based charges.WATER AND
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Figure 4.2 Real water and sewerage price trends — households, Sydney































Sydney (240 kl per year) Hunter (210 kl per year)
Note For details on the construction of the household real price indexes refer to attachment A.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); HWC (2001
and previous issues); SWC (2001a and previous issues).
South Australian case studies
In SA, the price of household water services comprises a fixed charge and a water
use charge. Until 1994-95, it also included a component of free water. The price of
sewerage services over the study period was based on the capital value of a
customer’s property set by the Valuer-General on 1 July each year.
In both the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, the combined water and
sewerage real prices for household customers increased by around 16 per cent over
the study period (see figure 4.3).17
The primary drivers of this increase were price restructuring associated with the
removal of the free water allowance in 1995-96 and a one-off sewerage charge
adjustment in 1994-95.18
                                             
17 The price trend for metropolitan Adelaide is the same as that reported in figure 4.1.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Metropolitan Adelaide (250 kl per year) Non-metropolitan SA (250 kl per year)
Note For details on the construction of the household real price indexes refer to attachment A.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); SA Water,
Adelaide, pers. comm., 10 October 2001.
In some years real price movements were different in non-metropolitan areas than
in metropolitan areas. These differences were influenced by relative movements in
metropolitan and non-metropolitan property values affecting the sewerage
component.
The tariff rate applied to the capital value of property for non-metropolitan
household customers for sewerage services is 26 per cent above the metropolitan
rate. This rate differential is designed to take some account of the generally lower
capital value of properties outside the metropolitan areas.
Apart from this rate differential, and some other minor exceptions, the SA Water
Corporation adopts a policy of State-wide tariffs for both water and sewerage
services. On average, however, the combination of sewerage rates and property
                                                                                                                                        
18 Sewerage charges were increased by around 10 per cent in 1994-95 (around 7 per cent after
allowing for inflation) in response to a finding by the South Australian Commission of Audit
that the total revenue from water and sewerage services in metropolitan and non-metropolitan
areas was low relative to other States (The Commission 1994).WATER AND
SEWERAGE
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values means that non-metropolitan customers pay less than metropolitan customers
and SA Water makes a less than commercial rate of return in the non-metropolitan
areas. The South Australian Government reimburses SA Water for this
less-than-commercial return under a CSO contract.
Concessions
Sydney Water, Hunter Water and SA Water all provide tariff concessions to eligible
customers. Generally, the revenue foregone from the provision of these concessions
is reimbursed by the respective State governments through a CSO contract. In
NSW, CSO payments were made over the entire study period.
SA Water provides pensioner concessions on behalf of the Department of Human
Services. Revenue shortfalls are reimbursed by the Department but are not
identified as a CSO in SA Water’s financial statements. In 1996-97, a payment was
made for the first time to SA Water for the administration of the pensioner
concession scheme and was reported as a CSO.
NSW concessions
Sydney Water Corporation provides NSW Government-funded rebates to assist
pensioners and low-income customers such as people on the Age, Disability
Support and Service pensions. The program also covers certain allowances for
Newstart and special benefit recipients (SWC 2001b).
Rebates apply to houses and home units (strata or company title) which are owned
and occupied by an eligible customer. For jointly owned and occupied property, a
proportion of these rebates may be granted to an eligible customer. Eligible
customers who are occupants of a retirement village on a long-term lease
arrangement may also be entitled to a rebate.
In Sydney, concession holder rebates date back to the 1970s. The original concept
was to provide concession holders with a 50 per cent rebate off their ‘water rates’
— that is the fixed component of their water, sewerage and drainage bill. At the
time pensioner rebates were introduced, the majority of customers did not pay a
volumetric charge for water use (due to the way pricing arrangements were
structured).
In the early 1990s, significant reforms to Sydney Water’s pricing arrangements
commenced. These reforms progressively increased the emphasis on water use
charges as a component of total water, sewerage and drainage bills.INFRASTRUCTURE
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An unintended consequence of the reform was that without compensatory action,
there would have been a shift in the relativity of charges between concession
holders and non-concession holders. It was decided that concession holders should
be subject to the same financial incentive to conserve water as non-concession
holders. Therefore, rebates were not extended to use charges, but fixed charge
rebates were adjusted to ensure concession holders were not adversely affected
relative to non-concession holders.
Real price indexes for low, medium and high use concession holders in Sydney
were constructed to examine the effect of these various changes for concession and
non-concession holders. This revealed that:
•   For low water users (150 kl per year), the real price index has not increased as
much as that for a non-concession holder — that is, 6 per cent for a concession
holder and 18 per cent for a non-concession holder (see figure 4.4). Trends in the
real price index show that the concession holder bill has fallen over the period
from 47 per cent of the non-concession bill, to 42 per cent of the non-concession
bill.
•   For medium water users (227  kl  per  year), the rate of increase has been
approximately the same as non-concession holders, at around 30  per  cent
(see  figure  4.4). Over the study period, concession holders paid around
49 per cent of the non-concession bill.
•   For high water users (300 kl per year), concession holders have faced slightly
larger real increases than non-concession holders — a 44 per cent increase and a
37 per cent increase respectively (see figure 4.4). The concession holder bill has
risen from 51 per cent to 54 per cent of the non-concession bill over the study
period.
In Sydney, 66  per  cent of concession holders consume less than 250  kl  per year
(Sydney Water Corporation, pers. comm., 23  November 2001). Accordingly, it
would seem that the majority of concession holders have not been disadvantaged
relative to non-concession holders.WATER AND
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Figure 4.4 Real water and sewerage price trends — non-concession and


























































































Non-concession holder (300 kl per year)  Concession holder (300 kl per year)
Note For details on the construction of the concession holder real price indexes refer to attachment A.
Data source: Table B4.4.INFRASTRUCTURE
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The trends, arising from the way concession holder rebates have been restructured
over the last decade, broadly maintain relativity between concession and
non-concession customers. They are also consistent with the water conservation and
demand management initiatives embodied in Sydney Water Corporation’s pricing
reforms generally.19
In the Hunter region, pensioners who own and occupy their properties are entitled to
a rebate equal to half of the fixed and use charges for water and sewerage, up to a
maximum of $175 per year. The level of the rebate has remained unchanged since
1988.
For average use concession holders in the Hunter region (210  kl  per  year), real
prices for water and sewerage decreased by 17 per cent compared with a real price
decrease of 19 per cent for non-concession households (see figure 4.5). Over the
study period the concession holder bill was around 62  per  cent of the
non-concession bill.
Figure 4.5 Real water and sewerage price trends — non-concession and































Non-concession holder (210 kl per year) Concession holder (210 kl per year)
Note For details on the construction of the concession holder real price indexes refer to attachment A.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Hunter Water
Corporation, pers. comm., 26 September 2001; HWC (2001 and previous issues).
                                             
19 The Sydney Water Corporation is required by its 2000 Operating Licence to meet certain water
conservation targets and demand management strategies. In particular, it must take action to
reduce the quantity of water it draws from all sources on a per capita basis by at least
35 per cent by 2010-11 from the 1990-91 baseline. In 2000-01, Sydney Water had reduced per




SA Water offers concessions on water and sewerage rates to eligible pensioners as
part of the State Pensioner Concession Scheme. To receive a concession, a
pensioner must own or part-own the property in which they live and be responsible
for paying the rates and land tax on the property.
In 2000-01 concession holders were eligible for a rebate of 60 per cent, up to a
maximum of $90 a year for water, and $95 a year for sewerage. The rebates have
varied in dollar terms from time-to-time, but the real value of the rebate has
declined over the study period.
For concession holders in metropolitan Adelaide, the declining real value of the
rebates has meant that real prices for water and sewerage increased by 37 per cent,
compared with a 16  per  cent real increase for non-concession customers
(see  figure  4.6). The average metropolitan concession holder bill has gradually
increased from 58 to 69 per cent of the total non-concession bill.
In non-metropolitan areas, concession holders have faced slightly higher real price
increases for water and sewerage services than concession holders in metropolitan
Adelaide. For concession holders the real price increased by 43  per  cent
(see figure 4.6). In a similar fashion to their city counterparts, the concession holder
bill as a proportion of the non-concession holder bill has gradually increased from
53 to 65 per cent.
The increase for non-metropolitan concession holders (43 per cent compared with
37  per  cent for metropolitan concession holders), does not imply that
non-metropolitan concession customers pay higher charges. On the contrary, the
higher percentage increase occurred because charges for the average




Figure 4.6 Real water and sewerage price trends — non-concession and





























































Non-metropolitan non-concession holder (250 kl per year) 
Non-metropolitan concession holder (250 kl per year)
Note For details on the construction of the concession holder real price indexes refer to attachment A.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); SA Water,




The construction of a real price index for business customers is more difficult than
that for household customers because of the greater variation in consumption levels,
and different pricing formulae within and between jurisdictions. The indexes are
extremely sensitive to changes in underlying assumptions concerning sewerage
discharge factors,20 the size of meter connections21 and property values.
The GST introduced in July 2000 was not included in the nominal price index series
for 2000-01 because business water and sewerage customers are exempt from this
tax. However, GST is included in the CPI (All groups) index used to deflate
nominal prices to real prices.
NSW business prices
For the NSW case studies, different business consumption levels were chosen. The
assumptions were based on information published by IPART and advice from the
respective water utilities (see attachment A).
In 2000-01, there were around 112  000  business customers (metered and
unmetered) serviced by Sydney Water, representing 7  per  cent of all customers.
Metered customers accounted for 30  per  cent of total water consumption
(Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, Sydney, pers. comm., 12  March
2002).
Over the study period, the real prices paid in Sydney by low water use businesses
(100 kl per  year)22 and medium water use businesses (1700  kl  per year) fell by
75 per cent and 65 per cent respectively (see figure 4.7).
These customers benefited from significant reductions in property-based charges23
and a rebalancing of tariffs to eliminate cross-subsidies from businesses to
                                             
20 A discharge factor is the assessed percentage of water purchased that is discharged into the
sewer.
21 For example, in the Hunter region the meter connection can range from 20 mm to 500 mm. A
different charge applies to each meter size.
22 Almost 50 per cent of Sydney Water’s business customers (around 17 000) use less than 250 kl
of water per year (IPART 2000b).
23 Between 1992-93 and 1995-96, property-based charges for business customers in Sydney were
reduced by $217 million. This reduction was achieved by reducing both capital and operating
costs. IPART was assured that reductions in capital spending reflected efficiency gains and not
a downgrading of Sydney Water’s commitment to existing standards (IPART 1995). In
1996-97, property-based charges for water were abolished and gradually reduced for sewerage
and stormwater over the study period. Between 1996-97 and 1999-2000 property-based chargesINFRASTRUCTURE
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household customers. For example, small to medium businesses in particular, which
tended to have high rental values and low water use, subsidised those who lived on
the urban fringes where servicing costs were higher (SWC 1995).
In contrast, real water and sewerage prices have increased by around 9 per cent for
high water use business customers (500 000 kl per year) (see figure 4.7).
In 1992-93, Sydney Water introduced a fixed charge for water and sewerage based
on the size of the water meter connected to the property. As a result, real prices
increased for medium and high water use business customers in that year.






























Low water use business (100 kl per year) Medium water use business (1700 kl per year)
High water use business (500 000 kl per year)
Note For details on the construction of the business real price indexes refer to attachment A. For business
customers it was assumed that a low water use customer (100 kl per year) had a 20 mm connection and an
assessed annual value (AAV) of $10 000, a medium water use customer (1700 kl per year) had a 40 mm
connection and an AAV of $50 000, and a high water use customer (500 000 kl per year) had a 300 mm
connection and an AAV of $1  000  000. All business customers were assumed to have an 80  per  cent
discharge factor.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); IPART (2000b).
                                                                                                                                        
were reduced by a further $80  million. However, in 1999 there were still around
26 500 business customers that paid property-based charges of varying degrees (SWC 1999).WATER AND
SEWERAGE
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In the Hunter region, there are 8300 business customers, of which 36 consume more
than 50  000  kl  per year (IPART 2000c). These 36  customers accounted for
20 per cent of total water consumption in 2000-01 (Hunter Water Corporation, pers.
comm., 19 March 2002).
In the Hunter region, real prices for low, medium, medium to high and high water
use business customers fell over the study period. In 1994-95 property-based
charges for water and sewerage services were removed. Real prices were relatively
unchanged between 1995-96 and 2000-01.
A declining two stepped volumetric tariff for water use applied to business
customers serviced by the Hunter Water Corporation over the study period.
Business customers who consumed more than 1000 kl of water per year paid less
per unit of water consumed.
According to Hunter Water, the two stepped declining volumetric tariff is designed
to reflect economies of scale that exist in the provision of water to large and very
large customers. The lower use charge in excess of 1000 kl is intended to reflect
economies in billing and servicing, and the fact that business customers are not the
main source of peak demand and associated costs, such as additional pumping.
Low water use business customers (300  kl  per year) have experienced the most
significant reductions — with real prices falling by 66  per  cent over the study
period (see figure 4.8).
Real prices for medium water use business customers (3000  kl  per year) and
medium to high water use business customers (30 000 kl per year) fell by 39 and
23 per cent respectively (see figure 4.8).
For a high water use business customer (300 000 kl per year), real prices remained
relatively constant for most of the study period but fell by 3 per cent in 2000-01
(see figure 4.8).24
                                             
24 The real price index for high water use business customers does not include sewerage charges.
As advised by Hunter Water, these customers tend to operate their own discharge systems and
are subject to trade waste charges and inspection fees. These charges and fees were not included
in the calculation of the real price index.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Low water use business (300 kl per year)
Medium water use business (3000 kl per year)
Medium to high water use business (30 000 kl per year)
High water use business (300 000 kl per year)
Note For details on the construction of the business real price indexes refer to attachment A. For business
customers it was assumed that a low water use customer (300 kl per year) had a 20 mm connection and a
property value of $9000, a medium water use customer (3000 kl per year) had a 40 mm connection and a
property value of $25 000, a medium to high water use customer (30 000 kl per year) had a 40 mm connection
and a property value of $100  000, and a high water use customer (300  000  kl per year) had a 300  mm
connection and a property value of $200 000. All business customers were assumed to have an 80 per cent
discharge factor with the exception of high water use customers. Few high use customers are connected to
sewerage services and therefore sewerage charges were not included for this group.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Hunter Water
Corporation, pers. comm., 27 March and 4 April 2002; IPART (2000c).
South Australian business prices
In SA, there are two classes of business customers — commercial and industrial.
Commercial businesses include shops, retailers and professional services. Industrial
businesses include mining, quarrying, medical and health services, hotels, motels
and recreational facilities. It was not possible to disaggregate each customer class
into low, medium, medium to high, and high water users because of the
complexities associated with the use of property-based charges.
Real price indexes for commercial and industrial customers were constructed based
on average water consumption over the period and an annual average property value
for each class of customer (see attachment A).WATER AND
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Uniform industrial business tariffs apply to water services in metropolitan and
non-metropolitan areas. However, the sewerage tariff is higher in non-metropolitan
areas to take account of the generally lower property values.
Real prices for average industrial customers located in metropolitan Adelaide fell by
8 per cent  over  the  study  period.  The real price index for the average
non-metropolitan industrial customer was at the same level in 2000-01 as it was in
1990-91 (see figure  4.9). Until 1994-95, water charges were based on property
values and attracted a free water allowance. From 1995-96, charges on industrial
customers comprised a fixed water charge and a water use charge.






























Metropolitan industrial (4300 kl per year) Non-metropolitan industrial (4800 kl per year)
Note For details on the construction of the business real price indexes refer to attachment A. For industrial
business customers it was assumed that average water consumption was 4300 kl per year in metropolitan
Adelaide and 4800 kl per year in non-metropolitan areas of SA over the study period.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); SA Water,
Adelaide, pers. comm., 10 October 2001.
Uniform commercial business tariffs apply to water services in metropolitan and
non-metropolitan areas. However, the sewerage tariff is higher in non-metropolitan
areas to take account of the generally lower property values.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Unlike industrial customers, commercial customers continue to pay a water charge
based on property values. In addition, commercial customers are entitled to a
quantity of water free of charge, which is linked to the fixed charge. Any water
consumed over and above the free allowance is charged for at the water use rate.25
Real prices for commercial customers located in metropolitan Adelaide fell by
18  per  cent, while in non-metropolitan areas real prices increased by around
25 per cent over the study period (see figure 4.10). This disparity in real price trends
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan commercial customers reflects different
movements in average property values.
































Metropolitan commercial (490 kl per year) Non-metropolitan commercial (229 kl per year)
Note For details on the construction of the business real price indexes refer to attachment A. For commercial
business customers it was assumed that average water consumption was 490 kl per year in metropolitan
Adelaide and 229 kl per year in non-metropolitan areas of SA over the study period.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); SA Water,
Adelaide, pers. comm., 10 October 2001.
                                             
25 In 2001, the South Australian Government amended the Waterworks Act 1932 to phase out the
provision of free water over a five year period effective from 2002-03 on a revenue neutral basis
(SA Water, Adelaide, pers. comm., 11 March 2002).WATER AND
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During the property boom of the 1980s, the average capital value of metropolitan
commercial properties increased. However, they declined significantly from 1990
— largely driven by a fall in property values in Adelaide’s central business district.
In contrast, property values in the non-metropolitan areas did not experience a
similar boom prior to the study period and have, on average, been increasing in
value in real terms over the study period.
4.4 Service  quality
Quality of service was examined to see if price trends might be explained by
changes in the quality and reliability of services. Lower prices can be achieved by
lowering expenditure below that required to maintain service standards. However,
lower service standards may take some time to manifest themselves.
Water utilities are required to meet a range of service quality measures relating to
compliance with health and environmental standards and service delivery.26
Although compliance with drinking water quality standards is an important aspect
of quality of service, the primary focus of this section is service delivery and
reliability of supply — that is, the ability of the distribution network to deliver water
and sewerage services to customers.
Reliability is measured by the frequency of interruptions and the time taken to
restore supply. Frequency of interruptions is measured by the number of water main
breaks and sewer main chokes per 100 km. These indicators were chosen because
they were consistently published over the study period. Other indicators, such as
interruption frequency per property and average duration of interruptions, were not
available in a continuous series.
The frequency of interruptions can be influenced by a number of factors including:
•   ageing infrastructure, which can increase the risk of interruptions to supply if
assets are not maintained or upgraded; and
•   climatic variability, over which a water utility has no control — dry weather
encourages tree root intrusion into sewers and causes sewer blockages, and burst
water mains are largely due to substantial ground movement in dry conditions.
In NSW, the frequency of interruptions in Sydney and the Hunter region has varied
from year-to-year over the study period (see figure  4.11). In the Hunter region,
climatic variability had a significant impact on the frequency of interruptions. In
                                             




particular, a higher level of sewer main chokes was experienced between 1990-91
and 1994-95 as a result of the adverse effects of the 1989 earthquake.27
Since 1994-95, the number of sewer main chokes per 100 km in the Hunter region
has fallen by 39 per cent. In contrast, the number of sewer main chokes per 100 km
in Sydney has continued to increase despite a significant injection of funds to
maintain and upgrade the system.28
Tariff rebalancing in Sydney and the Hunter region over the study period has meant
real price increases for some customers and real price declines for others. However,
there is no evidence to suggest that service delivery and reliability (as the indicators
of quality) have been compromised where price declines have occurred.
In SA, the data on frequency of interruption indicators for water main breaks and
sewer main chokes relate to metropolitan Adelaide.
Over the study period, the frequency of interruptions has remained relatively
constant, with less year-to-year variation than observed for the NSW case studies
(see figure 4.12).29
Although some customer classes in SA have benefited from real price reductions for
water and sewerage services, it would appear that these reductions have not been
achieved at the expense of service quality as measured by reliability.
                                             
27 It is believed that although the earthquake did not result in significant structural problems to the
sewerage system, it created joint movement and minor cracking of sewer pipes which greatly
increased the potential for tree root intrusion (HWC 1995).
28 In 1997, the Sydney Water Corporation published WaterPlan 21, which made a commitment to
reduce wet weather sewerage overflows at a cost of $1.6 billion over 20 years. In the first five
years, $112 million was allocated to repair cracks and leaks in the sewerage system.
29 Significant movement and corrosion problems caused by Adelaide’s unique soil conditions are
the principal reasons for burst water mains in the metropolitan area. The incidence of sewer
chokes increases during dry weather (SA Water 2001).WATER AND
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Figure 4.11 Quality of service measures — Sydney Water Corporation and



























































































































Water main breaks and leaks Sewer main breaks and chokes
Note Main breaks include bursts and leaks. Leaks include faults that can be fixed without shutting down the
main. Chokes are confirmed partial or total blockages occasioning an interruption to service, excluding any
blockages that occur upstream of the service connections.
Data source: WSAA (2001 and previous issues).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Water main breaks and leaks Sewer main breaks and chokes
Note Main breaks include bursts and leaks. Leaks include main faults that can be fixed without shutting down
the main. Chokes are confirmed partial or total blockages occasioning an interruption to service, excluding any
blockages that occur upstream of the service connections.
Data source: WSAA (2001 and previous issues).
4.5 Shareholder outcomes
The financial performance of the case study utilities was examined to provide
information on the relationship between price trends and financial outcomes, such
as the return on assets.
Low prices relative to costs may not achieve a satisfactory return on assets, nor
provide sufficient revenue to maintain and replace long-lived infrastructure assets.
If services are to be maintained, the community as owners of the utility will have to
provide financial support in the form of subsidies. Further, low prices may affect the
viability of the business and possibly expose the community to financial risks.
The data used in calculating the shareholder outcomes presented in this section were
generally taken from two sources:
•   Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government
Trading Enterprises; andWATER AND
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•   Productivity Commission reports on Financial Performance of Government
Trading Enterprises.
There may be inconsistencies between these two data sets and the information
published in the annual reports of water utilities. These inconsistencies arise
because of definitional differences.
In addition, there have been changes in accounting policies over the study period. In
particular, there were changes in how contributed assets were recognised in
financial statements.
Profitability
Sydney Water, Hunter Water and SA Water earned a positive rate of return on
assets over the study period. However, their rate of return was less than 5 per cent
(see figure  4.13), and always below the risk free rate (as approximated by the
10 year bond rate).30
In earning rates of return below the risk free rate, water utilities are in effect
receiving an implicit subsidy. Their ability to pay dividends to government will be
reduced and they may not be making a sufficient return to fund necessary capital
spending and asset replacement in the longer term.
In SA, there was a significant increase in the return earned by SA Water between
1995-96 and 1996-97 (see figure 4.13). This reflects the implementation of a new
CSO policy by the South Australian Government. Under this policy, SA Water
received payments to offset revenue losses associated with the provision of water
services in non-metropolitan areas. Since 1996-97, these payments contributed to
increased profit and an improvement in the rate of return on assets.31
Comparisons of performance over time, using indicators that include an estimate of
asset values, have to be interpreted with care. Differences in asset valuation
procedures and changes in the size of the asset base can affect the return on assets.
Over the study period, there have been significant changes in the asset values as a
result of asset transfers, revaluations and changes in asset valuation methodologies.
                                             
30 The rate of return on long-term bonds at June 2001 was 6 per cent — its lowest level over the
study period.
31 Prior to 1996-97, the costs were met internally by cross-subsidisation from other activities.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 4.13 Return on assets — Sydney Water Corporation and Hunter






















Sydney Water Hunter Water SA Water
Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).
Payments to government
Most publicly-owned water utilities are required to return some of their earnings to
their owner-governments in the form of dividend payments. This is justified on
competitive neutrality and cost recovery grounds.
Where a utility is not required to pay dividends, it has proportionately more funds
available for re-investment into its business, either for the development of new
services or the improvement of existing ones. Further, a utility need not rely on
debt-financing to the extent that its rivals must, and thus incurs lower overall
operating costs.
Each of the case study utilities was required to pay dividends to its shareholder
government. SA Water did not pay a dividend for the years 1990-91 to 1993-94
because it was not generating sufficient profits (SA Water, Adelaide, pers. comm.,WATER AND
SEWERAGE
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11  March 2002). The relative size of dividend payments is represented by the
dividend payout ratio (dividends as a proportion of profit after tax) and the dividend
to equity ratio (dividends as a proportion of average total equity).
In most years, the dividend payout ratios of the three utilities examined have been
higher than the payout rates of private sector utilities (see figure  4.14). In
1999-2000, the dividend payout ratios of private sector utilities averaged around
47 per cent and ranged between 27 and 56 per cent (PC 2001a). By comparison, the
dividend payout ratios of the three case study utilities averaged 92 per cent over the
study period, ranging between 40 per cent for Sydney Water and 124 per cent for
Hunter Water in 1999-2000.
Figure 4.14 Dividend payout ratio — Sydney Water Corporation and Hunter


























Note Dividend payout ratio is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. a The dividend payout ratios for 1993-94 and 1996-97 have been revised from those published
in previous Steering Committee Reports. b In 1992-93, Hunter Water had a dividend payout ratio of
1053 per cent, implying the payment of dividends from sources other than current year profits. c SA Water did
not pay a dividend for the years 1990-91 to 1993-94. d In 1994-95, SA Water had a dividend payout ratio of
1682 per cent, implying the payment of dividends from sources other than current year profits. e In 1995-96,
SA Water incurred an operating loss after tax. The dividend payout ratio for that year was –437 per cent,
implying the payment of dividends from sources other than current year profits.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).INFRASTRUCTURE
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When dividend payout ratios are greater than 100 per cent it indicates that the water
utility is paying the dividend from sources other than current year profits. This was
the case for Hunter Water and SA Water in some years. A negative dividend payout
ratio for SA Water in 1995-96 implies that the utility incurred an operating loss
after tax in that year but was still required to pay a dividend from sources other than
current year profits.
The dividend to equity ratios — broadly in the 1  to  3  per  cent range
(see figure 4.15) — appear to be below that of private companies operating in the
utilities market. In 1999-2000, for example, the dividend to equity ratio of private
sector utilities averaged around 5 per cent, but ranged between 2 and 10 per cent
(PC 2001a).
Changes in the dividend payout ratio and dividend to equity ratios from year-to-year
may reflect the profitability of a utility. However, they may also be due to the effect
of liabilities, changes in asset values and decisions to fund investment using
retained earnings.
Figure 4.15 Dividend to equity ratio — Sydney Water Corporation and

















Sydney Water Hunter Water SA Water
a
Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. a SA Water did not pay a dividend for the years
1990-91 to 1993-94.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).WATER AND
SEWERAGE
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Attachment A – Assumptions and data sources
underlying construction of real price indexes
Capital city household real price indexes
The first step in constructing a household real price index for most of the Australian
capital cities was to derive a consumption basket for water and sewerage. The value
of the basket was calculated using the tariff rates applicable for the period 1990-91
to 2000-01.
The resulting nominal price index was then deflated by the CPI (All groups) price
index for each capital city to convert it to a real price index.
The nominal price index excludes the GST that was introduced in 2000-01 because
household water and sewerage customers are exempt from this tax. However, GST
is included in the CPI (All groups) index used to deflate nominal prices to real
prices.
Sydney
The real price index for Sydney households was based on a water use charge and a
fixed charge for water and sewerage services over the study period. The
environmental levy was included,32 property-based charges were excluded
(see section 4.3 for details),33 and stormwater charges were excluded.
The following assumptions were used in constructing the index:
•   average water consumption of 240 kl per year; and
•   all properties had a 20 mm connection.
Melbourne
The real price index for Melbourne households was based on property-based
charges (1990-91 to 1996-97), a water use charge (1990-91 to 2000-01), a sewerage
use charge (1994-95 to 2000-01) and a fixed charge for water and sewerage
(1997-98 to 2000-01). The drainage charge was excluded.
                                             
32 The levy applied between 1990-91 and 1993-94.
33 Property-based charges were in place from 1990-91 to 1994-95 and were completely abolished
for household customers in 1995 (SWC 1995).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Data provided by WSAA was used to calculate the value of the consumption basket
for the period 1990-91 to 1993-94 (Water Services Association of Australia,
Melbourne, pers. comm., 6 December 2001). For 1994-95, it was assumed that the
value of the consumption basket was similar to that for 1995-96.
Data published in WSAAfacts for City West Water (the representative water utility
for Melbourne households), was used to calculate the value of the consumption
basket for the period 1995-96 to 2000-01 (WSAA 2001 and previous issues).
The following assumptions were used in constructing the index:
•   average water consumption of 270 kl per year; and
•   a 60 per cent discharge factor applied to the sewerage use charge (1994-95 to
2000-01).
Brisbane
The real price index for Brisbane households was based on property-based charges
for water and sewerage (1990-91 to 1995-96), a water use charge and a fixed charge
for water and sewerage (1996-97 to 2000-01). Calculations were based on average
water consumption of 255 kl per year.
Adelaide
The real price index for Adelaide households was based on a water use charge, an
annual fixed water supply charge and a sewerage charge based on the capital value
of the property, set by the Valuer-General on 1  July each year (1990-91 to
2000-01).
Average annual household property values were provided by SA Water and used to
calculate the value of the sewerage component of the consumption basket
(SA Water, Adelaide, pers. comm., 10 October 2001).
The following assumptions were used in constructing the index:
•   average water consumption of 250 kl per year; and
•   free water allowance of 136 kl per year (1991-92 to 1994-95).
Perth
The household real price index data published in the report titled ‘Steering
Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government TradingWATER AND
SEWERAGE
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Enterprises’ was used to construct the water and sewerage real price index series for
the period 1990-91 to 1996-97 (SCNPMGTE 1998 and previous issues).
For the years 1997-98, 1999-2000 and 2000-01, published price increases in the
Water Corporation’s annual reports were used to extend the earlier real price index
series (WCWA 2000 and previous issues).
For 1998-99, the approved general price increase was provided by the Water
Corporation (Water Corporation, Perth, pers. comm., 24 April 2002).
Hobart
The real price index for Hobart households was based on property-based charges for
water and sewerage (1990-91 to 2000-01). Calculations for the value of the
consumption basket were based on an average property value, that is, an assessed
annual value (AAV) of $7020 which was provided by Hobart City Council
(Hobart City Council, pers. comm., 27 November 2001).
Darwin
The real price index for Darwin households was based on a water use charge
(1990-91 to 2000-01), a daily fixed access charge for water (1998-99 to 2000-01)
and a fixed annual sewerage charge (1990-91 to 2000-01). An average water
consumption of 650 kl per year was assumed.
Canberra
The real price index for Canberra households was based on a water use charge and a
fixed charge for water and sewerage over the study period. The environmental levy
which applied between 1992-93 and 1998-99 was included.
The following assumptions were used in constructing the index:
•   average water consumption of 280 kl per year;
•   free water allowance of 455 kl per year (1990-91);
•   free water allowance of 350 kl per year (1991-92 to 1993-94); and
•   free water allowance of 1 kl per year (1994-95 to 2000-01).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Non-metropolitan household real price indexes
Hunter region
A similar approach to that used to construct the capital city household real price
indexes was used to construct a real price index for the Hunter region.
The real price index was based on a water and sewerage use charge, a fixed charge
for water and sewerage services, and an environmental improvement charge over
the study period. The drainage service charge was excluded.
The following assumptions were used in constructing the index:
•   average water consumption of 210 kl per year;
•   all properties had a 20 mm connection;
•   a 100 per cent discharge factor applied to the sewerage use charge in 1990-91;
and
•   a 50 per cent discharge factor applied to the fixed sewerage and use charge from
1991-92 to 2000-01.
South Australia
A similar approach to that used to construct the capital city household real price
indexes was used to construct the household real price index for non-metropolitan
areas of SA.
The real price index was based on a water use charge, an annual fixed water supply
charge and a sewerage charge based on the capital value of the property, set by the
Valuer-General on 1 July each year (1990-91 to 2000-01).
Average annual household property values were provided by SA Water and used to
calculate the value of the sewerage component of the consumption basket
(SA Water, Adelaide, pers. comm., 10 October 2001).
The following assumptions were used in constructing the index:
•   average water consumption of 250 kl per year; and
•   free water allowance of 136 kl per year (1991-92 to 1994-95).WATER AND
SEWERAGE
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Concession holder real price indexes
Sydney NSW
The real price index for Sydney concession holders involved deriving three
consumption baskets based on low water use (150 kl per year), medium water use
(227 kl per year) and high water use (300 kl per year) for non-concession holders
over the period 1990-91 to 2000-01. Property-based charges were excluded (see
section 4.3 for details),34 the environmental levy was excluded because concession
holders did not pay this levy,35 and stormwater charges were excluded.
The rebate entitlement for concession holders was deducted from the values for the
three non-concession holder baskets, and then expressed as a nominal price index.
The three nominal price indexes were then deflated by the CPI (All groups) for
Sydney.
It was assumed that all properties had a 20 mm connection.
Hunter region NSW
The real price index for Hunter concession holders involved deriving a consumption
basket based on average water use of 210 kl per year for non-concession holders
over the period 1990-91 to 2000-01.
The rebate entitlement for concession holders was deducted from the value for the
non-concession holder basket and then expressed as a nominal price index. The
nominal price index was then deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Sydney.
The environmental improvement charge was excluded in the calculation of the
value of the consumption basket because concession holders did not pay this levy.
Metropolitan and non-metropolitan South Australia
The real price index for metropolitan Adelaide and non-metropolitan concession
holders was derived using a consumption basket based on average water use of
250 kl per year for non-concession holders over the period 1990-91 to 2000-01.
                                             
34 Property-based charges were in place from 1990-91 to 1994-95 and were completely abolished
for household customers in 1995 (SWC 1995).
35 The levy applied between 1990-91 and 1993-94.INFRASTRUCTURE
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The rebate entitlement for concession holders was deducted from the value for the
non-concession holder basket and then expressed as a nominal price index. The
nominal price indexes for metropolitan and non-metropolitan concession holders
were then deflated by the CPI (All groups) for Adelaide.
Business real price indexes
The nominal business price index excludes the GST that was introduced in 2000-01
because business water and sewerage customers are exempt from this tax. However,
GST is included in the CPI (All groups) index used to deflate nominal prices to real
prices.
Sydney NSW
Three real price indexes for low, medium and high water use business customers in
Sydney were constructed. They were based on a water use charge, a sewerage use
charge (for discharges greater than 500  kl per year), a fixed charge for water,
sewerage and stormwater, and property-based charges for water, sewerage and
stormwater (for AAV greater than $2500).36
The following assumptions were used in constructing the indexes:
For low water use business customers:
•   average water consumption of 100 kl per year;
•   all properties had a 20 mm connection;
•   an AAV of $10  000 was used to calculate the value of the property-based
component of the consumption basket;
•   the sewerage use charge did not apply (because water consumption was below
500 kl per year); and
•   an 80 per cent discharge factor applied to the fixed sewerage charge.
For medium water use business customers:
•   average water consumption of 1700 kl per year;
•   all properties had a 40 mm connection;
                                             
36 From 1992-93 to 2000-01, the fixed charge for water and sewerage was based on the size of the
meter connected to the property. Prior to this a fixed charge applied to water and sewerage
services which was not based on the size of the customers meter. In 1996-97, property-based
charges for water were abolished. However, property-based charges for sewerage and
stormwater applied to all business customers over the study period.WATER AND
SEWERAGE
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•   an AAV of $50  000 was used to calculate the value of the property-based
component of the consumption basket; and
•   an 80 per cent discharge factor applied to the fixed sewerage and use charge.
For high water use business customers:
•   average water consumption of 500 000 kl per year;
•   all properties had a 300 mm connection;
•   an AAV of $1 000 000 was used to calculate the value of the property-based
component of the consumption basket; and
•   an 80 per cent discharge factor applied to the fixed sewerage and use charge.
Hunter region NSW
Four real price indexes for low, medium, medium to high and high water use
business customers in the Hunter region were constructed. They were based on a
water and sewerage use charge, a fixed charge for water and sewerage, the
environmental improvement charge, and property-based charges for water and
sewerage for the period 1990-91 to 1993-94.37 Drainage charges were excluded.
Sewerage charges, trade waste charges and inspection fees were not included in the
calculation of the real price index for high water use business customers.
The following assumptions were used in constructing the indexes:
For low water use business customers:
•   average water consumption of 300 kl per year;
•   all properties had a 20 mm connection;
•   a property value of $9000 was used to calculate the value of the property-based
component of the consumption basket; and
•   an 80 per cent discharge factor applied to the fixed sewerage and use charge.
For medium water use business customers:
•   average water consumption of 3000 kl per year;
•   all properties had a 40 mm connection;
                                             
37 Over the study period, the fixed charge for water was based on the size of the meter connected
to the property. From 1991-92 to 2000-01, the fixed sewerage and use charge was based on the
size of the meter connected to the property and a discharge factor.INFRASTRUCTURE
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•   a property value of $25 000 was used to calculate the value of the property-based
component of the consumption basket; and
•   an 80 per cent discharge factor applied to the fixed sewerage and use charge.
For medium to high water use business customers:
•   average water consumption of 30 000 kl per year;
•   all properties had a 40 mm connection;
•   a property value of $100  000 was used to calculate the value of the
property-based component of the consumption basket; and
•   an 80 per cent discharge factor applied to the fixed sewerage and use charge.
For high water use business customers:
•   average water consumption of 300 000 kl per year;
•   all properties had a 300 mm connection; and
•   a property value of $200  000 was used to calculate the value of the
property-based component of the consumption basket.
Metropolitan Adelaide
The real price indexes for industrial and commercial business customers in
metropolitan Adelaide were based on a water use charge, an annual fixed water
supply charge and a sewerage charge based on the capital value of the property, set
by the Valuer-General on 1 July each year (1990-91 to 2000-01).
Average annual industrial and commercial property values were provided by
SA Water (SA Water, Adelaide, pers. comm., 10 October 2001).
The following assumptions were used in constructing the indexes:
•   average water consumption of 4300 kl per year for industrial customers;
•   average water consumption of 490 kl per year for commercial customers;
•   a free water allowance applied to commercial customers. This was calculated by
dividing the water supply charge for the average customer by the water use
charge;
•   for industrial businesses, the calculation of the fixed water supply charge was




•   for commercial businesses, the calculation of the fixed water supply charge was
based on the average annual property value for the period 1990-91 to 2000-01.
Non-metropolitan South Australia
The real price indexes for industrial and commercial business customers in
non-metropolitan areas of SA were based on a water use charge, an annual fixed
water supply charge and a sewerage charge based on the capital value of the
property, set by the Valuer-General on 1 July each year (1990-91 to 2000-01).
Average annual industrial and commercial property values were provided by
SA Water (SA Water, Adelaide, pers. comm., 10 October 2001).
The following assumptions were used in constructing the indexes:
•   average water consumption of 4800 kl per year for industrial customers;
•   average water consumption of 229 kl per year for commercial customers;
•   a free water allowance applied to commercial customers. This was calculated by
dividing the water supply charge for the average customer by the water use
charge;
•   for industrial businesses, the calculation of the fixed water supply charge was
based on the average annual property value for the period 1990-91 and 1994-95;
and
•   for commercial businesses, the calculation of the fixed water supply charge was
based on the average annual property value for the period 1990-91 to 2000-01.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Attachment B – Data tables
Table B4.1 Real water and sewerage price trends — metropolitan
households
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 102.5 107.8 95.2 104.9 104.3 97.9 103.9 99.9
1992-93 106.4 113.7 98.1 107.2 102.9 98.7 107.7 108.5
1993-94 111.2 127.1 120.4 105.7 108.5 98.8 105.8 113.2
1994-95 103.7 105.6 113.8 107.2 112.0 97.6 102.9 109.4
1995-96 101.4 101.8 108.0 110.4 108.7 74.5 108.8 107.4
1996-97 104.7 101.4 97.6 114.8 107.7 77.6 115.4 109.5
1997-98 108.4 94.2 102.5 119.7 112.3 73.5 115.7 116.2
1998-99 108.7 86.2 114.6 120.7 113.6 67.5 141.1 114.2
1999-00 110.5 84.0 117.7 121.1 113.2 62.9 139.0 114.9
2000-01 107.4 79.2 122.7 115.8 109.5 65.6 134.4 112.0
Note For details on the construction of the household real price indexes refer to attachment A.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); ACT Electricity and
Water Corporation, Canberra, pers. comm., 29 April 2002; Brisbane Water, pers. comm., 7 November 2001;
Hobart City Council, pers. comm., 27  November 2001; IPART (1995, 1998, 2000b); PAWA (2000 and
previous issues); Power and Water Authority, Darwin, pers. comm., 16 October 2001; SA Water, Adelaide,
pers. comm., 10 October 2001; SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); SWC (2001a and previous issues);
WCWA (2000 and previous issues); WSAA (2001 and previous issues); Water Services Association of
Australia, Melbourne, pers. comm., 6 December 2001.
Table B4.2 Real water and sewerage price trends — households, Sydney
Water Corporation and Hunter Water Corporation (NSW)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)












Note For details on the construction of the household real price indexes refer to attachment A.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); HWC (2001 and
previous issues); SWC (2001a and previous issues).WATER AND
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Table B4.3 Real water and sewerage price trends — households, SA Water
(SA)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)












Note For details on the construction of the household real price indexes refer to attachment A.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); SA Water, Adelaide,
pers. comm., 10 October 2001.
Table B4.4 Real water and sewerage price trends — non-concession and
concession holders, Sydney Water Corporation (NSW)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
















1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 103.3 103.3 103.4 103.4 103.4 103.4
1992-93 107.5 105.9 108.3 107.8 108.3 107.8
1993-94 117.3 117.2 124.4 131.9 128.4 138.8
1994-95 116.7 90.8 125.6 111.0 130.7 122.4
1995-96 113.7 90.4 122.8 110.7 128.2 122.4
1996-97 116.8 96.9 126.7 118.6 132.7 131.0
1997-98 120.7 102.8 131.2 125.8 137.7 138.9
1998-99 120.8 104.3 131.6 127.6 138.1 140.8
1999-00 121.9 108.9 133.6 134.0 141.0 148.3
2000-01 118.3 106.1 129.8 130.5 137.0 144.5
Note For details on the construction of the concession holder real price indexes refer to attachment A. It was
assumed that a low water user consumed 150 kl per year, a medium water user consumed 227 kl per year
and a high water user consumed 300 kl per year.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Sydney Water
Corporation, pers. comm., 20 December 2001; SWC (2001a and previous issues).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table B4.5 Real water and sewerage price trends — non-concession and
concession holders, Hunter Water Corporation (NSW) and SA
Water (SA)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
















1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 102.9 105.8 104.9 106.1 105.1 106.7
1992-93 102.9 106.3 107.2 111.6 107.9 114.0
1993-94 102.6 106.6 105.7 110.5 108.5 116.8
1994-95 99.8 104.2 107.2 115.2 111.4 125.2
1995-96 94.2 97.8 110.4 123.0 117.2 139.2
1996-97 94.4 98.9 114.8 131.3 125.1 154.9
1997-98 93.6 97.7 119.7 137.5 126.4 154.7
1998-99 89.5 91.8 120.7 140.1 124.1 151.3
1999-00 86.3 88.0 121.1 142.4 124.1 153.3
2000-01 81.3 82.9 115.8 136.9 116.5 143.4
Note For details on the construction of the concession holder real price indexes refer to attachment A.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Hunter Water
Corporation, pers. comm., 26 September 2001; HWC (2001 and previous issues); SA Water, Adelaide, pers.
comm., 10 October 2001.
Table B4.6 Real water and sewerage price trends — business, Sydney
Water Corporation (NSW)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Low water user Medium water user High water user
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 103.4 103.4 107.4
1992-93 88.8 106.0 126.0
1993-94 76.5 91.6 119.8
1994-95 56.7 69.0 109.3
1995-96 44.0 54.6 103.7
1996-97 40.5 51.2 106.7
1997-98 37.6 48.3 109.9
1998-99 31.2 41.3 109.4
1999-00 27.8 38.1 111.2
2000-01 25.3 35.3 108.9
Note For details on the construction of the business real price indexes refer to attachment A. For business
customers it was assumed that a low water use customer (100 kl per year) had a 20 mm connection and an
assessed annual value (AAV) of $10 000, a medium water use customer (1700 kl per year) had a 40 mm
connection and an AAV of $50 000, and a high water use customer (500 000 kl per year) had a 300 mm
connection and an AAV of $1  000  000. All business customers were assumed to have an 80  per  cent
discharge factor.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); IPART (2000b).WATER AND
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Table B4.7 Real water and sewerage price trends — business, Hunter
Water Corporation (NSW)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)





1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 99.2 105.7 99.3 103.5
1992-93 92.1 100.2 96.3 105.4
1993-94 69.4 79.7 81.5 105.3
1994-95 36.7 62.3 76.9 104.2
1995-96 36.1 61.7 77.0 100.1
1996-97 35.5 63.8 80.4 103.5
1997-98 36.4 65.7 83.0 105.8
1998-99 35.9 64.9 82.3 104.2
1999-00 35.6 64.6 82.1 103.1
2000-01 34.1 61.4 77.4 97.1
Note For details on the construction of the business real price indexes refer to attachment A. For business
customers it was assumed that a low water use customer (300 kl per year) had a 20 mm connection and a
property value of $9000, a medium water use customer (3000 kl per year) had a 40 mm connection and a
property value of $25 000, a medium to high water use customer (30 000 kl per year) had a 40 mm connection
and a property value of $100  000, and a high water use customer (300  000  kl  per year) had a 300  mm
connection and a property value of $200 000. All business customers were assumed to have an 80 per cent
discharge factor with the exception of high water use customers. Few high use customers are connected to
sewerage services and therefore sewerage charges were not included for this group.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Hunter Water
Corporation, pers. comm., 27 March and 4 April 2002; IPART (2000c).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table B4.8 Real water and sewerage price trends — industrial and
commercial businesses, SA Water (SA)









1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 102.2 102.7 97.7 95.6
1992-93 101.9 104.8 90.4 104.5
1993-94 99.1 103.6 84.5 107.5
1994-95 98.8 102.1 82.5 119.6
1995-96 94.5 100.4 78.8 114.5
1996-97 97.0 101.9 82.3 123.6
1997-98 98.9 105.3 86.0 127.3
1998-99 98.1 103.9 88.0 134.9
1999-00 98.4 105.4 88.1 134.7
2000-01 92.0 99.5 82.2 125.3
Note For details on the construction of the business real price indexes refer to attachment A. For industrial
business customers it was assumed that average water consumption was 4300 kl per year in metropolitan
Adelaide and 4800  kl per year in non-metropolitan areas of SA over the study period. For commercial
business customers it was assumed that average water consumption was 490 kl per year in metropolitan
Adelaide and 229 kl per year in non-metropolitan areas of SA over the study period.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); SA Water, Adelaide,
pers. comm., 10 October 2001.
Table B4.9 Quality of service measures — Sydney Water Corporation
(NSW)
1990-91 to 2000-01












Note Main breaks include bursts and leaks. Leaks include faults that can be fixed without shutting down the
main. Chokes are confirmed partial or total blockages occasioning an interruption to service, excluding any
blockages that occur upstream of the service connections.
Source: WSAA (2001 and previous issues).WATER AND
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Table B4.10 Quality of service measures — Hunter Water Corporation (NSW)
1990-91 to 2000-01












Note Main breaks include bursts and leaks. Leaks include faults that can be fixed without shutting down the
main. Chokes are confirmed partial or total blockages occasioning an interruption to service, excluding any
blockages that occur upstream of the service connections.
Source: WSAA (2001 and previous issues).
Table B4.11 Quality of service measures — SA Water (SA)
1990-91 to 2000-01












Note Main breaks include bursts and leaks. Leaks include faults that can be fixed without shutting down the
main. Chokes are confirmed partial or total blockages occasioning an interruption to service, excluding any
blockages that occur upstream of the service connections.
Source: WSAA (2001 and previous issues).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table B4.12 Return on assets — Sydney Water Corporation and Hunter
Water Corporation (NSW) and SA Water (SA)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
Sydney Water Hunter Water SA Water
1990-91 4.3 2.4 0.5
1991-92 3.1 2.7 1.6
1992-93 2.2 2.4 1.1
1993-94 2.5 2.2 1.9
1994-95 2.2 1.8 2.1
1995-96 2.6 2.2 2.1
1996-97 3.2 3.1 4.0
1997-98 4.0 3.1 4.6
1998-99 2.6 2.8 4.7
1999-00 4.0 2.8 4.8
2000-01 3.2 2.2 4.8
Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year.
Sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).
Table B4.13 Dividend payout ratio — Sydney Water Corporation and Hunter
Water Corporation (NSW) and SA Water (SA)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
Sydney Water Hunter Water SA Watera
1990-91 56.6 46.5 0.0
1991-92 83.3 69.3 0.0
1992-93 50.0 1052.6 0.0
1993-94 40.3 287.2 0.0
1994-95 88.2 329.7 1681.5
1995-96 59.5 177.6 -437.4
1996-97 56.2 56.0 108.7
1997-98 86.0 80.0 90.1
1998-99 60.1 144.0 116.4
1999-00 40.3 80.1 123.6
2000-01 32.7 126.4 100.6
Note Dividend payout ratio is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. a SA Water did not pay a dividend for the years 1990-91 to 1993-94.
Sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).WATER AND
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Table B4.14 Dividend to equity ratio — Sydney Water Corporation and
Hunter Water Corporation (NSW) and SA Water (SA)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
Sydney Water Hunter Water SA Watera
1990-91 1.7 0.4 0.0
1991-92 1.5 0.6 0.0
1992-93 0.3 0.8 0.0
1993-94 0.5 0.9 0.0
1994-95 0.5 1.2 1.4
1995-96 0.4 1.8 0.9
1996-97 0.7 2.0 2.0
1997-98 1.9 2.1 2.3
1998-99 0.8 2.4 3.1
1999-00 1.2 1.5 3.8
2000-01 1.5 1.6 2.9
Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. a SA Water did not pay a dividend for the years
1990-91 to 1993-94.
Sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).URBAN TRANSPORT 139
5U r b a n  T r a n s p o r t
Key outcomes
•   In all capital cities real urban transport prices were higher in 2000-01 than they were
in 1990-91.
•   Increases in real urban transport prices added to overall household expenditure.
The real increase in household expenditure across all capital cities in 2000-01
compared to 1990-91 was about $326 million per year.
•   In all capital cities, real metropolitan taxi prices were higher in 2000-01 than they
were in 1990-91. Increases in taxi fares over the study period have generally been
lower than the increases in the remaining urban transport fares. The exception is
Melbourne.
•   In NSW and Queensland (examined as case studies), real household prices for
urban transport were also higher in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in
2000-01 compared with 1990-91.
•   In both states, the real price change for concession customers was the same as
non-concession customers.
•   There is some evidence of enhancement of service — such as the introduction of
new rolling stock, air-conditioned buses and wheelchair accessible buses. However
quality of service — as measured by punctuality and reliability — remained
generally unchanged.
•   Real price increases in NSW and Queensland do not appear to have been sufficient
to allow ‘commercial’ financial targets to be met.
•   In the case of the State Transit Authority, it appears that real government
contributions (defined as explicit payments and implicit subsidies) have declined.
The Australian urban transport industry has undergone extensive reform since
1990-91.1 These reforms have influenced the prices paid for urban transport
services. Further, as fares were re-structured to be more reflective of cost, price
trends varied between households situated in metropolitan and non-metropolitan
areas.
                                             
1 For the purposes of this study, urban transport is defined as bus, tram, train, ferry and taxi
services. The definition does not include hire cars, horse drawn vehicles or motorcycles.INFRASTRUCTURE
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In this chapter, trends in real prices paid by household customers for urban transport
services are presented for the period 1990-91 to 2000-01. Using a case study
approach, differences in price trends between metropolitan and non-metropolitan
customers, and between concession and non-concession customers are also
presented.
Quality of service measures were examined to determine whether any declines in
real prices over the period have been associated with lower service quality. Finally,
the financial performance of the case study utilities was examined to see if price
declines have been associated with falling rates of return.
Urban transport service providers generally require budgetary funding to make good
their operating deficits. Consequently, trends in the level of government subsidies
and funding of urban transport was also examined.
5.1 Industry reforms
Many governments are extensively involved in the provision of urban transport
services — through ownership, funding support and the regulation of fares and
quality of service. The reasons they cite for this include service coordination,
system-wide ticketing and recognition of natural monopoly characteristics and
positive externalities. Some States have addressed these issues through
public-private partnerships and privatisation.
Urban transport is not subject to a specific agreement under the National
Competition Policy (NCP) package of reforms. However, some aspects of the NCP
agreements have had a noticeable impact on administrative and operational
arrangements. These include, the application of competitive neutrality principles,
prices oversight of public monopolies and the contracting out of service provision.
A general aim of microeconomic reform has been to increase the commercial focus
of publicly-owned service providers and reduce their reliance on government
funding support. In urban transport, the principal reforms have been:
•   governance – the commercialisation, corporatisation or privatisation of
government-owned service providers;
•   market – the introduction of competitive tendering of some urban transport
services; and
•   tariff – the introduction of policies that increase prices to be more reflective of
costs and policies such as integrated ticketing — aimed at increasing
convenience to customers.URBAN TRANSPORT 141
Governance reforms
Governance reform in the period 1990 to 2001 was achieved by commercialisation,
corporatisation and in some cases privatisation. The rate at which these changes
were implemented varied across jurisdictions. These reforms were typical of those
described in chapter 1.
The Victorian public transport sector provides an example of the restructuring
process accompanying the reform of governance arrangements. The Public
Transport Corporation’s suburban passenger services, MetTrains and MetTram,
were restructured into four corporations under the Rail Corporations (Amendment)
Act 1997. MetTrains was divided into two State business corporations — Hillside
Trains and Bayside Trains.2 MetTram was also restructured into two State business
corporations — Yarra Trams and Swanson Trams. The four businesses were
incorporated in 1998.
Privatisation of Melbourne train and tram services occurred in August 1999, when
they were purchased by three companies — Metrolink Pty Ltd, Connex Melbourne
and National Express (Australia).
Privatisation of bus services in Melbourne was achieved in 1998 when the services
provided by MetBus were transferred to two private sector companies. As at
October 2001, there were 41 private sector bus operators providing Melbourne
metropolitan bus services.
Other jurisdictions have commercialised or corporatised their government-owned
urban transport service providers. In 1995-96, the Metropolitan Transport Trust
(Tasmania) became a government business enterprise (GBE) subject to the
Government Business Enterprise Act 1995. Prices oversight was provided for under
the Government Prices Oversight Act 1995. In February 1998, the Metropolitan
Transport Trust was made a government-owned company — Metro Tasmania Pty
Ltd — subject to corporations law.
Accompanying the process of structural reform has been a movement towards
making taxpayer funding more transparent and improving accountability through
the implementation of community service obligation (CSO) agreements, supported
by explicit government funding arrangements.
ACTION (ACT) entered into an agreement in 1996-97 to provide CSO services.
ACTION receives reimbursement for offering fares below a commercial level,
                                             
2 Hillside Trains became Connex on 23 July 2000.INFRASTRUCTURE
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providing general route off-peak services, concession travel for students, and the
provision of school services and special needs transport.3
Market reforms
Urban transport has been exposed to competition through competitive tendering for
designated bus and ferry services. GTEs have been required to compete with private
sector providers for the right to operate certain urban passenger services. For
example, in 1995, the Passenger Transport Board (SA) developed an area-based
competitive tendering program for the provision of urban transport services within
the Adelaide metropolitan region. The government-owned utility — TransAdelaide
— was required to compete with the private sector on the basis of a set of costing
rules aimed at ensuring competitive neutrality vis a vis private sector competitors.
In 1999-2000, TransAdelaide was unsuccessful in tendering for the provision of
urban bus services in Adelaide. As a result, TransAdelaide no longer provides bus
services in its own right.4 In 2001, urban transport contractors included Australian
Transit Enterprises Pty Ltd, Serco Australia Pty Ltd, Torrens Transit Pty Ltd,
SouthLink and TransitPlus.
In 1993-94, competitive tendering of service contracts was introduced in WA.
Transperth — the metropolitan urban transport system — is comprised of
businesses that provide bus, train, ferry and information services. Private companies
and government organisations compete to operate these services, and the successful
tenderers are known as Transperth operators.5
Competition has also been introduced through tendering franchise agreements. In
Melbourne, such agreements exist between the Victorian Government and
Metrolink Pty Ltd, Connex Melbourne and National Express (Australia) to operate
Hillside Trains, Bayside Trains, Yarra Trams and Swanson Trams as franchises.
Incentive-based payments and penalties are a feature of the Victorian franchise
agreements. The Victorian government implemented an Operational Performance
Regime, whereby tram and train operators may pay a penalty or receive an incentive
                                             
3 ACTION operates the special needs transport on a full cost recovery basis with the revenue for
this service coming from ACT Health Community Care, the ACT Department of Education and
Canberra Hospital.
4 Metropolitan bus services are provided by TransitPlus, a business formed through a relationship
between TransAdelaide and Australian Transit Enterprises Pty Ltd.
5 In October 2001, bus services were provided by CGEA Perth Bus, Southern Coast Transit,
Swan Transit, and Path Transit. Ferry services were provided by Perth Water Transport and
train services by Westrail. Information services are operated by Serco Australia.URBAN TRANSPORT 143
payment depending on their performance as measured by indicators of reliability
and punctuality. Further incentives are available to operators for increasing
patronage.
Tariff reforms
The fare structures for urban transport services also vary across jurisdictions (for an
explanation of fare structures see box 5.1). For example, a sectional structure is
employed in Hobart, while a flat fare structure is used in Adelaide. In addition,
some jurisdictions use a combination of fare structures. Sydney has a sectional
system overlaid with a zonal system. However, most jurisdictions tend to use a zone
based system.
Box 5.1 Fare structures — Urban transport
•   Flat fares are single fares which apply to all services. For example, a ticket in
Adelaide allows customers to travel anywhere on the Adelaide Metro public
transport system, within a two hour time period, with no constraints on intermodal
transfer.
•   Zone fares are similar to flat fares in that only one fare is payable within a specified
geographically defined area of travel. However, there are generally a number of
zones within a single urban transport network. Zonal systems are mostly
time-based so that tickets have an expiry time. Zonal systems are more conducive
to allowing transfers both within and between transport modes than other fare
types.
•   Distance-based fares are determined by the distance travelled. Distance fares are
usually described with reference to artificially created section points. Such fare
structures are employed by MetroTas, CityRail and for private bus operators in
NSW.
•   Time-based fares are valid for travel within a specified period regardless of the
distance travelled or the number of transfers. Elements of time-based travel are
evident in Melbourne fares.
•   Off-peak fares provide reductions in flat distance-based or zone fares outside of
peak periods. Off-peak fares are aimed at increasing patronage. Public transport
networks are designed to handle peak period demand (usually morning and
afternoon commuter traffic). Lower demand during non-peak may lead to under
utilisation of infrastructure. Off-peak pricing aims to increase demand during these
periods and therefore increase service revenue.
•   Mulitmodal fares allow passengers to transfer between modes of transport. For




Off-peak fares are available in most jurisdictions, as are multimodal fares. All
jurisdictions offer discounts on a periodical or volume purchase basis. Discounts
based on volume purchases include Multirider tickets and the Fare Saver or Ten
Trip Saver tickets in Brisbane. Discounts based on periodical purchases include the
daily, weekly, monthly or yearly Metcards available in Melbourne.
Several jurisdictions have implemented integrated ticketing to address declining
patronage and to increase convenience of use. Integrated ticketing ensures that one
ticket system applies to all transport modes and allows passengers to transfer
between modes.
Integrated ticketing affects fares as it necessitates the standardisation of full and
concession fares as well as the integration of existing fare zones or sections. Fully
integrated ticketing systems operate in Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth. Integrated
ticketing has been partially introduced in Brisbane and Sydney.6
In some jurisdictions, increases in the real fare price index over the study period
reflect the introduction of reforms aimed at increasing farebox cost recovery. An
example is the fare increases administered by ACTION (ACT) between 1990 and
2001.7
The Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission (ICRC) is responsible
for determining the price direction for ACTION. The ICRC has stated that
improvements in revenue are required to produce more efficient bus operations and
that there is further scope to raise the general level of ACTION fares as a means of
contributing to an improvement in farebox cost recovery (ICRC 2001). The ICRC
estimates that average real fare increases will assist in raising ACTION’s farebox
cost recovery from 22.7  per  cent in 1998-99 to 26.6  per  cent in 2000-01 (ICRC
2000).
In Victoria, as part of the public transport reform program, the State Government
sought to decrease taxpayer funding by $245 million per year. A specific element of
the financial strategies identified by the government for achieving the target
reduction was a 10 per cent increase in transport fares in 1993 (Auditor-General of
Victoria 1998).
                                             
6 In 2002 both Brisbane and Sydney were implementing smart card integrated ticketing.
7 In 1991-92 and 1992-93, fare increases were applied to most tickets. In 1995-96, the fare
increase was applied to adult pre-purchased tickets. Child, student and concession fares
remained unchanged, as did cash fares for all categories. In 1996-97, the fare increase was
applied to most pre-purchased tickets for adults and pensioner, senior and child categories. New
tickets were also introduced for students and for families and shoppers travelling at off-peak
times. The 2000-01 fare increase is consistent with the final price direction set by the ICRC —
the increase reflects movements in the CPI and a GST component of 8 per cent.URBAN TRANSPORT 145
Farebox cost recovery can also be increased through the implementation of revenue
protection measures, specifically, measures aimed at decreasing fare evasion. Such
measures include the appointment of revenue protection officers. The appointment
of revenue protection officers by ACTION contributed to an increase in cash fares
of $350 000 in 2000 (ICRC 2001).
5.2 Price outcomes for metropolitan households
The prices reported in this section are for the urban transport component of the
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) consumer price index (CPI) series. Prices are
presented for each capital city. In constructing this price series, the ABS covers all
major modes of urban transport according to their availability in particular capital
cities. The modes covered include trains, buses, trams, ferries and taxis.8
The Goods and Services Tax (GST), introduced in July 2000, was included in the
nominal household price series for 2000-01 because households incur the full cost
of this tax.
Prices are collected by the ABS for samples of a number of trips between specific
origins and destinations. The prices include those applying to single, multi,
periodical, peak, off-peak, non-concession or concession (including pensioner and
student) tickets.
The urban transport prices reported by the ABS can be expressed in real terms. Real
prices trended upwards in all capital cities between 1990-91 and 2000-01. The
largest increase (43  per  cent) was experienced in Perth. Increases in Brisbane,
Adelaide, Darwin and Canberra ranged from 30 to 35 per cent. Sydney, Melbourne
and Hobart had real increases of 22, 24 and 26 per cent respectively (see figure 5.1).
Real prices increased further in all capital cities in 2000-01, with the introduction of
the GST. For example, ACTION fares in Canberra increased by 8 per cent to reflect
the net impact of the GST.9
The rise in fares across all jurisdictions is consistent with the adoption of policies
aimed at increasing farebox cost recovery. The strong growth of prices in Perth,
may be attributed to a policy change first introduced in 1993.
                                             
8 Price indices that rely on ABS data include a weighting for taxis that can be regarded as one
mode of ‘public’ transport. The weighting varies by jurisdiction and taxi fares are discussed in
greater detail later in the chapter.
9 The impact of the GST has not been netted out of the price indexes.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
Note The real price index for each capital city was obtained by rebasing the CPI (urban transport) price
indexes to a base year of 1990-91 and then deflating the rebased indexes by the re-based CPI (All groups)
price index for each capital city. The CPI (urban transport) price indexes for 2000-2001 include the Goods and
Services Tax.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).URBAN TRANSPORT 147
In Adelaide, prices were increased significantly in July 1991 due to an
across-the-board fare increase, the application of a premium to onboard (cash)
tickets, and the introduction of student fares — previously students had travelled
free of charge. Prices rose again in July  1998 due to an across-the-board fare
increase of approximately 9  per  cent resulting from a general review process
(Passenger Transit Board, Adelaide, pers. comm., 25 September 2001).
Prices in Darwin were relatively stable until 1998, when bus fares were increased
by 20 cents across the board (Department of Transport and Works, Darwin, pers.
comm., 25 October 2001). Rising prices in 1999-2000 reflect a substantial increase
in taxi hiring charges in Darwin.
Hobart urban transport prices were increased in 1996-97 in order to improve
farebox cost recovery. Accompanying the across-the-board fare increase, was a
decrease in the discount on pre-purchased tickets, such as ten trip tickets, from
approximately 30  per  cent to 20  per  cent (Metro Tasmania Pty Ltd, Hobart,
pers. comm., 30 September 2001).
Implications for household expenditure
Urban transport prices have a direct effect on household expenditure. The direct
impact of changes in the price of urban transport over the decade on real household
expenditure in 2000-01 was estimated. This was done by multiplying the actual
household expenditure on urban transport in 2000-01, by the difference between the
movement in its price over the ten years to 2000-01 and the movement in the CPI
(All groups) over the same ten year period. For this calculation, the impact of price
changes on consumption was ignored.
In 2000-01, total expenditure by capital city households on urban transport was
around $1.6 billion.10
Urban transport price trends were such that prices increased faster than the CPI (All
groups). Real increases in household expenditure, arising from price changes over
the previous decade, on urban transport occurred in all jurisdictions (see tables 5.1
and 5.2). The level of increase varied between cities. Total increase in expenditure
by all households across all capital cities approximated $326  million per  year
                                             
10 Actual household expenditure in 2000-01 was derived by taking the proportion of total
household expenditure that was spent on urban transport by households in the 1998-99
Household Expenditure Survey (ABS 2000a). The proportion or expenditure weight was then
multiplied by total household expenditure in 1998-99 and inflated to 2000-01 prices using the




(see table 5.3). The largest increases were for households in Sydney (approximately
$128 million per year). The lowest increase was in Darwin at $2 million per year.
Table 5.1 Real change to household urban transport expenditure arising
from price changes over the previous decade
$ per capital city household, 2000-01
Income quintile Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
All households 84.82 64.10 87.75 49.45 59.47 37.31 49.71 86.98
Note  The Commission did not calculate the real change to expenditure by income quintile because the
estimates are statistically unreliable  at the necessary level of disaggregation.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0);
ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).
Table 5.2 Real change to household urban transport expenditure arising
from price changes over the previous decade, as a proportion
of total expenditure
Per cent per capital city household, 2000-01
Income quintile Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
All households 0.19 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.18
Note  The Commission did not calculate the real change to  expenditure by income quintile because the
estimates are statistically unreliable  at the necessary level of disaggregation.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0);
ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).
Table 5.3 Total change to household urban transport expenditure arising
from price changes over the previous decade
$ per capital city household, 2000-01
Householdsa Change per household Total change
No. $ $000s
Sydney   1,507,189               84.82 127 838 119
Melbourne   1,330,406               64.10 85 275 320
Brisbane      549,387               87.75 48 208 858
Adelaide      436,065               49.45 21 565 510
Perth      456,010               59.47 27 116 843
Hobart        89,751               37.31 3 348 783
Darwin        38,530               49.71 1 915 508
Canberra      125,561               86.98 10 921 584
Total   4,532,899 326 190 525
a Household numbers in each capital city were calculated by multiplying the proportion of households in each
capital city as reported by the ABS (1996) by the total number of capital city households reported in the ABS
(2000a).
Sources: ABS (The Australian Consumer Price Index-Concepts, Sources and Methods, Cat. no. 6461.0); ABS
(Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0).URBAN TRANSPORT 149
5.3 Price trends for taxis and other forms of urban
transport
In this section, the price trends for taxis and other forms of urban transport are
presented separately. Trends for all forms of urban transport other than taxis, were
derived by netting out taxi price trends from the ABS CPI series for urban transport
as a whole, which includes taxis. Price trends for taxis were derived from fare
information.
Taxis
Taxis have a number of characteristics which complicate price trend comparisons
with other modes of urban transport. Taxis do not provide scheduled transport
services — they are not subject to the constraint of set routes and timetables.
Government involvement in the taxi market has not extended to ownership as it has
in other modes of urban transport. However, governments do heavily regulate the
taxi industry.
Information regarding taxi fares over the last decade across all jurisdictions is not
readily available from a single source such as the ABS. Consequently, the
Commission collected fare and policy documents for taxis for all capital cities for
the period 1990-91 to 2000-01.
Industry reforms affecting taxi fares
Taxis are regulated in all jurisdictions of Australia. Regulatory arrangements
typically encompass three key elements — market entry, quality of service and
fares.
Entry regulations restrict the number of taxis, by requiring taxis to be licensed and
limiting the number of licences issued. The regulation of market entry directly
affects the value of taxi plates and consequently, taxi fares, such that fares are
higher than they otherwise would be (IPART 1999). Taxi plate values exceed
$200 000 in most Australian capital cities and the National Competition Council
(NCC) has stated that they have been estimated to add around one third to the cost
of a taxi fare (Deighton-Smith 2000).
On 1 January 1999, the NT government deregulated entry into the taxi sector. This
involved the cancellation of pre-existing taxi licences and a lump sum compensationINFRASTRUCTURE
PRICE TRENDS
150
of $23.7 million to plate owners.11 By August 1999, the number of taxis operating
in Darwin had grown by 22 per cent (Department of Transport and Works, Darwin,
pers. comm., 24 January 2002).12
Quality of service is regulated through the imposition of quality controls and
minimum standards. Such controls can take the form of owner accreditation, driver
authorisation, vehicle standards (such as age) and roadworthiness. Customer service
can also be regulated — by monitoring driver behaviour and mandating the wearing
of uniforms.
The imposition of minimum standards for vehicles and operators affects taxi costs
and fares. For example, in 1996, flagfall rates were increased in NSW so that taxi
drivers and operators could recoup the costs incurred through the introduction of
new regulatory requirements, such as installing a vehicle tracking device, security
alarms device, security screen and driver uniforms (Taxi Hire Car Bureau, Sydney,
pers. comm., 20 August 2001).
Fares or hiring charges are regulated through the setting of maximum and additional
fares. Fares typically comprise a booking fee, flagfall rate, distance rate and a
detention rate. In all jurisdictions, fares vary according to the time of day, with the
exception of Victoria, where a single fare applies all day.
Taxi price trends
Real taxi price indexes were constructed for all capital cities based on a common
reference journey. A distance of 10  kilometres, with one flagfall and 3  minutes
waiting time was assumed for a reference journey. Booking fees were not included.
The price indexes were calculated using the fares in each jurisdiction.
The resulting indexes reveal that fares have increased in real terms for all
jurisdictions since 1990-91 (see figure  5.2). In 2000-01 fares increased in all
jurisdictions due to the introduction of the GST. The increase attributable to GST in
Darwin  was  approximately  6 per cent  and  8 per cent  in  Perth  and  Melbourne
(Department of Transport and Works, Darwin, pers.  comm., 24  January  2002;
Batchelor 2000).
                                             
11 Prior to the reforms the valuation of taxi plates was partially determined by the fact that taxi
licences were sold and not leased to operators. Under the introduced reforms taxi plates are
leased for periods of up to 12 months after which they need to be renewed.
12 This increase should be viewed in the context of substantial accompanying decreases in the
number of operating private hire vehicles and mini buses.URBAN TRANSPORT 151


























































Perth Hobart Dawin Canberra
Note  Real taxi price indexes were constructed for all capital cities based on a common reference journey —
distance of 10 kilometres, with one flagfall and 3 minutes waiting time. Booking fees were not included. The
real price index for each capital city was obtained by rebasing taxi fares to 1990-91 and then deflating by the
CPI (All groups) for each capital city. The nominal price series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services
Tax. Fare determinations for Darwin 1991 were not available, therefore the 1992 fare was extrapolated
backwards based on the CPI for Darwin.
Data Source: For details on data sources refer to attachment A, table A5.2.INFRASTRUCTURE
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In 1994, price increases were implemented in Melbourne, to partially offset the cost
of a taxi industry reform package (uniforms, taxi livery, driver training). A similar
increase was experienced in Sydney in 1995-96, when the flagfall was increased by
$1, to enable taxi operators to fund new regulatory requirements. However, this
additional flagfall was removed in the subsequent year.
Taxi fares are also sensitive to movements in the price of fuel. For example, due to
increases in the price of Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG), Melbourne hiring charges (in
nominal  terms)  increased  by  3.5 per cent  in  December 1990,  4.6 per cent  in
May  2000 and 5.3  per  cent in December  2000 (Victorian Taxi Directorate,
Melbourne, pers. comm., 28 August 2001).
The movement evident in Darwin fares is partially the result of a change in
methodology for fare determination. During 1994, the NT government moved away
from automatic fare adjustments based on CPI movements towards industry
initiated determinations (Department of Transport and Works, Darwin, pers. comm.,
8  August  2001). Subsequently, the real value of fares has been variable (see
figure  5.2). In 2001, the NT government moved away from CPI based
determinations towards determinations based on a basket of inputs (such as fuel,
tyres and automotive paint).
Forms of urban transport other than taxis
Household expenditure on taxi services represents a significant proportion of
expenditure on urban transport as a whole. For example, in both 1988-99 and
1998-99, taxis accounted for nearly 30 per cent of expenditure on urban transport —
public transport and taxis combined — for Australia as a whole (ABS 2000a).
If taxis are removed from the CPI urban transport series, then the residual price data
trend should better approximate the price trends for the remaining transport
providers — bus, train, tram and ferry (see figure 5.3).
When taxis are removed from the CPI prices series for urban transport as a whole,
the data tends to show even greater increases in public transport fares. This is
because the increase in taxi fares over the last decade has, in general, been lower
than the increases in the remaining urban transport fares (see figures 5.1 and 5.3).
However, towards the end of the study period, increases in taxi fares in Melbourne
exceeded those for the remaining urban transport modes.URBAN TRANSPORT 153



























































Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
Note Taxis were separated from the CPI series using weights derived from ABS HES (1998-99) expenditure
on taxis as a proportion of urban transport expenditure. The exact algorithm for calculating the urban transport
component of the CPI (inclusive of taxis) can not be disclosed by the ABS. Therefore, the indexes in figure 5.3
act as an approximation only.




Service providers in NSW and Queensland were selected as case studies to examine
whether prices have varied according to customer location (metropolitan or
non-metropolitan centre) and eligibility for concessions. The NSW service
providers included:
•   the State Transit Authority (STA),
•   CityRail (State Rail Authority) and
•   Wollongong bus service providers — Dion’s Bus Service, Rutty’s Bus Service
and John J Hill Pty Ltd.13
The Queensland providers included in the case studies were:
•   Brisbane Transport (BT),
•   Citytrain (Queensland Rail) and
•   Rockhampton bus service providers — Rockhampton City Council and
Capricorn Sunbus.14
The different environments in which these providers operate mean that prices over
the period are not directly comparable between service providers. Differences in
modal composition (bus, ferry and train), route densities and passenger volumes
may influence the costs of provision and impact on price movements relative to
those for other urban transport service providers. For example, the relative size of
the area served by an urban rail system and its population density affect
requirements for rolling stock and fixed rail infrastructure per passenger trip.
Price trends, however, should be reflective of the cost environment for individual
utilities providing that the operational circumstances of each provider remained
unchanged over the study period and that there were no significant changes in
competing transport modes or operators.
Location
Real household price indexes for metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas of NSW
and Queensland were constructed based on the cost of a 10 kilometre journey — or
as close as possible to 10  kilometres from the city centre. An average fare is
reported for each mode of transport where possible. There were a large number of
                                             
13 In addition to bus services, CityRail provides urban passenger rail services within the
Wollongong area. Fares for these services are based on the same schedule as those provided in
metropolitan Sydney.
14 STA, SRA (State Rail Authority), BT and QR (Queensland Rail) are publicly owned utilities.URBAN TRANSPORT 155
ticket types available to customers. Where service providers offered more than one
ticket type, the index prices were based on an average fare, in which differing ticket
types were weighted according to their usage.
Intermodal ticket prices are reported separately, as bus and ferry, or bus, ferry and
rail combined (see lower panel of figure 5.4).
In Sydney, STA was chosen as representative of bus services. STA services the
higher density inner city areas, while privately-owned bus operators service the
middle and outer suburbs. Therefore, STA is the appropriate choice for a
10 kilometre journey from the city centre. In 1998, STA carried 55 per cent of bus
passengers on the average week day.
Price indexes based on a 10 kilometre journey may not be indicative of prices for
trips of a shorter or longer length. For example, the average bus trip length in
Sydney is 5.7 kilometres. Differences in fare types and the possible redefinition of
distance bands serviced by a fare may result in differing price paths for different
journey lengths. For example, a price index for STA based on a 5.7  kilometre
journey may show a decline in 2000 and 2001 resulting from the redefinition of
distance bands applicable to fare types.
The case study trend data for STA and CityRail is not directly comparable to the
ABS CPI series for Sydney urban transport (see figures 5.1 and 5.4). Unlike the
case study data, the CPI series data includes the fare schedules of private bus
companies, operating within the middle and outer suburban areas of Sydney.
Case study trend data shows that the increase in real prices is marginally greater in
Wollongong (non-metropolitan) than it is in Sydney (metropolitan) (see figures 5.4
and 5.5).
CityRail provides urban passenger services in Wollongong and in metropolitan
Sydney. The Wollongong services are provided at the same fares as those in
Sydney. Consequently, rail fares presented in figure  5.4 are also applicable to
Wollongong.
The net impact of the implementation of the GST on fares varies between service
providers. In 2000-01, due to GST, STA bus fares (in nominal terms) increased by
7.8  per  cent, STA ferries increased by 1.5  per  cent, CityRail increased by
9.2 per cent (IPART 2000d), Brisbane Transport 7.5 per cent (Brisbane Transport,
Brisbane, pers. comm., 19 April 2002) and Citytrain 10 per cent (Queensland Rail,
Brisbane, pers. comm., 13 December 2001).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Bus & Ferry Bus, Ferry & Rail
Note Real household price indexes for Sydney were constructed based on the cost of a 10 kilometre journey
from the city centre. Where service providers offered more than one ticket type, the index prices were based
on an average fare, in which differing ticket types were weighted according to their usage. The real price index
was obtained by rebasing fares to 1990-91 and then deflating by the CPI (All groups) for Sydney. The nominal
price series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax.
Data Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); IPART (2001
and previous determinations).URBAN TRANSPORT 157
Figure 5.5 Real urban transport price trends — non-metropolitan bus




























































Rockhampton Single Rockhampton Weekly
Note Real household price indexes for non-metropolitan areas of NSW and Queensland were constructed
based on the cost of a 10 kilometre journey from the city centre. The real price index for Wollongong and
Rockhampton was obtained by rebasing fares to 1990-91 and then deflating by the CPI (All groups) for each
capital city. The nominal price series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax.
Data Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Dions Bus
Service, Wollongong, pers.  comm., 22  October  2001; Queensland Transport, Rockhampton, pers  comm.,




Relative to single mode fares, multimodal fares have increased at a greater rate in
NSW (see figure 5.4).15 This is consistent with a policy of reducing discounts on
pre-purchased periodical and multitrip tickets.
Equity is another reason that governments have increased periodical and multitrip
fares at a greater rate than singles and daily tickets. For example, IPART (1993)
stated that the main customers of periodicals are commuters from higher income
groups and therefore fare increases are less likely to impact adversely than on lower
income groups.
The large increase evident in the price index for Rockhampton in 1995-96 (see
lower panel of figure  5.5) is related to a change in service provider and the
implementation of an urban transport reform package.16 During this period the
responsibility for the provision of services was transferred from the Rockhampton
City Council to a private operator — SunBus.
In Wollongong prior to 1994, bus service providers had individual fare schedules.
In 1994, all services were standardised on a metropolitan standard fare scale
determined by the Department of Transport. The 1994 increase in fares partly
reflect the need to increase the relatively low fare level in the contract with Seapost
Pty Ltd prior to standardisation.
Fares for services from BT have risen over the period. There have been a number of
major changes to fare policy over the study period. These include, changes to the
discount rate applying to multi-trip tickets,17 and the withdrawal of some periodical
ticket types (Brisbane Transport, Queensland, pers. comm., 19 April 2002).18
The rise in Citytrain prices in 1993-94 (see lower panel of figure  5.6) may be
attributed to the implementation of two fare increases within the same financial
year. The real price increases experienced by Citytrain in the later years are partially
due to fares being rounded up to the next 5 or 10 cents.
                                             
15 Multimodal ticketing exists in both Sydney and Brisbane. In Sydney, multimodal tickets exist in
the form of Travel Passes. In Brisbane, multimodal tickets are available as 1-2-3, Citytrans and
South East Explorer  tickets.
16 These reforms included the introduction of performance based contracts, the introduction of a
system of operator accreditation, greater self-regulation and the gradual abolition of general
passenger-based urban bus subsidies and their replacement with fare mark-ups for government
specified and required fare concessions (Goebel 1995).
17 The discount rate for 10 Trip Savers decreased from 20 per cent in 1990 to 10 per cent in 1991.
In 1998 the discount rate was reinstated at 20 per cent in 1998.
18 A ticket product withdrawal occurred on 30 June 2000, with the removal of Weekly and
Monthly tickets.URBAN TRANSPORT 159


























































Note The real household price indexes were obtained by rebasing fares to 1990-91 and then deflating by the
CPI (All groups) for Brisbane. Brisbane Transport intermodal tickets — 1-2-3 and Citytrans — were introduced
in 2000-01 and are not included in the weighted average fare. The fare reported for Citytrain represents that
relevant to a journey from Central Station to Northgate Station. Queensland Rail was unable to provide fare
schedules from 1990-91 to 1997-98, consequently the series reported represents movements in the overall
fare level and not movement in an average weighted fare as reported for BT, STA and SRA. The real price
series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax.
Data Source; PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); BT, Brisbane,




Traditionally, urban transport providers have offered a wide range of concessions.
These concessions are generally aimed at achieving social objectives. For example,
ensuring affordable access to low income groups such as the elderly, the
unemployed, sickness beneficiaries, ex-service personnel, children and full time
tertiary and secondary students.
Concessions are available in both NSW and Queensland. In general, these
concessions take the form of half-price fares and as such exhibit the same price
trend as non-concession fares. Half-price fares are available in Sydney,
Wollongong, Brisbane and Rockhampton.19
In NSW, two notable exceptions to the half-price fare are the pensioner excursion
ticket and free travel for students under the School Student Transport Scheme
(SSTS).
SSTS provides free travel to and from school for students who have to travel more
than 2 km to school. The scheme provides a bus service where there are a sufficient
number of eligible students to sustain the service. The level of funding required by
SSTS has increased from $228 million in 1989-90 to $403 million in 2000-01.
The pensioner excursion ticket is available to pensioners and seniors. The ticket
allows unlimited all-day travel on CityRail trains, Sydney Buses and Sydney
Ferries. The ticket is priced on a zone basis and covers metropolitan, outer
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. The Sydney metropolitan zone is bounded
by Cowan, Emu Plains, Macarthur and Otford. Since 1990-91, the ticket has
remained at $1 in nominal terms — in real terms the fare has decreased to
approximately 80 cents in 2000-01.20
In addition to half price concessions, Citytrain (Queensland) offers a school
concession for primary and secondary students travelling from their home station.
The school concession ticket is valued at one third the full fare.
BT offers two notable exceptions to half price concession fares — tertiary tickets
and free travel for children under 5 years of age. Tertiary tickets were available
from 1990-91 on a monthly, semester, or annual basis. In addition, there was a
monthly intermodal ticket available from 1993. These tickets were withdrawn in
                                             
19 In addition to half price fares Rockhampton also has available — for secondary students —
fares at two thirds the price of the full fare.
20 The pensioner excursion ticket is available on State Transit buses and not on private operator
buses. Consequently, the ticket generally applies to inner Sydney and Newcastle metropolitan
areas.URBAN TRANSPORT 161
January 1999, with the exception of the intermodal ticket, which was withdrawn in
July 2000. Over the study period the price of tertiary tickets decreased in real terms
by 13 per cent.21
5.5 Service quality
Quality of service was examined to see if price trends might be explained by
changes in the quality and reliability of services. Lower prices can be achieved by
lowering expenditure below that required to maintain service standards. However,
lower service standards may take some time to manifest themselves.
Trends in quality of service indicators are not directly comparable between service
providers. For example, urban rail tracks are mainly located in their own transport
corridors and segregated from other traffic, whereas bus routes are generally located
along streets — with or without priority over other traffic. In general, the greater the
degree of segregation from other traffic, the higher the average travelling speed.
Segregation also reduces the potential for accidents.
Reliability and punctuality
Two common indicators of quality of service in urban transport are reliability and
punctuality. Reliability is generally measured in respect of service cancellations.
Punctuality is generally measured by on-time running indicators, such as the
proportion of services which arrive more than a specified interval outside the
scheduled arrival time.
The definition of on-time running varies between modes. For example, in Victoria,
on-time running for buses is defined as not more than 2 minutes early or 5 minutes
late at scheduled destinations, whereas a metropolitan train is considered on time if
it arrives at a destination no more than 59  seconds before and 5  minutes and
59 seconds after the scheduled time.22
Other sources of difference include the location and time at which the measurement
is taken. For example, on-time running for Melbourne trains and buses is measured
at the final journey destination, whereas for trams, on-time running is averaged over
a number of points along the route.
                                             
21 The Tertiary Annual and Semester tickets were replaced by Monthly Concession tickets.
22 On-time running indicators may also vary depending on what events — outside of the control of
the utility — are excluded. In NSW, such Force Majeure events include an act of God or an
unavoidable accident or incident such as suicides or attempted suicides.INFRASTRUCTURE
PRICE TRENDS
162
CityRail (NSW) measures on-time running as no more than 3 minutes and
29 seconds late for suburban services and no more than 5 minutes and 29 seconds
for intercity services. CityRail statistics are measured during ‘peak’ service hours.23
Citytrain (Queensland) measures on-time running within 3 minutes 59 seconds over
a 24 hour period, and produces statistics for both weekdays and weekend services.
In 1995-96, Citytrain showed a significant decrease in quality of service as
measured by service cancellations and on-time running. This is partially attributable
to major network track upgrading and lower availability of rolling stock resulting
from the expansion of services on the Gold Coast.
The service cancellation and on-time running statistics for STA and CityRail show
no marked change in quality of service accompanying fare increases (see figures 5.7
and 5.8).24
Vehicle kilometres and patronage
Other possible indicators of service quality include vehicle kilometres and
patronage. An increase in vehicle kilometres would tend to indicate an increase in
frequency or an expansion of the route, both of which can be viewed as
improvements to service quality.
Movements in the level of patronage may indicate the extent to which customers are
satisfied with the services provided. However, levels of patronage will be affected
by both circumstances outside of the control of service providers and price
movements. For example, IPART (1996b) noted that the patronage decline
experienced by STA bus services in the early 1990s may be partially attributed to
economic downturn and the diminishing importance of the central business district
as a commuter destination.
Patronage may also be affected by movements in price. For example, governments
may adopt policies targeting peak hour congestion — through increasing peak hour
fares relative to off peak fares. If the resulting reduction in peak hour patronage is
greater than the increase in off-peak patronage then the overall patronage level will
decrease.
                                             
23 Peak service hours for Sydney are, between the hours of 6.00 a.m. and 9.00 a.m. (morning peak)
and between 4.00 p.m. and 6.00 p.m. (evening peak).
24 Over the study period CityRail has experienced a significant growth in patronage accompanied
by a minimal growth in infrastructure, this may impact upon on-time running statistics.URBAN TRANSPORT 163











































Note On-time running for CityRail is reported as peak services arriving no more than 5  minutes and
29 seconds late at their final destination. On-time running for NSW is reported as urban services arriving
within 5  minutes of schedule. On-time running in Queensland relates to Citytrain urban inner city and
metropolitan weekday services arriving within 3  minutes and 59  seconds of the scheduled time. On-time
running statistics for Citytrain do not include services operated by Citytrain for Airtrain. On-time running
indicators were not available for BT. In 1995-96, Citytrain showed a significant decrease in quality of service
as measured by service cancellations and on-time running. This is partially attributable to major network track
upgrading and lower availability of rollingstock resulting from the expansion of services on the Gold Coast.
Data sources: SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); SRA (2001 and previous issues); STA (2001 and
previous issues); Queensland Rail, Brisbane, pers. comm., 14 November 2001.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Vehicle kilometres for STA bus and ferry services and BT have increased over the
study period (see figure  5.9). Patronage declined in the early 1990s for most
metropolitan service providers. However, from 1994-95 to 2000-01 patronage
trended upwards.
Service enhancement
A number of improvements in quality of service have occurred that are not evident
in the preceding indicators. These include the introduction of real time passenger
information services, the granting of bus priority, the construction of bus ways, the
refurbishment of passenger carriages, increasing access for the elderly and disabled
by means of low floor buses, and the establishment of on demand or ‘hail and ride’
bus services.
In NSW, specific examples of quality of service enhancements include the fitting of
security cameras on STA buses, the acquisition of air-conditioned buses and low
floor wheelchair accessible buses.25 CityRail service enhancements have included
‘Easy Access’ stations, increased security at stations and improved passenger
information provision (State Rail Authority, NSW, pers. comm., 30 April 2002).
In Queensland, specific examples include the 1996-97 introduction by BT of a high
speed Citycat ferry service, the purchase of 20  low-floor buses in 1997-98
(improving access for people with disabilities and the elderly) and the introduction
of new services such as ‘dial and ride’. In 1995-96 Citytrain installed closed circuit
television surveillance systems and improved lighting at 47  stations and 15  car
parks. In 2000, BT acquired 50 low-floor, easy access, low-emission gas buses
                                             
25 In 2002, 25 per cent of the Sydney bus fleet was wheelchair accessible.URBAN TRANSPORT 165
Figure 5.8 Quality of service measures — service cancellations, Sydney






























































































Note Quality of service indicators for the period 1990-91 to 2000-01 were not available for BT.
Data sources: SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); SRA (2001 and previous issues); STA (2001 and
previous issues); Queensland Rail, Brisbane, pers. comm., 14 November 2001.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 5.9 Quality of service measures — vehicle kilometres and




























































Citytrain State Transit Authority (bus) State Transit Authority (ferry)
Brisbane Transport CityRail
Note Quality of service indicators for each utility have been expressed as an index with 1990-91 as the base
year. Quality of service indicators for the State Transit Authority exclude services offered by Newcastle Bus
and Ferry.
Data sources: Brisbane Transport, Brisbane, Pers comm., 8 October 2001; SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous
issues); SRA (2002 and previous issues); STA (2001 and previous issues); Queensland Rail, Brisbane,
pers. comm., 14 November 2001.URBAN TRANSPORT 167
5.6 Shareholder outcomes
The financial performance of the case study service providers was examined to
provide information on the relationship between price trends and financial
outcomes, such as the return on assets.
Low prices relative to costs may not achieve a satisfactory return on assets, nor
provide sufficient revenue to maintain and replace long-lived infrastructure assets.
If services are to be maintained, the community, as owners of the service provider,
will have to provide financial support in the form of subsidies. Further, low prices
may affect the viability of the business and possibly expose the community to
financial risks.
The data used in calculating the shareholder outcomes presented in this section were
generally taken from two sources:
•   Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government
Trading Enterprises; and
•   Productivity Commission reports on Financial Performance of Government
Trading Enterprises.
There may be inconsistencies between these two data sets and the information
published in the Annual Reports of service providers. These inconsistencies arise
because of definitional differences. In addition, there have been changes in
accounting policies over the study period which may affect the comparability of
data over time.
The financial performance of State Rail Authority (SRA) and Queensland Rail (QR)
were examined as representative of the performance of CityRail and Citytrain. The
urban rail passenger service providers, CityRail (SRA) and Citytrain (QR) are both
business units operating within larger rail utilities. However, there are difficulties in
separating the performance of these business units from the performance of their
respective rail utilities as a whole, because assets and government funding are
shared.
The profitability of privately owned non-metropolitan bus services discussed earlier
in the chapter, was not analysed.
Profitability
Return on assets has varied over time and between jurisdictions. Three of the four
service providers earned positive returns over most of the period. However, the
rates of return earned by the case study transport service providers have in manyINFRASTRUCTURE
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years been significantly lower than the risk free rate —as approximated by the 10
year Commonwealth Government bond rate (see figure 5.10).
Returns earned by QR show an upward trend. Returns earned by BT have varied
over the period.26 Returns earned by STA and SRA, although low and sometimes
negative, have begun to trend upwards in the latter part of the decade.
IPART (1996c) considered that a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for an
operator in urban public transport with the same capital structure as the STA should
be around 11.7  per  cent (before tax).27 The selected urban transport service
providers have, in most years, been unable to achieve a return on assets of this
order. This suggests that over the study period, the growth in real prices (as
presented earlier in this chapter) has not been sufficient to service debt and provide
a commercial return on equity.
Comparisons of performance over time that are based on indicators that include an
estimate of asset values, have to be interpreted with care. Differences in asset
valuation procedures and changes in the size of the asset base can affect the return
on assets. Over the study period, there have been significant changes in asset values
as a result of asset transfers, revaluations and changes in asset valuation
methodologies.
The calculated return on assets is affected by internal structural changes within the
service providers. For example, the separation and divestiture of business units can
impact significantly upon the asset base and the revenue earning potential of these
urban transport providers as a whole (see box 5.2).
                                             
26 Return for  BT between 1990-91 and 1996-97 were published by the Steering Committee on
National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises. The financial statistics
required to construct comparable return on asset ratios for the period 1997-98 to 2000-01 are not
publicly available.
27 The WACC is the weighted-average of the risk-adjusted cost of debt and equity capital.URBAN TRANSPORT 169
Box 5.2 Issues affecting comparability between asset-based
performance indicators — State Rail Authority (SRA).
Asset revaluation and structural change within SRA provide examples of the factors
affecting comparability between asset-based performance indicators. SRA’s return on
assets, which is dependent on asset values, has changed markedly in particular years
— notably in 1994-95 and in 1997-98 (see figure 5.10).
Asset revaluation
Return on assets for SRA decreased by around 3 percentage points in 1994-95. This
fall was the consequence of a change in asset valuation methodology. The value of
total assets increased in that year by 103.7  per  cent from $6  031  million to
$12  283  million. The increase in asset values resulted from the revaluation of
non-current assets using current value methodologies. Previously, non-current asset
values were based on historical cost.
Structural change
On 1 July 1996, SRA was vertically and horizontally separated into four smaller entities
— SRA, Rail Access Corporation (RAC), Rail Services Australia (RSA) and Freight Rail
Corporation.
SRA retained responsibility for the provision of city and country passenger rail services.
RAC assumed ownership of rail infrastructure from SRA and was responsible for
negotiating the use of the track by rail operators and funding the upkeep of the track.
RSA assumed responsibility for maintenance of the track under contract to RAC and
also provided construction and rolling stock overhaul and repair services. The Freight
Rail Corporation provides freight services throughout NSW.
On 1  January  2001, the RAC merged with RSA to form the Rail Infrastructure
Corporation.
As part of the restructuring process in 1996, a significant proportion of SRA’s assets
were transferred to the three new entities. Some of the key financial consequences of
the restructure include a general divesture of assets totalling $6.4  billion to other
entities, a de-recognition of land controlled by RAC of approximately $857 million and
an agreement by Treasury to assume, and subsequently fund, certain personnel
liabilities to the value of approximately $918 million.
Sources: SRA (1995 and 1997); PC (2000).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a Statistics reported for the State Transit Authority (STA) are inclusive of Newcastle bus
services. b The high return evident in 1991-92 for STA relates to a decrease in total assets of $28 million and
an increase in operating profit of $79.3 million — partly attributable to receipt of redundancy funding from the
NSW state government and increased CSO payments. c The financial information reported for the State Rail
Authority (SRA) refers to the whole rail entity and not to the individual urban passenger transport business unit
— CityRail.  SRA’s returns have been affected by costs incurred through infrastructure replacement and
refurbishment, as a consequence of deferred maintenance. d The financial information reported for
Queensland Rail (QR) refers to the whole rail entity and not to the individual urban passenger transport
business unit — Citytrain. Financial information was not available for QR for the years 1990-91 and 1991-92.
e The relevant financial information is not publicly available for BT from 1997-98 onwards.
Data sources: SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues), PC (2002  forthcoming).
Payments to government
Government-owned service providers are often required to return some of their
earnings to their owner governments in the form of dividend payments. This is
justified on competitive neutrality and cost recovery grounds.
Where a service provider is not required to pay dividends, it has proportionately
more funds available for re-investment into its business, either for the development
of new services or the improvement of existing ones. Further, a service providerURBAN TRANSPORT 171
need not rely on debt-financing to the extent that its rivals must, and thus incurs
lower overall operating costs.
With the exception of QR, most of the case study service providers have not paid
dividends consistently over the period. This is reflected in their dividend payout and
dividend to equity ratios (see figures 5.11 and 5.12).


















State Transit Authority Queensland Rail Brisbane Transport
a b c
d
Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. Dividend payout ratios are not reported for the State Rail Authority, as the utility is not required
to make dividend payments to the NSW Government. a Statistics reported for the State Transit Authority are
inclusive of Newcastle bus services. b The financial information reported for Queensland Rail refers to the
whole rail entity and not to the individual urban passenger transport business unit —  Citytrain. c The high
dividend ratio payout ratio for BT in 1996-97 relates to commercialisation and the readjustment of CSO
payments. d The relevant financial information is not publicly available for BT from 1997-98 onwards.
Data sources: ; SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues), PC (2002 forthcoming).
The negative dividend payout ratio for STA in 1998-99 was due to the payment of a
special dividend at the same time that the service provider recorded an operating
loss.28 The high dividend to equity ratio recorded for STA in 1991-92 resulted from
the payment of a $58 million dividend. The method of calculating CSOs in 1991-92
                                             
28 STA sold land for $20 million, and paid the net sale proceeds to the NSW Treasury as a special




resulted in STA earning a profit in that year and the profit was returned to
government as a dividend. The dividend payout ratios are not reported for SRA, as
the utility is not required to make dividend payments to the NSW Government.




















State Transit Authority Queensland Rail Brisbane Transport a b
c
Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. Dividend to equity ratios are not reported for the
State Rail Authority, as the utility is not required to make dividend payments to the NSW Government.
a Statistics reported for the State Transit Authority are inclusive of Newcastle bus services. b The financial
information reported for Queensland Rail refers to the whole rail entity and not to the individual urban
passenger transport business unit — Citytrain. c The relevant financial information is not publicly available for
Brisbane Transport from 1997-98 onwards.
Data sources: SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues), PC (2002 forthcoming).
QR has consistently paid dividends since corporatisation in 1995-96. However, the
increases in fares have not resulted in increased dividend payments to government
(see figure 5.11 and 5.12).
The return on assets, dividend to equity and dividend payout ratios suggest that the
substantial real price increases — experienced by all case study service providers
over the last ten years — may not have been sufficient to allow commercial
financial performance targets to be met.29
                                             
29 The financial indicators for SRA and QR include activities outside of urban passenger transport.URBAN TRANSPORT 173
Payments by governments and implicit subsidies
As part of urban transport reforms, governments have set out to increase cost
recovery through the farebox. This policy has implications for the level of explicit
payments made by governments and implicit subsidies.
Requiring full cost recovery, including the cost of capital, imposes disciplines for
good financial management and signals the full cost of providing the service. There
may also be adverse productive and dynamic efficiency consequences of not fully
recovering costs if there are insufficient funds to invest. Further, there are equity
considerations as to whether the community in general should bear some of the cost.
That said, urban transport services have traditionally been heavily reliant on
taxpayer contributions and payments. Indeed, there can be disadvantages to full cost
recovery that have to be weighed up against the advantages.
First, non-user benefits sometimes result from public transport investment and the
substitution of public transport for car use. It has been argued that by reducing car
use there is an associated reduction in traffic congestion, public car park provision
and pollution resulting from motor vehicle emissions. A more recent concern
regarding increasing car use has been the effects of expanding road networks on the
urban environment (Mees 2000).
Second, pricing for full cost recovery can foreclose efficient demand if marginal
costs are lower than average costs. This can have the effect of denying access to
some low income groups for whom governments may wish to provide low cost
transport services, but are unable to through targeted concessions.
Third, there are benefits that flow from reducing prices to increase patronage. If this
leads to more frequent services, the overall cost of trips, taking waiting time into
account, may be reduced — providing that it does not result in peak hour
congestion.
A fourth point, is that public transport also addresses equity issues such as improved
mobility for people without access to cars.
Payments by government
Explicit payments made by government to service providers include payments to
offset operating deficits, payments for delivering CSOs, and reimbursement for the
provision of concessions. The nature and purpose of explicit government payments
is not always clearly identified in published records.INFRASTRUCTURE
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The proportion of funding directly attributable to CityRail through CSO and Social
Program funding has increased in real terms by 84 per cent — from $191 million in
1992-93 to $352 million in 1999-00 (in real terms).30 However, it was not possible
to establish the proportion of other explicit government payments made to SRA that
were attributable to CityRail. Such payments include State, Commonwealth and
departmental capital grants.
QR began receiving explicit payments in the form of CSOs and receipts for
concession passengers in 1993-94.31 While explicit payments for QR have
increased in real terms between 1995-96 and 2000-01, the CSO payments
attributable to passenger services — Citytrain and Traveltrain — have decreased in
real terms from $257 million in 1995-96 to $232 million in 2000-01. The proportion
of other explicit government payments made to QR that were attributable to
Citytrain could not be identified. Such payments include amounts received from
various State Government departments as direct reimbursement for concessions
provided to pensioners and school children.
Over the course of the study period, STA has received CSO payments,
reimbursement for travel concessions and government grants such as contributions
for redundancy packages.32 Total explicit payments (in real terms) have declined
from 1990-91 to 1999-00 by 19 per cent (see figure 5.13). The increase in 1991-92
is attributable to a $67 million growth in CSO payments.33
The decline in explicit payments received by BT towards the end of the study
period may reflect the State Government reduction in the service providers general
                                             
30 Government CSO funding is provided to CityRail in respect of targeted concessions, pricing
(low fare) policies, and non-commercial services. Over the course of the study period CityRail
has also received capital grants from Commonwealth, State, and Local Governments as well as
government departments.
31 QR receives CSO payments from the Queensland Government for certain freight and passenger
rail services. Contributions received in respect of passenger services are for the Citytrain and
Traveltrain services and the Brisbane to border portion of interstate services. QR also receives
amounts from various State Government departments as direct reimbursement for concessions
provided to senior citizens, pensioners and students. The government payments considered are
net of transfers from utility to government, such as dividends.
32 STA receives government payments as reimbursement for free travel by school students and
concession travel by pensioners and other groups. In 2000-01, STA received government
payments for pricing CSOs — fares held below commercial levels in order to increase
patronage — and service level CSOs. The Authority provided services in excess of its minimum
service level requirements and received payment for the operation of some non-commercial
services provided by Sydney Ferries and Newcastle Services. No payments were received for
operating these non-commercial services by Sydney Buses.
33 The method of calculating CSO payments for STA in 1991-92 resulted in STA earning a profit
in that year. The profit was returned to government as a dividend.URBAN TRANSPORT 175
subsidy by $1 million each year. (Queensland Transport, Brisbane, pers. comm.,
5 February 2002).
































State Transit Authority (bus & ferry) Rockhampton (Bus) Brisbane Transport
Note   Explicit payments made by government to service providers include payments to offset operating
deficits, payments for delivering CSOs, reimbursement for the provision of concessions and grants. The real
explicit funding index for service provider was obtained by re-basing explicit funding to 1990-91 and then
deflating by the CPI (All groups) for each capital city. a Government funding for the bus and ferry operations of
State Transit Authority (STA) includes a government contribution towards a redundancy program in 1990-91
and 1991-92. Statistics reported for STA are inclusive of Newcastle bus services.
Data Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); BT, Brisbane,
pers.  comm., 5  February  2002; STA (2002 and previous issues); Queensland Transport, Brisbane,
pers. comm., 14 November 2001.
Payments by government have decreased in Rockhampton (see figure 5.13). The
decrease in Rockhampton is partly the result of the withdrawal of payments by the
Rockhampton City Council that occurred from 1994-95, when responsibility for
service provision transferred from the Rockhampton City Council to SunBus.34
                                             
34 Urban bus transport providers receive funding in accordance with individual contracts between
bus operators and the government. The current contract in Rockhampton was issued after a
public tender and is for a fixed amount plus escalation for cost movement. The current contract
with the Brisbane City Council (BCC), who provide transport services through BT, is also for a
fixed amount. In addition, BCC has received $1 million per year since 1999 to assist with theINFRASTRUCTURE
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The reduction in payments by the council was offset by additional revenue from
fare increases (see figure 5.5).
Implicit subsidies
Implicit subsidies arise when the achieved rate of return on assets by service
providers (after including revenue from CSO payments and explicit subsidies) is
less than ‘normal’ or commercially acceptable. The Commonwealth Government
10 year bond rate plus a premium for risk may be used as an approximate estimate
of a ‘normal’ rate of return.
Risk premiums will vary over time and across service providers.35 Estimates of the
implicit subsidy are in figure 5.14. They are based solely on the risk free rate —
Commonwealth Government 10 year bond rate — due to difficulties in obtaining
risk premiums specific to the case study service providers.
Consequently, the levels of subsidies reported are lower than they would be if based
on a ‘commercial’ rate of return. The Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality
Complaints Office (CCNCO 1998) has stated that typical rate of return targets for
low risk business should include a nominal pre-tax premium of 3 percentage points,
and that high risk business should include a premium of 7 percentage points.
The implicit subsidy received by SRA and QR could not be estimated because there
are problems in isolating the payments and revenues received that are specific to
urban transport activities — CityRail and Citytrain.
The level of explicit government payments will reduce the size of any implicit
subsidy. All things being equal, the greater the explicit payments by government,
the greater the return earned by the service provider, thereby decreasing its implicit
subsidy.
The implicit subsidy for STA has decreased over the study period from $33 million
in 1990-91 to $15 million in 1999-2000 (see figure 5.14). The large decrease in
                                                                                                                                        
purchase of accessible buses and received an additional $1 million in 2000 for fuel cost rises.
Prior to 1995-96, payments to bus operators were made as a percentage of cash fare revenue,
60 per cent for BCC and 30 per cent for Rockhampton City Council.
35 Premiums for risk are generally composed of two parts — the equity premium and the market
risk. The equity premium is the market rate of return less the risk free rate of return, often
around 6 or 7 per cent. The market risk is an estimate of the level of market risk associated with
the business or utility. The market risk, usually expressed as a ‘beta’, will vary over time and
across service providers (CCNCO 1998). Some examples of the betas used in the calculation of
risk premiums for Australian industries are 0.6 (energy), 1.0 (transport) and 0.9 (healthcare)
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implicit subsidy in 1991-92 may be attributable in part to an increase in explicit
payments from government — CSO payments and also an abnormal revenue item
relating to redundancy funding.






















Note Statistics reported for STA are inclusive of Newcastle bus services. The implicit subsidy is an estimate
based on the difference between STA’s return on assets and the risk free rate of return (as measured by the
Commonwealth Government 10 year bond rate). The subsidy is measured in absolute terms in relation to the
value of the utility’s asset base. A negative implicit subsidy implies that the utility did not receive a subsidy but
rather earned a return greater than the Commonwealth Government 10  year bond rate. The real implicit
subsidy index for service provider was obtained by re-basing implicit subsidies to 1990-91 and then deflating
by the CPI (All groups) for Sydney. Return on assets is measured as earnings before interest and tax
payments (EBIT) as a proportion of average total assets. EBIT is measured before transfer payments from
service providers to government, such as dividends, tax equivalents and debt guarantee fees.
Data sources: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); PC (2002
forthcoming); RBA (2002); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); STA (2001 and previous issues).
For the case study service providers, it appears that there has been a general
improvement in financial performance. Returns have increased towards the end of
the study period. These improvements, together with evidence of enhancement of
service — such as the introduction of new rolling stock and air-conditioned buses
— suggests that the substantial real price increases over the last ten years, may have
facilitated improved financial performance and paid for improved service quality.
Improvements in financial performance and service quality do not take into account
any flow-on costs that may have been generated by increased fares.INFRASTRUCTURE
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One consequence of increases in urban transport prices may be an increase in the
spillover costs associated with substitute modes of transport, such as car use. For
example, if rising urban transport prices result in greater car use, this may cause an
increase in pollution and congestion.URBAN TRANSPORT 179
Attachment A – Data tables
Table A5.1 Real urban transport price trends, — metropolitan households
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 102.6 102.7 101.6 121.8 110.2 105.4 101.1 104.1
1992-93 105.6 113.7 106.1 120.0 112.0 104.0 99.7 108.8
1993-94 106.6 113.9 108.6 122.9 120.1 102.8 103.7 114.2
1994-95 105.1 115.2 108.0 125.1 121.0 107.4 100.8 112.5
1995-96 105.4 111.1 110.1 122.5 123.7 103.5 102.4 116.5
1996-97 111.6 113.7 114.8 125.4 132.7 120.6 106.4 125.0
1997-98 113.3 114.7 114.9 128.7 140.6 121.1 106.7 127.6
1998-99 111.4 116.6 118.4 138.1 141.3 119.9 111.3 127.3
1999-00 120.1 114.6 118.9 134.8 137.4 118.1 119.7 125.0
2000-01 122.0 123.5 130.9 134.9 143.1 125.9 131.1 133.6
Note The real price index for each capital city was obtained by rebasing the CPI (urban transport)indexes to a
base year of 1990-91 and then deflating the rebased indexes by the rebased CPI (All groups) price index for
each capital city. The CPI (urban transport) price indexes for 2000-2001 include the GST.
Data source: ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).
Table A5.2 Real urban transport price trends — taxis
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwina Canberra
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 99.6 97.9 98.0 97.5 105.6 94.3 102.7 97.5
1992-93 102.8 103.3 98.7 95.5 105.3 93.1 101.3 97.8
1993-94 101.4 101.2 96.9 93.7 107.0 90.4 113.9 96.1
1994-95 98.8 107.8 97.3 95.8 103.4 87.7 110.7 95.0
1995-96 99.1 103.9 99.7 94.9 107.6 84.5 92.6 95.7
1996-97 110.5 102.6 101.0 97.4 112.0 89.6 91.0 103.3
1997-98 110.4 110.4 109.5 101.7 117.4 92.0 91.3 110.8
1998-99 109.6 109.4 108.3 102.9 115.4 91.1 90.5 112.3
1999-00 112.6 117.6 111.7 100.4 112.7 91.2 112.7 112.5
2000-01 114.2 131.5 127.3 107.8 124.8 107.2 122.6 123.3
Note  Real taxi price indexes were constructed for all capital cities based on a common reference journey —
 distance of 10 kilometres, with one flagfall and 3 minutes waiting time. Booking fees were not included. The
real price index for each capital city was obtained by rebasing taxi fares to 1990-91 and then deflating by the
CPI (All groups) for each capital city. Prices for 2000-01 include the GST. a Fare determinations for Darwin
1991 were not available, therefore the 1992 fare was extrapolated backwards based on the CPI for Darwin.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Canberra
Cabs, Canberra, pers.  comm., 26  September  2001; Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources,
Hobart, pers.  comm., 27  August  2001; Department of Transport and Works, Darwin, pers.  comm.,
9 August 2001; Department of Transport, Perth, pers. comm., 27 August 2001; Passenger Transport Board,
Adelaide,  pers. comm.,  29 August 2001;  Queensland  Transport,  Brisbane,  pers. comm.,  21 August 2001;
Transport NSW, Sydney, pers.  comm., 17  September  2001; Urban Service, Canberra, pers.  comm.,
31 August 2001; Victorian Taxi Directorate, Melbourne, pers. comm., 28 August 2001.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A5.3 Real urban transport price trends — excluding taxis
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Darwin Canberra
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 103.5 104.1 104.0 133.3 112.5 113.5 99.2 110.7
1992-93 106.5 116.8 111.1 131.5 115.4 112.1 97.9 119.9
1993-94 108.3 117.7 116.7 136.8 126.6 111.8 91.6 132.4
1994-95 107.0 117.4 115.4 139.0 129.8 121.8 89.0 130.1
1995-96 107.4 113.2 117.4 135.6 131.7 117.4 113.9 137.3
1996-97 112.0 116.9 124.4 138.7 143.1 143.3 124.7 146.7
1997-98 114.3 115.9 118.7 141.4 152.2 142.5 125.0 144.4
1998-99 112.0 118.8 125.4 154.8 154.2 141.1 136.2 142.3
1999-00 122.4 113.7 124.0 151.0 149.7 137.9 128.1 137.7
2000-01 124.4 121.1 133.5 147.8 152.2 139.5 141.2 143.9
Note Taxis were separated from the CPI series using weights derived from ABS HES (1998-99) expenditure
on taxis as a proportion of urban transport expenditure. The exact algorithm for calculating the urban transport
component of the CPI (inclusive of taxis) can not be disclosed by the ABS. Therefore, the indexes in table 5.3
act as an approximation only.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Canberra
Cabs, Canberra, pers.  comm., 26  September  2001; Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources,
Hobart, pers.  comm., 27  August  2001; Department of Transport and Works, Darwin, pers.  comm.,
9 August 2001; Department of Transport, Perth, pers. comm., 27 August 2001; Passenger Transport Board,
Adelaide,  pers. comm.,  29 August 2001;  Queensland  Transport,  Brisbane,  pers. comm.,  21 August 2001;
Transport NSW, Sydney, pers.  comm., 17  September  2001; Urban Service, Canberra, pers.  comm.,
31 August 2001; Victorian Taxi Directorate, Melbourne, pers. comm., 28 August 2001.
Table A5.4 Real urban transport price trends Sydney (NSW)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Bus Ferry Rail Bus & Ferry Bus, Ferry & Rail
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 102.6 102.8 102.5 103.9 103.5
1992-93 105.5 107.4 107.1 112.8 112.8
1993-94 105.3 108.0 108.3 116.7 121.3
1994-95 103.0 105.7 104.7 116.4 122.1
1995-96 99.8 106.3 105.3 116.3 120.9
1996-97 100.7 115.6 110.7 120.1 123.8
1997-98 101.7 117.0 111.8 123.0 128.3
1998-99 101.2 120.9 110.0 125.8 130.7
1999-00 113.5 134.7 127.6 137.1 145.3
2000-01 115.9 137.2 131.9 137.9 149.2
Note Real household price indexes for Sydney were constructed based on the cost of a 10 kilometre journey
from the city centre. Where service providers offered more than one ticket type, the index prices were based
on an average fare, in which differing ticket types were weighted according to their usage. The real price index
was obtained by re-basing fares to 1990-91 and then deflating by the CPI (All groups) for Sydney.
Data Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); IPART (2001
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Table A5.5 Real urban transport price trends — non-metropolitan bus
services, Wollongong (NSW) and Rockhampton (Queensland)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Wollongong Rockhampton single Rockhampton weekly
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 109.1 106.9 106.9
1992-93 118.9 105.5 105.5
1993-94 117.2 112.1 110.9
1994-95 131.1 108.1 106.9
1995-96 134.8 156.1 178.4
1996-97 137.8 165.5 189.2
1997-98 137.7 172.5 188.2
1998-99 140.3 170.7 186.2
1999-00 146.5 167.8 183.1
2000-01 151.3 158.5 181.1
Note  Real household price indexes for non-metropolitan areas of NSW and Queensland were constructed
based on the cost of a 10 kilometre journey from the city centre. The real price index for Wollongong and
Rockhampton was obtained by rebasing fares to 1990-91 and then deflating by the CPI (All groups) for each
capital city.
Data sources: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Dions Bus
Service, Wollongong, pers.  comm., 22  October  2001; Queensland Transport, Rockhampton, pers  comm.,
2 November 2001; Transport NSW, Wollongong, pers. comm., 6 September 2001.
Table A5.6 Real urban transport price trends — Brisbane (Queensland)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91-100)
Periodical based ticketsa Volume based ticketsa Citytrainb
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 100.4 112.4 98.0
1992-93 103.0 120.1 102.8
1993-94 107.0 117.8 106.8
1994-95 103.2 118.5 103.0
1995-96 99.4 114.1 99.2
1996-97 118.6 124.3 97.6
1997-98 118.0 123.6 104.9
1998-99 120.0 121.5 110.0
1999-00 118.4 117.7 114.5
2000-01 131.5 121.8 117.1
Note The real household price indexes for Brisbane were obtained by rebasing fares to 1990-91 and then
deflating by the CPI (All groups) for Brisbane.a Brisbane Transport intermodal tickets — 1-2-3 and Citytrans —
were introduced in 2000-01 and are not included in the weighted average fare. b  The fare reported for
Citytrain represents that relevant to a journey from Central Station to Northgate Station. Queensland Rail was
unable to provide fare schedules from 1990-91 to 1997-98, consequently the series reported represents
movements in the overall fare level and not movement in an average weighted fare as reported for BT, STA
and SRA..
Data Source; PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Brisbane




Table A5.7 Quality of service measures — on-time running, Sydney (NSW)
and Brisbane (Queensland)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
State Transit Authority
Bus Ferries CityRaila Citytrainb
1990-91 n.a. n.a.             87.5 n.a.
1991-92              98.1             95.8              91.5             94.4
1992-93             96.4             99.7              92.1             97.6
1993-94             97.8             99.8              93.1             97.6
1994-95             97.3             99.7             92.2             94.2
1995-96             98.0              99.1              91.9             90.0c
1996-97             97.5             99.5              90.1             97.4
1997-98             97.2             98.6             94.0              96.1
1998-99              97.1             98.4             93.0             96.8
1999-00             97.4             99.5             90.3             96.2
2000-01             98.0             99.0 91.0             95.3
Note On-time running indicators are not available for BT. a On-time running for CityRail is reported as peak
services arriving no more than 5 minutes and 29 seconds late at their final destination. On-time running for
NSW is reported as urban services arriving within 5 minutes of schedule. b On-time running in Queensland
relates to Citytrain urban inner city and metropolitan weekday services arriving within 3 minutes and
59 seconds of the scheduled time. On-time running statistics for Citytrain do not include services operated by
Citytrain for Airtrain. c In 1995-96, Citytrain showed a significant decrease in quality of service as measured by
service cancellations and on-time running. This is partially attributable to major network track upgrading and
lower availability of rollingstock resulting from the expansion of services on the Gold Coast. n.a. Not available.
Data sources: SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); SRA (2001 and previous issues); STA  (2001 and
previous issues); Queensland Rail, Brisbane, pers. comm., 14 November 2001
Table A5.8 Quality of service measures — service cancellations
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
State Transit Authority
Bus Ferries CityRail Citytrain
1990-91 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1991-92                0.1               3.9               0.6                0.3
1992-93               0.7               0.3               0.5                0.2
1993-94               0.2               0.4               0.7                0.3
1994-95               0.2               0.5               0.7                0.4
1995-96               0.3               0.9               0.7                0.9
1996-97               0.3                1.5               0.6                0.4
1997-98               0.4 n.a. n.a.                0.2
1998-99               0.5 n.a. n.a.                 0.1
1999-00               0.4 n.a. n.a.                 0.1
2000-01               0.4 n.a. n.a.                0.2
Note Quality of service indicators for the period 1990-91 to 2000-01 were not available for BT. n.a. Not
available.
Data sources: SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); SRA (2001 and previous issues); STA  (2001 and
previous issues); Queensland Rail, Brisbane, pers. comm., 14 November 2001URBAN TRANSPORT 183
Table A5.9 Quality of service measures —vehicle kilometres, Sydney
(NSW) and Brisbane (Queensland)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
State Transit Authority
Bus Ferries Brisbane Transport
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 98.7 95.6 105.9
1992-93 98.3 101.9 105.5
1993-94 87.9 114.0 100.8
1994-95 89.0 120.4 105.7
1995-96 95.3 121.2 108.1
1996-97 98.4 123.9 108.4
1997-98 100.5 124.0 111.8
1998-99 102.9 120.3 121.8
1999-00 108.1 121.9 121.8
2000-01 112.3 124.0 121.8
Note Quality of service indicators for each utility have been expressed as an index with 1990-91 as the base
year. Quality of service indicators for STA exclude services offered by Newcastle Bus and Ferry.
Data sources: Brisbane Transport, Brisbane, Pers comm., 8 October 2001; SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous
issues); SRA (2001 and previous issues); STA  (2001 and previous issues); Queensland Rail, Brisbane,
pers. comm., 14 November 2001.
Table A5.10 Quality of service measures — patronage
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
State Transit Authority
Citytrain Bus Ferry Brisbane Transport CityRail
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 95.3 98.7 99.6 100.3 96.9
1992-93 93.7 98.3 95.0 100.3 91.3
1993-94 91.3 87.9 60.5 101.1 93.3
1994-95 88.0 89.0 54.9 102.5 99.2
1995-96 93.2 95.3 58.7 106.3 101.9
1996-97 98.6 98.4 60.2 104.8 105.2
1997-98 98.7 100.5 60.4 105.1 105.9
1998-99 97.7 102.9 60.5 105.6 107.5
1999-00 100.7 108.1 61.3 113.7 110.8
2000-01 106.1 112.3 69.0 111.7 120.3
Note Quality of service indicators for each utility have been expressed as an index with 1990-91 as the base
year. Quality of service indicators for STA exclude services offered by Newcastle Bus and Ferry.
Data sources: Brisbane Transport, Brisbane, Pers comm., 8 October 2001; SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous
issues); SRA (2001 and previous issues); STA  (2001 and previous issues); Queensland Rail, Brisbane,
pers. comm., 14 November 2001.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A5.11 Return on assets — selected urban transport providers
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
State Transit Authoritya State Rail Authorityc Queensland Railb Brisbane Transportd
1990-91 3.7 -0.5 n.a. 9.1
1991-92 21.0b -4.0 n.a. 6.3
1992-93 2.5 -1.7 2.4 6.4
1993-94 2.8 -2.5 2.2 1.4
1994-95 7.0 -5.2 2.6 5.3
1995-96 3.6 -5.6 8.1 10.1
1996-97 -0.4 -5.0 10.0 7.2
1997-98 -0.5 -0.6 8.1 n.a.
1998-99 -1.3 0.6 5.8 n.a.
1999-00 1.6 1.8 5.7 n.a.
2000-01 1.2 0.5 6.0 n.a.
Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a Statistics reported for the State Transit Authority (STA) are inclusive of Newcastle bus
services. b The high return evident in 1991-92 for STA relates to a decrease in total assets of $28 million and
an increase in operating profit of $79.3 million — partly attributable to receipt of redundancy funding from the
NSW state government and increased CSO payments c The financial information reported for the State Rail
Authority (SRA) refers to the whole rail entity and not to the individual urban passenger transport business unit
— CityRail.  SRA’s returns have been affected by costs incurred through infrastructure replacement and
refurbishment, as a consequence of deferred maintenance. d The financial information reported for
Queensland Rail (QR) refers to the whole rail entity and not to the individual urban passenger transport
business unit — Citytrain. Financial information was not available for QR for the years 1990-91 and 1991-92.
d The relevant financial information is not publicly available for BT from 1997-98 onwards. n.a. Not available.
Data sources: SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues), PC (2001a).URBAN TRANSPORT 185
Table A5.12 Dividend payout ratio — selected urban transport providers
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
State Transit Authoritya Queensland Railb Brisbane Transportc
1990-91 0.0 0.0 0.0
1991-92 73.0 0.0 0.0
1992-93 0.0 0.0 0.0
1993-94 0.0 0.0 0.0
1994-95 7.5 0.0 0.0
1995-96 77.0 80.0 0.0
1996-97 0.0 91.3 341.1d
1997-98 0.0 53.4 n.a.
1998-99 -171.9 91.1 n.a.
1999-00 0.0 55.8 n.a.
2000-01 0.0 63.5 n.a.
Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. Dividend payout ratios are not reported for the State Rail Authority, as the utility is not required
to make dividend payments to the NSW Government. a Statistics reported for the State Transit Authority are
inclusive of Newcastle bus services. b The financial information reported for Queensland Rail refers to the
whole rail entity and not to the individual urban passenger transport business unit —  Citytrain. c The relevant
financial information is not publicly available for Brisbane Transport from 1997-98 onwards. d The high
dividend ratio payout ratio for BT in 1996-97 relates to commercialisation and the readjustment of CSO
payments. n.a. Not available.
Data sources: SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues), PC (2001a).
Table A5.13 Dividend to equity ratio — selected urban transport providers
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
State Transit Authoritya Queensland Railb Brisbane Transportc
1990-91 0.0 0.0 0.0
1991-92 75.0 0.0 0.0
1992-93 0.0 0.0 0.0
1993-94 0.0 0.0 0.0
1994-95 1.3 0.0 0.0
1995-96 3.5 5.1 0.0
1996-97 0.0 10.5 14.8
1997-98 0.0 4.1 n.a.
1998-99 11.0 3.7 n.a.
1999-00 0.0 4.1 n.a.
2000-01 0.0 3.1 n.a.
Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. Dividend to equity ratios are not reported for the
State Rail Authority, as the utility is not required to make dividend payments to the NSW Government.
a Statistics reported for the State Transit Authority are inclusive of Newcastle bus services. b The financial
information reported for Queensland Rail refers to the whole rail entity and not to the individual urban
passenger transport business unit — Citytrain. c The relevant financial information is not publicly available for
Brisbane Transport from 1997-98 onwards. n.a. Not available.
Data sources: SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues), PC (2001a).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A5.14 Real explicit government funding — selected urban transport
providers
1990-91 to 2000-01
State Transit Authoritya Brisbane Transport Rockhampton
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 120.4 117.1 105.8
1992-93 88.3 115.8 102.8
1993-94 84.3 116.6 93.7
1994-95 75.0 115.9 92.0
1995-96 66.4 116.4 78.1
1996-97 70.8 116.2 83.2
1997-98 76.1 125.4 72.3
1998-99 77.7 118.7 74.9
1999-00 81.2 116.6 73.8
2000-01 82.4 102.9 78.0
Note   Explicit payments made by government to service providers include payments to offset operating
deficits, payments for delivering CSOs, reimbursement for the provision of concessions and grants. The real
explicit funding index for service provider was obtained by rebasing explicit funding to 1990-91 and then
deflating by the CPI (All groups) for each capital city. a Government funding for the bus and ferry operations of
the State Transit Authority (STA) includes a government contribution towards a redundancy program in
1990-91 and 1991-92. Statistics reported for STA are inclusive of Newcastle bus services.
Data sources: PC estimates based on ABS 2001a, (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); PC
(2001a); RBA (2002); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); STA (2001 and previous issues).
Table A5.14 Real implicit subsidy — State Transit Authority













Note Statistics reported for the State Transit Authority (STA) are inclusive of Newcastle services. The implicit
subsidy is an estimate based on the difference between STA’s return on assets and the risk free rate of return
(as measured by the Commonwealth Government 10 year bond rate). The subsidy is measured in absolute
terms in relation to the value of the utility’s asset base. A negative implicit subsidy implies that the utility did
not receive a subsidy but rather earned a return greater than the Commonwealth Government 10 year bond
rate. The real implicit subsidy index for service provider was obtained by rebasing implicit subsidies to
1990-91 and then deflating by the CPI (All groups) for Sydney. Return on assets is measured as earnings
before interest and tax payments (EBIT) as a proportion of average total assets. EBIT is measured before
transfer payments from service providers to government, such as dividends, tax equivalents and debt
guarantee fees.
Data sources: PC estimates based on STA (2001 and previous issues); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous
issues), PC (2001a); RBA (2002).PORTS AND RAIL
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6 Ports and rail freight
Key outcomes
Ports
•   Between 1990-91 and 2000-01, port authority charges for container ships fell in real
terms at the ports of Sydney (53  per  cent), Melbourne (62  per  cent), Brisbane
(24 per cent), Fremantle (20 per cent) and Burnie (17 per cent).
•   Port authority charges for bulk ships have fallen in real terms at the ports of Sydney
(28 per cent),  Melbourne  (52 per cent),  Fremantle  (23 per cent)  and  Burnie
(17 per cent).
•   Shareholder outcomes, as measured by return on assets, dividend payout and
dividend to equity ratios, have been variable over the study period. Falls in real
charges for container and bulk ships will have placed downward pressure on the
return on assets and dividend ratios, with some port authorities earning a return less
than the weighted average cost of capital.
Rail freight
•   Between 1996-97 and 2000-01, average rail freight charges for the transport of
wheat from the silo to the port have fallen in real terms in NSW (22  per  cent),
Victoria  (20 per cent),  Queensland  (17 per cent),  SA  (6 per cent)  and  WA
(9 per cent).
•   Between 1995-96 and 2000-01, average rail freight charges for the transport of coal
have fallen in real terms in NSW (52 per cent) and Queensland (26 per cent).
•   Between 1990-91 and 2000-01, coal freight rates in the Hunter Valley fell in real
terms (61 per cent).
•   A real index of general freight prices showed similar trends.
•   Shareholder outcomes, as measured by return on assets, dividend payout and
dividend to equity ratios, have been variable over the study period, consistent with a
period of significant restructuring and transition. Most rail authorities earned rates of
return at or slightly above the risk free rate. In these cases, rail authorities have
been able to deliver real falls in freight charges without reducing profitability.
Over the last decade, State governments have introduced a range of reforms aimed
at improving the performance of government-owned port and rail authorities by
making them more commercially focused. The reforms have includedINFRASTRUCTURE
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corporatisation, restructuring, privatisation and the contracting out of some
functions.
In this chapter, trends in the real prices paid by businesses for port and rail freight
services are presented for the period 1990-91 to 2000-01. Real price indexes were
constructed using tariff schedules and information provided by suppliers and users.
For port authority price trends, charges that are levied directly on ship and cargo
owners for containerised and bulk freights were examined. Indirect charges for
ancillary marine (pilotage, towage and mooring) and stevedoring services were
excluded.
In the case of rail freight price trends, charges levied for the transport of wheat, coal
and general freight are presented. In some cases, pricing information was only
available for a part of the study period. Charges levied for urban rail passenger
services are incorporated in the price trends presented in Chapter 5.
The financial performance of port and rail authorities was examined to see if price
declines have been associated with falling rates of return.
Quality of service measures can also be examined to determine whether price
reductions or increased profitability have been achieved by lowering quality of
service. Typical indicators of quality of service for ports and rail freight include
berth availability and on-time running, respectively. Consistent measures of these
indicators over the study period were unavailable.
6.1 Ports
Ports play a significant role in the transport of international and domestic freight. In
2000-01, over 3.3 million twenty foot equivalent units (TEUs) (89.7 per cent of all
containers handled at Australian ports) and 58.6  million tonnes of bulk cargo
(11.1 per cent of all bulk cargo handled by Australian ports) were shipped through
the ports of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Fremantle and Burnie (AAPMA 2002).1
These port authorities are typically involved in the provision and management of
infrastructure, such as navigation channels and aids, berths, cargo storage areas and
other wharf facilities. Some, such as the Victorian Channels Authority (VCA),
provide and manage infrastructure at more than one port. Others, such as the
                                             
1 A TEU or twenty foot equivalent unit is a unit of measurement used to describe containers, with
each unit equal to a 20 foot international Standards Organisation container size.PORTS AND RAIL
FREIGHT
189
Brisbane Port Corporation and the Burnie Port Corporation, also have a
shareholding in or operate an airport.
The terminology and structure of port authority charges varies between ports
(see  box  6.1). There are both ship-based and cargo-based charges. Ship-based
charges are levied on the basis of ship size and, in some cases, on the time the ship
is berthed. Cargo-based charges, such as wharfage, are typically levied on a per
TEU basis in the case of container cargo, or on a per tonne basis in the case of bulk
cargo. Cargo-based charges might also vary on the basis of whether cargo is being
shipped into (loaded inwards) or shipped out of (loaded outwards) the port. As port
authorities have no direct relationship with importers or exporters, cargo-based
charges are generally collected by ship operators.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Box 6.1 Structure of port authority charges 2001
Sydney
A  navigation services charge is levied per ship visit and is based on ship size
measured in terms of gross tonnage (GT). An additional environmental services charge
is levied on ships transporting noxious bulk liquid, gas and oil cargoes. Wharfage is
levied per twenty foot equivalent unit (TEU) for containerised cargo and per revenue
tonne for bulk cargo. A revenue tonne is the greater of the mass or the volume of the
cargo measured in units of tonnes, cubic metres or kilolitres. Incorporated into the
wharfage charge is the port cargo access charge which is levied by the NSW
Government.
Melbourne
Tonnage is levied per ship visit, by the Victorian Channels Authority, on the basis of the
ship’s GT. The Melbourne Port Corporation (MPC) levies a ship-based berth hire
charge based on the time the ship is at berth. Depending on which berth is used, berth
hire is levied either on the ship operator or the terminal operator. In most cases,
terminal operators pass this charge onto ship operators. The MPC also levies wharfage
on a per TEU basis for containerised cargo and on the greater of the weight or the
volume in the case of bulk cargo.
Brisbane
The Port of Brisbane Corporation levies both wharfage and harbour dues on the
owners of cargo. These charges are levied on a per TEU basis for containerised cargo
and per weight or volume for bulk cargo, whichever is the greater.
Fremantle
Tonnage is levied per ship visit on the basis of the GT of the ship. A different rate is
applied depending on whether the ship has an inboard incinerator and is berthed in the
inner or outer harbour. Wharfage is levied on a per TEU basis for containerised cargo
and on a per tonne, kilolitre or cubic metre basis for bulk cargoes. Wharfage is not
levied on bulk cargo loaded and discharged at privately operated facilities in
Fremantle’s outer harbour.a Instead a port administration fee is levied on the private
operators of these facilities. A cargo berth hire charge is also levied on cargo loaded
onto or discharged from a ship berthed at a heavy duty berth.
Burnie
Tonnage rates are levied per visit on the basis of the GT of the ship. The daily rate
varies with the number of days the ship is berthed. However, there is a limit to the total
daily charge for the first day and the next nine days, as well as a total overall charge for
any period up to and including the tenth day. Wharfage is levied on a per TEU basis for
containerised cargo and on a per tonne, kilolitre, or cubic metre basis for bulk cargo.
a Over the study period, between 88 and 95 per cent of all bulk tonnes were handled at privately operated
facilities at the Port of Fremantle.
Sources: Burnie Port Corporation, pers. comm., 14 November 2001; Fremantle Port Authority, pers.
comm., 28 September 2001; Melbourne Port Corporation, pers. comm., 24 September 2001; Port of
Brisbane Corporation, pers. comm., 28 September 2001; Sydney Ports Corporation, pers. comm.,
3 October 2001; VCA (2001).PORTS AND RAIL
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Industry reforms affecting prices
Reforms have involved corporatisation, restructuring and contracting out of some
functions and, in some cases, privatisation. A greater emphasis has also been placed
on the commercial role of port authorities to create incentives for efficient
management.
In general, the reform process has been consistent with the recommendations set out
in the 1993 Industry Commission report Port Authority Services and Activities
(IC 1993). The report recommended, among other things, that:
•   ports should be constituted as statutory bodies, which are separate from the
departmental structure of government;
•   ports should be exposed to a tax-equivalent regime, be reimbursed for any
community service obligations, and pay dividends from after-tax profits;
•   governments should adopt the landlord model of operation where cost efficient;2
and
•   where the landlord model is adopted, governments should identify and divest
non-core activities and contract out core activities, where cost effective.
Market reforms
Most of the port authorities included in the study were corporatised during the study
period. Key initiatives associated with corporatisation included separation of
commercial and regulatory functions, provision for the identification and costing of
community service obligations, and the introduction of dividend and tax-equivalent
regimes.
The Fremantle Port Authority has not been corporatised, but was commercialised in
1996 and like the corporatised ports in other States, is required to pay dividends and
tax-equivalent payments. However, the WA Government retains a power of veto
over charges.
As a part of the corporatisation process, a number of port authorities have also been
restructured. The Sydney Port Corporation (SPC) was established following the
restructure of the Maritime Services Board (MSB) in 1995.3 Two other
                                             
2  The landlord model is characterised by the port authority concentrating on the supply of core
activities, such as the provision of safe access and harbouring for ships only, with the more
contestable non-core waterfront services, such as stevedoring and pilotage, supplied privately.




corporations, the Waterways Authority and the Office of Marine Administration,
were also established.4
All the port authorities considered in the study have moved to the landlord model of
operation to varying degrees. In Melbourne for example, the Port of Melbourne
Authority was restructured in 1996 into a port landlord (Melbourne Port
Corporation) and a channel operator (VCA). Melbourne Port Services was also
established to provide services such as security, cleaning and general maintenance,
previously provided by the Melbourne Port Authority (MPA). Melbourne Port
Services was sold to Skilled Engineering in 1997. As part of the move to a landlord
model, responsibility for the regulation of environmental, safety and pricing matters
was transferred to independent regulatory agencies, and non-core assets, such as the
World Trade Centre, were sold.
Most of the other port authorities have also contracted out or privatised, to varying
degrees, non-core activities such as stevedoring, pilotage, mooring, general
maintenance and cleaning.
Tariff reforms
Over the last decade, consumption-based charging has been progressively
introduced, resulting in charges that relate more closely to individual service
requirements, rather than the value of cargo. For example, the MSB began phasing
in a new pricing structure in 1990-91. It was based on user-pays principles and
aimed to be more reflective of the costs incurred by users in each of the individual
ports under its control.
Most State Governments have now established independent prices oversight bodies
as a part of their obligations under the National Competition Policy agreements. Of
the ports included in this study, only the Victorian port industry has been declared
for prices oversight. Both the MPC and the VCA are subject to an average revenue
cap administered by the Office of the Regulator-General (ORG) in accordance with
the Port Services Act 1995.
In meeting its revenue cap, the MPC was required to provide an average real annual
reduction in wharfage, berth hire and area hire charges of 10  per  cent over the
period 1997-98 to 1999-2000. The VCA was required to reduce channel use charges
by 12 per cent per annum in real terms from 1 July 1997 until 30 June 2000.
                                             
4  The Waterways Authority is responsible for recreational and commercial boating and the Office
of Marine Administration is responsible for the administration of marine safety in NSW.PORTS AND RAIL
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During 2000, the ORG finalised price determinations for the period 1 July 2000 to
30 June 2005. The determinations provide for real annual price reductions of
5.2 per cent for the MPC and 2.1 per cent for the VCA.
Price outcomes
Most port authorities levy a mix of ship and cargo-based charges. Consequently, the
total charge per ship visit and hence the charge per unit of cargo will depend on a
range of factors, including:
•   the ship size;
•   the time the ship is at berth (in the case of some ports);
•   the type and size of cargo exchanged (measured in TEUs or tonnes); and
•   the composition of cargo (loaded inwards, outwards or empty).
In order to estimate port authority charges, it is necessary to make certain
assumptions about these factors. As one of the objectives of this study is to present
information on price trends, it was decided to keep the ship visit parameters
constant over the study period. If the ship visit parameters were not kept constant,
estimates of port authority charges would more closely reflect the actual level of
charges incurred by ship and cargo owners at any one point in time. However, the
resulting price trends would reflect both changes in the ship visit parameters and
changes in the charges levied.
In the case of container ships, a consistent and publicly available source for ship
visit parameters was available through the Bureau of Transport Economics as part




Box 6.2 Port interface cost index
The Port Interface Cost Index (PICI) was developed by the Bureau of Transport
Economics and is published in alternate issues of Waterline (published quarterly). The
PICI provides a measure of shore-based shipping costs for container ships,
incorporating the charges for various waterfront services. The PICI includes the Goods
and Services Tax.
The major components of the PICI include:
•   port and related charges — ship and cargo-based charges levied by port authorities,
government charges, pilotage, towage and mooring charges;
•   stevedoring charges; and
•   land-based charges — custom brokers fees and road transport charges.
The PICI is calculated for each six month period, that is January to June and July to
December, for the ports of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Fremantle. The
PICI for the port of Burnie is calculated on an irregular basis.
The parameters used to estimate the components of the PICI relate to a port call by a
representative container ship. The representative ship is selected from the ship size
range that had the most port calls during the particular period. The other parameters
are then determined by taking the mean of all port calls by ships in the range that
contains the representative ship.
The PICI has been published on a regular basis since 1994-95. Over this period, the
gross tonnage of the representative ship has remained constant at 17 125. The other
parameters have varied over the period, reflecting differences in average cargo
exchange and time at berth.
Sources: BTCE (1998); BTE (2001).
The PICI provides information on shore-based costs for container ships and is
broader than the indexes presented in this study. The ship visit parameters used in
this study are based on the PICI for January to June 2001 and are presented in
table 6.1.
In the case of bulk ships, a consistent and publicly available source for ship visit
parameters was unavailable and port authorities were approached directly for this
information. The ship visit parameters used to construct price indices for bulk ships
are presented in Table 6.2.PORTS AND RAIL
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Table 6.1 Ship visit parameters — container ships
January to June 2001
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Fremantle Burniea
Ship size
GT 17 215 17 215 17 215 17 215 17 215
TEUs exchanged
Total 834 1 215 540 533 458
Loaded 669 1 011 418 401 277
Empty 165 204 122 132 181
Loaded inwards 397 511 170 200 51
Loaded outwards 271 500 248 202 226
Time at berth 37 36 22 20 n.a.
Note The ship visit parameters are those used by the Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE) in constructing its
Port Interface Cost Index. The BTE derives these parameters for a representative ship. The representative
ship is selected from the ship size range that had the most port calls during the particular period. The other
cost parameters are then determined by taking the mean of all port calls in the range that contains the
representative ship. a  The Port of Burnie is not regularly included in the BTE’s Port Interface Cost Index, the
ship call parameters are taken from the last time Burnie was included (1995-96). N.a. not available
Sources: BTCE (1997); BTE (2001).
Table 6.2 Ship visit parameters — bulk ships
Sydney Melbourne Fremantle Burnie
Ship size (GT) 11 754 17 453 24 873 17 255
Cargo size (Tonnes) 14 700 9 464 30 192 10 144
Sources: Burnie Port Corporation, pers. comm., 14 November 2001; Fremantle Port Authority, pers. comm.,
18 December 2001; Melbourne Port Corporation, pers. comm., 1 February 2002; Sydney Ports Corporation,
pers. comm., 11 December 2001.
Container ships
Using tariff schedules provided by port authorities and the ship visit parameters in
table 6.1, a real price index (base year of 1990-91) for container ships was estimated
for each port. The Goods and Services Tax (GST), introduced in July 2000, was
excluded from the nominal price series because businesses are able to claim a GST
rebate on their inputs. However, GST is included in the CPI (All groups) index used
to deflate nominal prices to real prices. An index could not be constructed for the
Port of Adelaide because tariff schedules were unavailable.
Over the study period, real prices fell by 53  per cent at the Port of Sydney,
62  per  cent at Melbourne, 24  per  cent at Brisbane, 20  per  cent at Fremantle and
17 per cent at Burnie (see figure 6.1).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 6.1 Real port authority price trends — container ships































































Note A real price index was constructed for Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Fremantle and Burnie by
estimating the ship and cargo-based charges levied using the ship visit parameters in table 6.1. The price per
TEU exchanged was deflated by the relevant capital city CPI (All groups) and expressed as an index with
1990-91 as the base year. The price index for Sydney is based on charges levied by the Marine Services
Board between 1990-91 and 1995-96, and by the Sydney Ports Corporation between 1996-97 and 2000-01.
The price index for Melbourne is based on charges levied by the Melbourne Port Authority between 1990-91
and 1994-95 and the Melbourne Port Corporation (MPC) and the Victorian Channels Authority between
1995-96 and 2000-01. It was assumed that the ship is berthed at a dock for which the MPC does not levy a
berth hire charge. The nominal price series for 2000-01 exclude the Goods and Services Tax.
Data source: Table A6.1.PORTS AND RAIL
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Most port authorities reduced both ship and cargo-based charges in nominal terms
over the study period. For example, at the Port of Sydney, wharfage on loaded
containers was reduced in each year between 1992-93 and 1994-95. The navigation
services charge was reduced in 1996-97 and again in 1997-98. Some ports have also
abolished charges. At Brisbane, berthage (the only ship-based charge) was
abolished in 1994-95 and at Fremantle, berth hire on empty containers was
abolished in 1995-96. Wharfage on empty containers was abolished at Sydney and
Melbourne in 1999-2000. From 1999-2000, Fremantle has exempted wharfage on
empty containers where shipping lines submit electronic manifests.5
Bulk ships
The cargoes carried on bulk ships include wheat, coal, ore, cement, sand, petroleum
and oils. They are carried loose and take up the shape of the ship’s hold.
Using tariff schedules and information on a representative ship size and cargo
exchange provided by port authorities (see table 6.2), a real price index (base year
of 1990-91) for bulk ships was estimated for the ports of Sydney, Melbourne,
Fremantle and Burnie. The Goods and Services Tax was excluded in estimating port
authority charges for 2000-01.
Over the study period, real prices fell by 28  per  cent at the Port of Sydney,
52 per cent at the Port of Melbourne, 23 per cent at Fremantle and 17 per cent at
Burnie (see figure 6.2).
                                             
5 38.8 per cent of empty containers were exempt in 1999-2000 and 70.1 per cent in 2000-01.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 6.2 Real port authority price trends — bulk ships





























Sydney Melbourne  Fremantle Burnie
Note A real price index was constructed for each port by estimating the ship and cargo-based charges levied
using the ship visit parameters in table 6.2. The price per tonne exchanged was deflated by the relevant
capital city CPI (All groups) and expressed as an index with 1990-91 as the base year. The price index for
Sydney, is based on charges levied by the Marine Services Board between 1990-91 and 1995-96, and by the
Sydney Ports Corporation between 1996-97 and 2000-01. The price index for Melbourne is based on charges
levied by the Melbourne Port Authority between 1990-91 and 1994-95, and the Melbourne Port Corporation
(MPC) and the Victorian Channels Authority between 1995-96 and 2000-01. It was assumed that the ship is
berthed at a dock for which the MPC does not levy a berth hire charge. Wharfage is not levied on bulk cargo
loaded and discharged at privately operated facilities in Fremantle’s outer harbour. Instead, a port
administration fee is levied on the private operators of these facilities. The price index for Fremantle
incorporates the port administration fee on a per tonne basis. The nominal price series for 2000-01 exclude
the Goods and Services Tax.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Burnie Port
Corporation, pers. comm., 14 November 2001; Fremantle Port Authority, pers. comm., 18 December 2001;
Melbourne Port Corporation, pers. comm., 1 February 2002; Sydney Ports Corporation, pers. comm., 11
December 2001; VCA (2001) and ship visit parameters in table 6.2.
Estimating the effect of price changes on business costs
Trends in real port authority charges indicate whether expenditure on port authority
services as a business input cost is greater or less than it would have been if charges
had increased at the same rate as general inflation.
Trends in port authority charges have been such that the charges levied on container
and bulk ships have declined in nominal terms at all ports included in the study,
with an even greater decline in real terms.PORTS AND RAIL
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For each port authority, an approximation of the real change in business costs in
2000-01 was obtained by multiplying current port authority revenues from charges
on ships and cargo, by the ratio of the CPI (All groups) index number and the real
price index number for port authorities in the relevant capital city. For this
calculation, the impact of price changes on consumption of port authority services
was ignored.
This approach was used to estimate the real change in business costs for both
container and bulk ships, where trends in port authority charges were available. A
simple average of the two was taken as an indication of the total change in business
costs for each port.
For all the ports for which data was available, revenues earned from container and
bulk ships would have been approximately $261.6 million higher if port authority
charges had risen in line with inflation rather than falling (see  table  6.3). This
suggests that business costs were around 53 per cent lower than if prices had risen
with the general inflation rate.
Table 6.3 Real reductions in business costs — ports
2000-01









The financial performance of port authorities was examined to provide information
on the relationship between price trends and financial outcomes, such as the return
on assets.
Low prices relative to costs may not achieve a satisfactory return on assets, nor
provide sufficient revenue to maintain and replace long-lived infrastructure assets.
If services are to be maintained, the community, as owners of the utility, will have
to provide financial support in the form of subsidies. Further, low prices may affect
the viability of the business and possibly expose the community to financial risks.INFRASTRUCTURE
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The data used in calculating the shareholder outcomes presented in this section were
generally taken from two sources:
•   Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government
Trading Enterprises; and
•   Productivity Commission reports on Financial Performance of Government
Trading Enterprises.
There may be inconsistencies between these two data sets and the information
published in the Annual Reports of port authorities. These inconsistencies arise
because of definitional differences.
Changing market conditions can also have an impact on shareholder outcomes from
year to year. The level of earnings generated by port Government Trading
Enterprises (GTEs) is strongly linked to trade throughput. Trade throughput, and
hence earnings, is susceptible to changes in both domestic and international
markets, particularly shifts in demand for key traded commodities.
In the case of the ports considered in this study, only part of their revenue is earned
by levying the ship and cargo-based charges discussed in the price outcomes section
of this chapter. However, the shareholder outcomes presented in this section reflect
the revenue earned from all aspects of their business. Consequently, it is difficult to
draw strong conclusions about the significance of shareholder outcomes over the
study period.
Profitability
Return on assets has generally fallen over the period for Sydney, Brisbane and
Burnie and has increased for Melbourne and Fremantle. However, returns have been
fairly variable (see  figures  6.3 and 6.4), with asset transfers, revaluations and
changes in asset valuation methodologies accounting for most of this variation
(see box 6.3).
Over the last 6 years, Sydney and Fremantle have generally earned nominal pre-tax
rates of return above 10  per  cent, Melbourne between 4  and 11  per  cent and
Brisbane between 5 and 6 per cent. By comparison, the ORG has estimated that a
real pre-tax weighted average cost of capital for the MPC and VCA of about
8.5  per  cent would be sufficient to meet the risk adjusted cost of capital
(ORG 2000c).6
                                             
6 The weighted average cost of capital is the weighted average of the risk-adjusted cost of equity
and debt capital.PORTS AND RAIL
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At all ports included in the study, falls in real charges have been associated with
falling rates of return. Moreover, some are now earning below the weighted average
cost of capital.
Comparisons of performance over time that are based on indicators that include an
estimate of asset values, have to be interpreted with care. Differences in asset
valuation procedures and changes in the size of the asset base can affect the return
on assets. Over the study period, there have been significant changes in asset values
as a result of asset transfers, revaluations and changes in asset valuation
methodologies.

























Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a  Prior to 1995-96, the Port of Sydney was operated by the Marine Services Board, and
estimates of the return on assets are unavailable. b The return on assets ratio for the Port of Melbourne is
based on the operations of the Melbourne Port Authority between 1990-91 and 1994-95 and on the combined
operations of the Melbourne Port Corporation and the Victorian Channels Authority between 1995-96 and
2000-01.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Box 6.3 Major changes in return on assets — 1990-91 to 2000-01
Sydney
•   Property, plant and equipment were revalued upwards in 1997-98. The increase in
asset values resulted in a fall in the return on assets.
Melbourne
•   The return on assets for Melbourne was for the Melbourne Port Authority between
1990-91 and 1994-95. Between 1995-96 and 2000-01, a combined return on assets
ratio was estimated based on the operations of both the Melbourne Ports
Corporation (MPC) and the Victorian Channels Authority (VCA).
•   The VCA earned an extraordinarily high return on assets in 1996-97 as a result of
the decision to value channels at zero in the financial statements prior to 1997-98.
Asset values increased in 1999-2000 following the inclusion of channels transferred
to the VCA from predecessor bodies.
•   The MPC’s assets were revalued upwards in 1997-98 and again in 1999-2000.
Brisbane
•   The return on assets fell in 1994-95, when assets were revalued upwards by
67.7 per cent as part of the corporatisation process.
•   Asset values increased in 1996-97, following an investment in the Brisbane Airport
and an upwards revaluation. Assets were revalued upwards again in 1997-98.
Fremantle
•   Abnormal expenses of $26.1 million resulted in an operating loss and a negative
return on assets in 1990-91.
•   Abnormal revenue relating to payments from the Western Australian Government
for the reimbursement of costs incurred in the reclamation of Port Beach land, and
the surrender of a lease on the ‘A' shed at Victoria Quay led to an increase in the
return on assets in 1997-98.
Burnie
•   Abnormal revenue contributed to the increase in the ratio in 1993-94 and the loss of
stevedoring revenue contributed to its decrease in 1995-96.
•   Although non-current assets were revalued downwards, the value of total assets
rose in 1997-98 with the inclusion of Burnie Airport's assets. Abnormal expenses
relating to the devaluation, the capitalisation of a finance lease, losses due to the
obsolescence of an oil berth, and redundancy payments, contributed to an operating
loss and a negative return.
•   Another downward revaluation of assets in 1999-2000 contributed to an operating
loss and a negative return on assets.PORTS AND RAIL
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Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a Abnormal expenses contributed to an operating loss after tax and a negative return on assets
in 1990-91.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).
Publicly-owned electricity utilities are often required to return some of their
earnings to their owner-governments in the form of dividend payments. This is
justified on competitive neutrality and cost recovery grounds.
Where a utility is not required to pay dividends, it has proportionately more funds
available for re-investment into its business, either for the development of new
services or the improvement of existing ones. Further, a utility need not rely on
debt-financing to the extent that its rivals must, and thus incurs lower overall
operating costs.
Most of the ports included in the study have been required to make dividend
payments over the last decade. In the case of Burnie, the policy on dividend
payments was first introduced in 1997-98, but the Port of Burnie is yet to make a
dividend payment. The amount of dividend paid by each port depends on the
dividend policy agreed to with the relevant State government.INFRASTRUCTURE
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The dividend payout and dividend to equity ratios for most of the ports included in
the study have been variable (see figures 6.5 and 6.6). Variability in the dividend to
equity ratio partly reflects changes in equity levels flowing from changes in asset
and liability levels. For example, the fall in SPC’s dividend to equity ratio in
1997-98, reflects a significant increase in asset values and hence equity, following
an upward revaluation and the purchase of land.




























Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for includes normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. a Prior to 1995-96, the Port of Sydney was operated by the Marine Services Board. Estimates
of the dividend payout ratio are unavailable. b The dividend payout ratio for the Port of Melbourne is based on
the operations of the Melbourne Port Authority between 1990-91 and 1994-95 and on the combined
operations of the Melbourne Port Corporation and the Victorian Channels Authority between 1995-96 and
2000-01. c In 1990-91 and 1991-92, the Melbourne Port Authority earned an operating loss after tax, implying
the payment of dividends from sources other than current year profits. d Prior to commercialisation in 1996-97,
the Fremantle Port Authority was required to pay a levy based on total revenue to the WA Government.
Between 1990-91 and 1992-93, Fremantle Port Authority earned an operating loss after tax, implying the
payment of the levy from sources other than current year profits. e Between 1993-94 and 1995-96, the levy
was rebated back to the Fremantle Port Authority, and in 1996-97, no dividend was paid. Consequently, the
dividend payout ratio for these years was zero.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).
When dividend payout ratios are greater than 100 per cent it means that the port
authority is paying the dividend from sources other than current year profits. If the
dividend payout ratio is negative, as has been the case for Melbourne andPORTS AND RAIL
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Fremantle, this implies that the utility incurred an operating loss after tax in that
year but was still required to pay a dividend.



























Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for includes normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. a Prior to 1995-96, the Port of Sydney was operated
by the Marine Services Board, estimates of the dividend to equity ratio are unavailable. b The dividend to
equity ratio for the Port of Melbourne is based on the operations of the Melbourne Port Authority between
1990-91 and 1994-95, and on the combined operations of the Melbourne Port Corporation and the Victorian
Channels Authority between 1995-96 and 2000-01. c Prior to commercialisation in 1996-97, the Fremantle
Port Authority was required to pay a levy based on total revenue to the WA Government. Between 1990-91
and 1992-93, the Fremantle Port Authority had negative equity, resulting in a negative dividend to equity ratio.
d Between 1993-94 and 1995-96, the levy was rebated back to the Fremantle Port Authority and in 1996-97,
no dividend was paid. Consequently, the dividend to equity ratio for these years was zero.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).
The payment of special dividends has also contributed to the variability in the
dividend payout and dividend to equity ratios. For example, the MPC made a
special dividend payment in 1998-99 of $26 million from cash reserves.
Despite this variation, most of the ports included in the study have delivered
dividend to equity ratios of between 2 and 10 per cent. This is broadly comparable
to that of private companies operating in the utilities market. In 1999-2000, for
example, the dividend to equity ratio of private sector utilities averaged around
5 per cent, but ranged between around 2 and 10 per cent (PC 2001a).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Shareholder outcomes have been variable over the study period and port authority
charges for container and bulk ships have fallen in real terms, perhaps too fast for
some to achieve a commercial rate of return. Because of restructuring and different
approaches to asset valuation, it is difficult to disentangle the effect that falling real
charges have had on financial performance measures.
6.2 Rail  freight
Rail accounts for over one third of the rail, road and domestic sea freight task. In
1999-2000, government and privately owned railways hauled over 134 billion net
freight tonne kilometres (ntkm) (see figure 6.7) (ARA 2001).
Rail carries a range of commodities including coal, grain, sugar, minerals and ores,
petroleum, liquids, cement, steel, containers, manufactured products, cars, paper,
parcel post, fruit and vegetables and other general freight.
Not all government-owned rail authorities are discussed in this section. The
chapter’s focus is on GTEs providing rail freight services.
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Industry reforms affecting prices
In 1990-91, Australia’s rail industry was characterised by integrated,
government-owned railways, providing passenger and freight services in their
respective jurisdictions, with private operators hauling iron ore in WA. Australian
National (AN) provided interstate freight services across jurisdictions and intrastate
services in both SA and Tasmania, as well as long distance non-urban passenger
services on the Australian mainland.
Following a process which involved structural reform, changes to governance
arrangements, and the introduction of third party access arrangements, a number of
rail authorities have been restructured and some have been privatised.
The Productivity Commission’s report on Progress in Rail Reform (PC  1999b)
identified a number of factors driving reform in the 1990s, including:
•   continued and increasing competition from road transport;
•   continued pressure on State government budgets in providing goods and services
to the community;
•   the pressure on railway freight rates from increasing competition in downstream
markets, such as Australia's black coal industry; and
•   the implementation of the National Competition Policy (NCP).
Market reforms
During the 1990s, all rail GTEs were commercialised and most were corporatised.
This process involved clarifying management objectives and responsibilities,
transferring regulatory responsibilities to other agencies, identifying and explicitly
funding community service obligations, and introducing stronger financial
disciplines.
In 1991-92, the National Rail Corporation (NRC) was established to take over
interstate freight traffic from the State rail authorities and AN.7 AN continued to
provide intrastate freight services in SA and Tasmania. The NRC commenced
commercial operations in 1993.
                                             
7 The NRC’s shareholders are the Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian governments. Queensland




In 1997-98, the Commonwealth Government sold AN’s interstate freight businesses
in SA and Tasmania, and transferred AN’s mainline track to the Australian Rail
Track Corporation (ARTC). The ARTC was established as a ‘one-stop shop’ for rail
operators seeking access to the interstate standard gauge rail network between
Brisbane and Perth. The ARTC is currently responsible for managing access and
track maintenance in South Australia (and parts of NSW and WA) as track owner,
and in Victoria as track manager via a lease arrangement.
In 1996-97, the NSW Government restructured the State Rail Authority into four
separate entities, with FreightCorp established to provide freight services.8 In
1995-96, the Victorian Government began a process of dismantling the Public
Transport Corporation with the establishment of V/Line Freight and the Victorian
Rail Track Access Corporation as body corporates. V/Line freight was sold to
Freight Victoria (a consortium headed by RailAmerica) and subsequently renamed
FreightAustralia.
In late 2000, the Western Australian Government finalised the sale of Westrail’s
freight business to the Australian Railroad Group (ARG) (a joint venture between
Wesfarmers Ltd and Genesee and Wyoming Inc). As part of the sale, ARG was
granted a 49 year lease of the freight rail network infrastructure. In early 2002,
FreightCorp and the NRC were both sold to a Lang Corporation and Toll Holdings
joint venture.
Third party access to rail infrastructure (essentially the rail track) is seen as a means
of increasing the scope for competition. As part of the NCP package, Part IIIA of
the Trade Practices Act 1974 established a national regime for third party access to
services provided by ‘nationally significant’ infrastructure facilities.
The national regime provides a number of alternatives. Access seekers can request
that the National Competition Council (NCC) ‘declare’ access to the services of a
particular infrastructure facility. Once declared, the parties enter into negotiation in
order to reach agreeable terms and conditions. Alternatively, infrastructure owners
can submit an access undertaking to the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) for approval. Such an undertaking outlines the terms and
conditions under which third party access will be negotiated. Third, State
governments can introduce State-based regimes which outline the terms and
                                             
8  The State Rail authority continued to be responsible for the provision of rail passenger services,
the Rail Access Corporation was established as owner of the track and the Rail Services
Authority was established to provide maintenance services to the other rail businesses. On
1 January 2001, Rail Services Australia and the Rail Access Corporation were merged to form
the Rail Infrastructure Corporation.PORTS AND RAIL
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conditions for negotiating third party access. These regimes can be certified as
effective by the NCC.
The introduction of a national regime has encouraged some rail authorities to
submit access undertakings for approval as well as the development of State-based
rail access regimes.
The ARTC has submitted an undertaking to the ACCC for approval. In its draft
decision released at the end of 2001, the ACCC approved the undertaking subject to
the ARTC addressing a number of concerns raised in the draft decision. The
Queensland Competition Authority gave final approval to Queensland Rail’s (QR’s)
access undertaking in December 2001.
In WA, a State-based access regime came into effect in September 2001. The
regime covers the track leased by ARG from the Western Australian Government.
ARG has established a subsidiary (WestNet Rail Pty Ltd) to manage the track
infrastructure and negotiate terms and conditions with access seekers.
The introduction of third party access arrangements has facilitated the entry of a
number of private operators. These include interstate freight operators (Specialised
Container Transport, Toll Rail and Patrick) and smaller private operators providing
a range of services including crews, locomotives and short haul operations
(Northern Rivers Railroad and Great Northern Rail Services) (PC 1999b).
Over the 1990s, governments also removed a number of restrictions on the transport
of certain commodities. These restrictions were designed to prevent such
commodities from being carried by transport modes other than rail. For example,
from 1993, the Victorian Government removed restrictions on  the transport by road
of bulk oil, minor bulk commodities, timber, cement and briquettes. The Western
Australian Government deregulated the transport of bulk fuels, minor bulks and
timber in 1992-93, and the transport of major bulk ore, mineral and woodchip
traffics in 1994-95.
Price outcomes
Rail freight is typically hauled under commercially negotiated contracts. The
Commission approached both providers and major users of rail freight for
information on freight rates over the study period. Limited information on freight
rates for the transport of wheat was available from the Australian Wheat Board Ltd




The AWB provided information on the average cost of transporting wheat from
silos to the port for each mainland State. The average is equal to the cost of
transporting grain from each silo, weighted by the tonnage of Export Pool grain
moved from that site as a proportion of the aggregate State tonnage of AWB Pool
grain moved to the port for export.
In the case of Export Pool grain, the AWB negotiates fixed term contracts with
various freight providers. The freight rates that apply to each contract are normally
set for the season, but can change with movement in various cost and efficiency
factors included in a rate adjustment mechanism.
Between 1996-97 and 2000-01, real prices for transport of wheat by rail fell
nationally by 15 per cent, 22 per cent in NSW, 20 per cent in Victoria, 17 per cent
in Queensland, 6 per cent in South Australia and 8 per cent in WA (see figure 6.8).9
                                             
9  The nominal price series for 2000-01 includes the GST.PORTS AND RAIL
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Figure 6.8 Real rail freight price trends — wheat

























































Note The real price index for each State reflects the average cost of transporting wheat from silos to the port.
The average is equal to the cost of transporting grain from each silo, weighted by the tonnage of Export Pool
grain moved from that site as a proportion of the aggregate State tonnage of Australian Wheat Board Pool
grain moved to the port for export. The nominal cost per tonne was deflated by the relevant capital city CPI (All
groups) and expressed as an index with 1996-97 as the base year. The nominal price series for 2000-01
include the Goods and Services Tax.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Australian
Wheat Board, Melbourne, pers. comm., 8 April 2002.INFRASTRUCTURE
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The Queensland Mining Council provided information on average freight rates for
the transport of coal in NSW and Queensland. Between 1995-96 and 2000-01, real
prices fell by 52 per cent in NSW and 26 per cent in Queensland (see figure 6.9).10
Figure 6.9 Real rail freight price trends — coal






























Note Nominal average freight rates were  deflated by the relevant capital city CPI (All groups) and expressed
as an index with 1995-96 as the base year. Excludes any ‘monopoly rent’ or ‘de facto royalties’ collected by
the NSW and Queensland governments through the rail freight system. The nominal price series for 2000-01
include the Goods and Services Tax.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Queensland
Mining Council, Brisbane, pers. comm., 21 January 2002.
In NSW, freight services were provided by the State Rail Authority prior to
1996-97, when FreightCorp was established. FreightCorp provided information on
Hunter Valley (NSW) export coal freight rates. The majority of NSW export coal is
mined in the Hunter Valley Region and transported by rail to the Port of Newcastle.
Between 1990-91 and 2000-01, real freight rates for the transport of export coal in
the Hunter Valley fell 61 per cent (see figure 6.10).11
                                             
10  The nominal price series for 2000-01 includes the GST.
11 The nominal price series for 2000-01 includes the GST.PORTS AND RAIL
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Figure 6.10 Real rail freight price trends — Hunter Valley export coal






























Note A nominal price index of rail freight rates with 1990-91 as the base year was deflated by the CPI
(All  groups) for Sydney. Excludes any ‘monopoly rent’ collected by the NSW government through the rail
freight system. The nominal price series for  2000-01 includes the Goods and Services Tax.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); FreightCorp,
Sydney, pers. comm., 15 March 2002.
Prices for freight services were also measured as the average revenue from all
freight services, that is, the real revenue earned per net freight kilometre.
Movements in price indexes constructed using this approach reflect both changes in
the mix of cargo carried and changes in the freight rates levied.
Price indexes for QR and Westrail were constructed using this approach. A joint
AN-NRC index was constructed because of the restructuring that took place
following the establishment of the NRC.
The real price index for QR fell by 41 per cent and the AN-NRC index fell by
38  per  cent between 1990-91 and 2000-01. Westrail’s index fell by 49  per  cent
between 1990-91 and 1999-2000 (see figure 6.11).12
                                             
12 The nominal price series for 2000-01 includes the GST.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 6.11 Real rail freight price trends — general freight



























Queensland Rail Westrail Australian National-National Rail 
a
b
Note Real price indexes were constructed from average freight rates estimated by dividing freight revenue by
net tonne kilometres (ntkm) carried each year. The rate per ntkm was deflated by the relevant capital city CPI
(All groups) and expressed as an index with 1990-91 as the base year. a Freight revenue figures for Westrail
were unavailable for 2000-01. b Australian National (AN) provided both inter and intrastate freight services up
until 1993-94, when AN’s interstate freight business was transferred to the National Rail Corporation (NRC).
AN continued to provide intrastate services for SA and Tasmania until November 1997. These services are
included in the AN-NRC index. The price nominal prices series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services
Tax.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); NRC (2001 and
previous issues), SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); QR (2001 and previous issues); Westrail (2000
and previous issues).
Estimating the effect of price changes on business costs
Trends in real rail freight rates indicate whether expenditure on rail freight services
as a business input cost is greater or less than it would have been if charges had
increased at the same rate as general inflation. Trends in rail freight charges have
been such that the freight rates levied by all the authorities considered in this study
have declined in nominal terms, with even greater declines in real terms.
For each rail authority, an approximation of the real change in business costs was
obtained by multiplying current rail authority freight revenue by the ratio of the CPI
(All groups) index number and the real price index number for the rail authority in
the relevant capital city (see figure 6.11). For this calculation, the impact of price
changes on the consumption of rail services was ignored.PORTS AND RAIL
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For QR, Westrail and the NRC, revenues earned from rail freight services would
have been approximately $2.4 billion higher if rail freight rates, rather than falling,
had risen in line with inflation (see table 6.4). This suggests that business costs were
around 53 per cent lower than if prices had risen with the general inflation rate.
Table 6.4 Real reduction in business costs — rail freight
2000-01
$ million Per cent
Queensland Rail 1 601.5 53.3
Westraila 327.9 56.0
National Rail Corporation 479.0 50.5
Total 2 408.4 53.0




The financial performance of rail GTEs providing freight services was examined to
provide information on the relationship between price trends and financial
outcomes, such as the return on assets.
Some of the rail GTEs considered in this section provided both passenger and
freight services over the study period. Their financial performance reflects both
aspects of their business, whereas the price outcomes discussed earlier relate only to
rail freight. This makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions about the significance
of freight rates and shareholder outcomes over the study period.
Changing market conditions can also affect shareholder outcomes from year to year.
Rail plays a dominant role in the transport of bulk commodities such as coal, grain,
minerals and ore. Rail GTE’s ability to generate revenue is affected by the demand
and supply conditions in the markets for these commodities.
As discussed in section 6.1, the data used in calculating the shareholder outcomes
presented in this section were taken from a number of sources. There may be
inconsistencies between these data sources and the information published in the





As discussed in section  6.1, low prices relative to costs may not achieve a
satisfactory return on assets, nor provide sufficient revenue to maintain and replace
long-lived infrastructure assets.
Return on assets has been variable for most rail GTEs (see figure 6.12). Abnormals
relating to restructuring, provisions for redundancy payments and changes to
superannuation provisions have contributed to this variability.
























Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a FreightCorp commenced operations in 1996-97. b The financial information reported for
Queensland Rail refers to the whole rail entity and not to its freight operations. Financial information was not
available for  the years 1990-91 and 1991-92.c Financial information reported for Westrail refers to the whole
rail entity and not to its freight operations. Westrail was privatised in 2000-01. d The financial information
reported for Australian National (AN) relates to the whole rail entity and not to its freight operations. AN was
privatised in 1997-98. e 1993-94 was National Rail Corporation’s (NRC) first full year of operation. f Abnormal
revenue relating to changes in superannuation provisions contributed to higher operating profit and return on
assets in 1990-91. g Abnormal revenue mainly from a reduction in the provision for superannuation liabilities
contributed to higher operating profit and return on assets in 1993-94. h Abnormal expenses relating mainly to
redundancies contributed to an operating loss and a negative return on assets. i Abnormal expenses relating
mainly to the transfer of business to the NRC and the restructuring of AN in preparation for its sale contributed
to an operating loss and a negative return on assets in 1995-96. j Abnormal revenue relating mainly to the
transfer of business and assets to the NRC, and the restructuring of AN and its balance sheet prior to sale
contributed to a higher operating profit and return on assets.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).PORTS AND RAIL
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Since 1995-96, Westrail has earned a return on assets above the risk free rate (as
approximated by the 10 year bond rate).13 Since 1996-97, FreightCorp and QR have
generally earned rates of return that are closer to the risk free rate.
Assessing the financial performance of the NRC and Australian National is difficult
because of the restructuring that took place during much of the study period. During
a five year establishment period, the NRC’s three shareholders — the
Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments — agreed to provide the NRC
with cash equity injections, the transfer of selected nominated assets, and
compensation payments to meet any losses incurred from transferred functions.
Company profits during the establishment period do not provide a good indication
of financial performance because of payments being made by shareholder
governments to the NRC. Shareholder compensation payments ceased in 1998.
That said, the returns earned by the NRC have been below the risk free rate in most
years during the study period. In 2000, the Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality
Complaints Office (CCNCO) found that the NRC had not earned a commercial rate
of return for the years 1995-96 to 1998-99. The CCNCO found that a lower than
commercial rate of return reflected the restructuring and delays involved in the
formation of the NRC (CCNCO 2000).
Payments to government
Publicly-owned rail authorities are often required to return some of their earnings to
their owner-governments in the form of dividend payments. This is justified on
competitive neutrality and cost recovery grounds.
It has been a policy requirement that QR make dividend payments from 1995-96
and Westrail and FreightCorp from 1996-97. AN and the NRC were not required to
make dividend payments during the study period.
The amount of dividend paid depends on the dividend policy agreed to with the
respective State government. When dividend payout ratios are greater than 100 per
cent it means that the rail authority is paying the dividend from sources other than
current year profits.
In most years, the dividend payout ratios for FreightCorp, Queensland Rail and
Westrail have been higher than the payout rates of the private sector utility firms
(see figure 6.13). In 1999-2000, the dividend payout ratios of private sector utilities
averaged around 47 per cent and ranged between 27 to 56 per cent (PC 2001a).
                                             




Over the period, the dividend payout ratios of the three rail authorities averaged
72 per cent and ranged between 41 and 176  per cent.
FreightCorp, QR and Westrail have delivered dividend to equity ratios in the range
of 3 to 30 per cent over the study period (see  figure 6.14) with an average of
6 per cent. This is higher than that of private companies operating in the utilities
market. In 1999-2000, for example, the dividend to equity ratio of private sector
utility firms averaged around 5 per cent, but ranged between 2 and 10  per  cent
(PC 2001a).






















Queensland Rail Westrail FreightCorp
a b c
Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for includes normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. a FreightCorp commenced operations in 1996-97. b The financial information reported for
Queensland Rail (QR) refers to the whole rail entity and not to its freight operations. QR was first required to
make dividend payments in 1995-96.c Financial information reported for Westrail refers to the whole rail entity
and not to its freight operations. Westrail was privatised in 2000-01. Westrail was first required to make
dividend payments in 1996-97.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).PORTS AND RAIL
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Queensland Rail Westrail FreightCorp
a b c
d
Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for includes normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. a FreightCorp commenced operations in 1996-97.
b The financial information reported for Queensland Rail (QR) refers to the whole rail entity and not to its
freight operations. QR was first required to make dividend payments in 1995-96. c Financial  information
reported for Westrail refers to the whole rail entity and not to its freight operations. Westrail was privatised in
2000-01. Westrail was first required to make dividend payments in 1996-97. d In 1996-97, Westrail had
negative equity, resulting in a negative dividend to equity ratio
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).
Over the study period,  shareholder outcomes as measured by return on assets,
dividend payout and dividend to equity ratios have been variable, consistent with a
period of significant restructuring and transition. Most rail authorities considered in
the study have earned rates of return at or slightly above the risk free rate and some
have delivered above average dividend payments. In these cases, rail authorities
have been able to deliver real falls in freight charges without reducing profitability.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Attachment A — Data tables
Ports
Table A6.1 Real port authority price trends — container ships (per TEU
exchanged)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Fremantle Burnie
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 98.3 103.5 98.0 106.2 97.9
1992-93 94.7 102.7 96.7 110.1 96.7
1993-94 73.8 100.7 94.8 109.0 93.9
1994-95 63.0 85.5 88.3 105.3 91.1
1995-96 59.9 77.9 85.0 98.4 87.7
1996-97 55.0 63.4 83.7 97.1 91.0
1997-98 54.5 57.8 83.3 92.9 91.1
1998-99 51.6 52.7 82.4 91.3 90.2
1999-00 50.4 40.1 81.0 88.0 88.5
2000-01 47.5 38.5 76.5 79.6 83.5
Note A real price index was constructed for Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Fremantle and Burnie by
estimating the ship and cargo-based charges levied using the ship visit parameters in table 6.1. The price per
TEU exchanged was deflated by the relevant capital city CPI (All groups) and expressed as an index with
1990-91 as the base year. The price index for Sydney is based on charges levied by the Marine Services
Board between 1990-91 and 1995-96, and by the Sydney Ports Corporation between 1996-97 and 2000-01.
The price index for Melbourne is based on charges levied by the Melbourne Port Authority between 1990-91
and 1994-95 and the Melbourne Port Corporation (MPC) and the Victorian Channels Authority between
1995-96 and 2000-01. It was assumed that the ship is berthed at a dock for which the MPC does not levy a
berth hire charge. The nominal price series for 2000-01 exclude the Goods and Services Tax.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Burnie Port
Corporation, pers. comm., 14 November 2001; Fremantle Port Authority, pers. comm., 28 September 2001;
Melbourne Port Corporation, pers. comm., 24 September 2001; Port of Brisbane Corporation, pers. comm., 28
September 2001; Sydney Ports Corporation, pers. comm., 3 October 2001; VCA (2001) and ship visit
parameters in table 6.1.PORTS AND RAIL
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Table A6.2 Real port authority price trends — bulk ships (per tonne
exchanged)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Sydney Melbourne Fremantle Burnie
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 98.3 103.9 102.9 97.9
1992-93 98.0 103.2 101.3 96.7
1993-94 96.6 101.1 98.1 93.9
1994-95 89.0 88.6 92.9 91.1
1995-96 84.8 74.4 89.4 87.7
1996-97 81.0 63.2 86.1 90.8
1997-98 80.0 56.9 85.8 90.8
1998-99 78.7 53.5 82.4 89.9
1999-00 76.8 49.9 81.2 88.3
2000-01 72.3 47.7 77.2 83.4
Note A real price index was constructed for each port by estimating the ship and cargo-based charges levied
using the ship visit parameters in table 6.2. The price per tonne exchanged was deflated by the relevant
capital city CPI (All groups) and expressed as an index with 1990-91 as the base year. The price index for
Sydney, is based on charges levied by the Marine Services Board between 1990-91 and 1995-96, and by the
Sydney Ports Corporation between 1996-97 and 2000-01. The price index for Melbourne is based on charges
levied by the Melbourne Port Authority between 1990-91 and 1994-95, and the Melbourne Port Corporation
(MPC) and the Victorian Channels Authority between 1995-96 and 2000-01. It was assumed that the ship is
berthed at a dock for which the MPC does not levy a berth hire charge. Wharfage is not levied on bulk cargo
loaded and discharged at privately operated facilities in Fremantle’s outer harbour. Instead, a Port
Administration fee is levied on the private operators of these facilities. The price index for Fremantle
incorporates the Port Administration Fee on a per tonne basis. The nominal price series for 2000-01 exclude
the Goods and Services Tax.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index,  Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Burnie Port
Corporation, pers. comm., 14 November 2001; Fremantle Port Authority, pers. comm., 18 December 2001;
Melbourne Port Corporation, pers. comm., 1 February 2002; Sydney Ports Corporation, pers. comm., 11
December 2001; VCA (2001) and ship visit parameters in table 6.2.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A6.3 Return on assets — port authorities
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
Sydneya Melbourneb Brisbane Fremantle Burnie
1990-91 n.a. 1.0 17.4 -30.7c 9.0
1991-92 n.a. 0.2 16.3 -0.6 10.9
1992-93 n.a. 4.9 17.6 7.4 8.5
1993-94 n.a. 5.3 17.7 14.3 15.3
1994-95 n.a. 7.0 7.9 15.7 5.1
1995-96 15.8 4.2 5.8 14.6 1.0
1996-97 15.5 8.1 5.5 14.9 1.0
1997-98 12.5 9.6 4.4 20.0 -8.1
1998-99 11.5 10.5 6.4 17.1 6.3
1999-00 10.2 6.9 6.3 15.6 -2.5
2000-01 7.9 6.1 5.0 13.5 -2.6
Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a  Prior to 1995-96, the Port of Sydney was operated by the Marine Services Board, and
estimates of the return on assets are unavailable. b The return on assets ratio for the Port of Melbourne is
based on the operations of the Melbourne Port Authority between 1990-91 and 1994-95, and on the combined
operations of the Melbourne Port Corporation and the Victorian Channels Authority between 1995-96 and
2000-01. c Abnormal expenses contributed to an operating loss after tax and a negative return on assets in
1990-91. n.a. Not available.
Sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).PORTS AND RAIL
FREIGHT
223
Table A6.4 Dividend payout ratio — port authorities
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
Sydneya Melbourneb Brisbane Fremantle
1990-91 n.a. -46.5 10.7 -4.3c
1991-92 n.a. -35.3 12.3 -13.3c
1992-93 n.a. 40.3 22.7 -68.4c
1993-94 n.a. 67.5 16.6 0.0d
1994-95 n.a. 35.2 33.0 0.0d
1995-96 56.5 29.2 38.8 0.0d
1996-97 61.3 25.2 37.5 0.0d
1997-98 50.0 43.9 39.7 10.0
1998-99 42.2 104.9 90.5 10.0
1999-00 50.0 53.3 94.8 19.9
2000-01 44.8 21.7 130.5 20.0
Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for includes normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. a Prior to 1995-96, the Port of Sydney was operated by the Marine Services Board, estimates
of the dividend payout ratio are unavailable. b The dividend payout ratio for the Port of Melbourne is based on
the operations of the Melbourne Port Authority between 1990-91 and 1994-95, and on the combined
operations of the Melbourne Port Corporation and the Victorian Channels Authority between 1995-96 and
2000-01. c In 1990-91 and 1991-92, the Melbourne Port Authority earned an operating loss after tax, implying
the payment of dividends from retained earnings. c Prior to commercialisation in 1996-97, the Fremantle Port
Authority was required to pay a levy based on total revenue to the Western Australian Government. Between
1990-91 and 1992-93, Fremantle Port Authority earned an operating loss after tax, implying the payment of
the levy from retained earnings. d Between 1993-94 and 1995-96, the levy was rebated back to the Fremantle
Port Authority and in 1996-97, no dividend was paid. Consequently, the dividend payout ratio for these years
was zero. n.a. Not available.
Sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A6.5 Dividend to equity ratio — port authorities
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
Sydneya Melbourneb Brisbane Fremantlec
1990-91 n.a. 1.6 2.2 -10.4c
1991-92 n.a. 1.9 2.3 -3.3c
1992-93 n.a. 1.0 4.5 -2.9c
1993-94 n.a. 2.2 3.3 0d
1994-95 n.a. 2.3 2.8 0d
1995-96 11.0 1.0 1.6 0d
1996-97 10.3 1.6 1.8 0d
1997-98 5.2 2.8 1.2 2.7
1998-99 3.9 8.6 3.8 1.5
1999-00 3.6 1.9 4.0 2.5
2000-01 2.9 0.8 2.7 2.4
Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for includes normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. a Prior to 1995-96, the Port of Sydney was operated
by the Marine Services Board, estimates of the dividend to equity ratio are unavailable. b The dividend to
equity ratio for the Port of Melbourne is based on the operations of the Melbourne Port Authority between
1990-91 and 1994-95, and on the combined operations of the Melbourne Port Corporation and the Victorian
Channels Authority between 1995-96 and 2000-01. c Prior to commercialisation in 1996-97, the Fremantle
Port Authority was required to pay a levy based on total revenue to the Western Australian Government.
Between 1990-91 and 1992-93, the Fremantle Port Authority had negative equity, resulting in a negative
dividend to equity ratio. d Between 1993-94 and 1995-96, the levy was rebated back to the Fremantle Port
Authority and in 1996-97, no dividend was paid. Consequently, the dividend to equity ratio for these years was
zero. n.a. Not available.




Table 6.6 Net freight tonne kilometres carried by rail
1990-91 to 1999-00












Table A6.7 Real rail freight price trends — wheat (per tonne)
1995-96 to 2000-01 (index 1996-97=100)
NSW Victoria Queensland SA WA National
1996-97 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1997-98 101.3 100.1 100.1 100.0 98.9 100.0
1998-99 92.6 99.2 97.0 103.2 96.4 96.2
1999-00 91.4 91.3 93.5 98.4 90.3 92.1
2000-01 78.1 80.1 82.8 93.7 91.3 84.7
Note The real price index for each State reflects the average cost of transporting wheat from silos to the port.
The average is equal to the cost of transporting grain from each silo, weighted by the tonnage of Export Pool
grain moved from that site as a proportion of the aggregate State tonnage of Australian Wheat Board Pool
grain moved to the port for export. The nominal cost per tonne was deflated by the relevant capital city CPI (All
groups) and expressed as an index with 1996-97 as the base year. The nominal price series for 2000-01
include the Goods and Services Tax.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Australian Wheat
Board, Melbourne, pers. comm., 8 April 2002.INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A6.8 Real rail freight price trends — coal (per tonne)








Note Nominal average freight rates were  deflated by the relevant capital city CPI (All groups) and expressed
as an index with 1995-96 as the base year. Excludes any ‘monopoly rent’ or ‘de facto royalties’ collected by
the NSW and Queensland governments through the rail freight system. The nominal price series for 2000-01
include the Goods and Services Tax.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); Queensland Mining
Council, Brisbane, pers. comm., 21 January 2002.
Table A6.9 Real rail freight price trends — Hunter Valley export coal (per
tonne)













Note A nominal price index of rail freight rates with 1990-91 as the base year was deflated by the CPI
(All  groups) for Sydney. Excludes any ‘monopoly rent’ collected by the NSW government through the rail
freight system. The nominal price series for 2000-01 includes the Goods and Services Tax.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index,  Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); FreightCorp,
Sydney, pers. comm., 15 March 2002.PORTS AND RAIL
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Table A6.10 Real rail freight price trends — general freight (per ntkm)
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)
Queensland Rail Westraila Australian 
National-National Railb
1990-91 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991-92 93.1 99.1 95.2
1992-93 95.1 92.9 89.4
1993-94 92.6 90.2 84.1
1994-95 87.5 78.7 80.5
1995-96 88.5 63.9 75.7
1996-97 81.1 57.8 74.6
1997-98 66.3 55.2 67.8
1998-99 68.0 52.5 67.8
1999-00 65.4 50.5 68.1
2000-01 59.0 n.a. 62.2
Note Real price indexes were constructed from average freight rates estimated by dividing freight revenue by
net tonne kilometres (ntkm) carried each year. The rate per ntkm was deflated by the relevant capital city CPI
(All groups) and expressed as an index with 1990-91 as the base year. a Freight revenue figures for Westrail
were unavailable for 2000-01. b Australian National (AN) provided both inter and intrastate freight services up
until 1993-94, when AN’s interstate freight business was transferred to the National Rail Corporation (NRC).
AN continued to provide intrastate services for SA and Tasmania until November 1997. These services are
included in the AN-NRC index. The nominal price series for 2000-01 include the Goods and Services Tax.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0); NRC (2001 and




Table A6.11 Return on assets — selected rail GTEs
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
FreightCorpa Queensland Railb Westrailc Australian Nationald National Raile
1990-91 n.r. n.a. 23.0f 10.1 n.r.
1991-92 n.r. n.a. 3.4 -22.2h n.r.
1992-93 n.r. 2.3 5.4 0.4 n.r.
1993-94 n.r. 2.2 48.6g 3.1 0.2
1994-95 n.r. 2.6 4.5 0.3 5.8
1995-96 n.r. 8.1 12.5 -13.8i 4.1
1996-97 12.9 10.0 10.7 63.1j 1.3
1997-98 6.3 8.1 10.8 n.r. 0.6
1998-99 6.9 5.8 11.6 n.r. -1.0
1999-00 9.1 5.7 9.6 n.r. -1.1
2000-01 5.8 6.0 n.a. n.r. 2.9
Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. a FreightCorp commenced operations in 1996-97. b The financial information reported for
Queensland Rail refers to the whole rail entity and not to its freight operations. Financial information was not
available for  the years 1990-91 and 1991-92.c Financial information reported for Westrail refers to the whole
rail entity and not to its freight operations. Westrail was privatised in 2000-01. d The financial information
reported for Australian National (AN) relates to the whole rail entity and not to its freight operations. AN was
privatised in 1997-98. e 1993-94 was National Rail Corporation’s first full year of operation. f Abnormal
revenue relating to changes in superannuation provisions contributed to higher operating profit and return on
assets in 1990-91. g Abnormal revenue mainly from a reduction in the provision for superannuation liabilities
contributed to higher operating profit and return on assets in 1993-94. h Abnormal expenses relating mainly to
redundancies contributed to an operating loss and a negative return on assets. i Abnormal expenses relating
mainly to the transfer of business to the NRC and the restructuring of AN in preparation for its sale contributed
to an operating loss and a negative return on assets in 1995-96. j Abnormal revenue relating mainly to the
transfer of business and assets to the NRC, and the restructuring of AN and its balance sheet prior to sale
contributed to a higher operating profit and return on assets. n.r. Not relevant. n.a. Not available.
Sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).PORTS AND RAIL
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Table A6.12 Dividend payout ratio — selected rail GTEs
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
FreightCorpa Queensland Railb Westrailc
1990-91 n.r. n.r. n.r.
1991-92 n.r. n.r. n.r.
1992-93 n.r. n.r. n.r.
1993-94 n.r. n.r. n.r.
1994-95 n.r. n.r. n.r.
1995-96 n.r. 80.0 n.r.
1996-97 51.0 91.3 7.6
1997-98 171.6 53.4 177.6
1998-99 166.3 91.1 79.1
1999-00 41.5 55.8 99.4
2000-01 176.4 63.5 n.a.
Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for includes normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. a FreightCorp commenced operations in 1996-97. b The financial information reported for
Queensland Rail (QR) refers to the whole rail entity and not to its freight operations. QR was first required to
make dividend payments in 1995-96. c Financial information reported for Westrail refers to the whole rail entity
and not to its freight operations. Westrail was privatised in 2000-01. Westrail was first required to make
dividend payments in 1996-97. n.r. Not relevant. n.a. Not available.
Sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).
Table A6.13 Dividend to equity ratio — selected rail GTEs
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
FreightCorpa Queensland Railb Westrailc
1990-91 n.r. n.r. n.r.
1991-92 n.r. n.r. n.r.
1992-93 n.r. n.r. n.r.
1993-94 n.r. n.r. n.r.
1994-95 n.r. n.r. n.r.
1995-96 n.r. 5.1 n.r.
1996-97 14.2 10.5 -0.6
1997-98 6.2 4.1 24.7
1998-99 4.3 3.7 29.8
1999-00 7.5 4.1 28.9
2000-01 11.4 3.1 n.a.
Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for includes normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. a FreightCorp commenced operations in 1996-97.
b The financial information reported for Queensland Rail (QR) refers to the whole rail entity and not to its
freight operations. QR was first required to make dividend payments in 1995-96. c Financial  information
reported for Westrail refers to the whole rail entity and not to its freight operations. Westrail was privatised in
2000-01. Westrail was first require to make dividend payments in 1996-97. d In 1996-97, Westrail had
negative equity, resulting in a negative dividend to equity ratio. n.r. Not relevant. n.a. Not available.
Sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues).TELECOMMUNICATIONS 231
7  Telecommunications
Key outcomes
•   The real price of telecommunications services in Australia fell by more than
20 per cent over the period 1990-91 to 2000-01, or an average of 2 per cent each
year.
•   Telecommunications expenditure has increased in real terms due to increased
demand, with Australian Bureau of Statistics data suggesting that Australian
households spent around $7.5 billion on telecommunications services in 2000-01.
•   The prices paid by household and business customers appear to have declined at
broadly similar rates since June 1998.
•   The same appears to be true of metropolitan and non-metropolitan customers,
although a different methodology was used and the data is less conclusive.
•   Falling real telecommunications prices represented a real saving on
telecommunications expenditure by households of up to $2 billion in 2000-01, if
demand effects are overlooked.
•   The savings by lower income groups are larger when measured as a proportion of
their household expenditure, although households in higher income brackets make
larger savings in dollar terms.
•   Most but not all of the service quality indicators examined showed an improvement,
suggesting that price reductions had not been achieved at the expense of service
quality.
•   Concessions are provided to customers and additional price caps are in place to try
to ameliorate the effects of price changes on low-spending customers.
•   Telstra has paid a dividend in each year over the study period. Up until 1997-98, all
of these dividends were paid to the Commonwealth Government.
•   During the period of part private ownership (1997-98 to 2000-01), return on assets
has averaged 21 per cent, compared with 13 per cent for the period of full public
ownership (1990-91 to 1996-97).
The Australian telecommunications industry has undergone significant reform in the
past decade. Beneficial reforms can be expected to lead to reduced prices. Further,
if tariff rates are rebalanced from a focus on usage to be more reflective of the costs
of supplying network access to customers, observed price trends may vary between232 INFRASTRUCTURE
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households situated in different areas, and between household and business
customers.
In this chapter, trends in real prices paid by household customers for
telecommunications services are presented for the period 1990-91 to 2000-01. The
impact of these real price trends on household expenditure for a range of income
groups is also examined.
Drawing on the results of a study conducted by the Communications Research Unit
(CRU) for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC),
differences in price trends between metropolitan and non-metropolitan customers,
between household and business customers, and between concession and non-
concession customers are presented.1
Quality of service measures were examined to determine whether any declines in
real prices over the study period have been associated with lower service quality.
Finally, the financial performance of Telstra was examined to see if price declines
have been associated with falling rates of return.
7.1 Industry reforms
In the past decade, market reforms and institutional changes have been introduced
in the telecommunications industry. In addition to these developments, there have
been major advances in technology.
Market reforms
The main changes to the market and governance of the telecommunications industry
in the past decade have included the:
•   introduction of competition;
•   introduction of telecommunications specific access and conduct arrangements;
•   partial privatisation of Telstra following public share offers in 1997 and 1999;
•   transfer of regulatory responsibilities from the Australian Telecommunications
Authority (AUSTEL) to the Australian Communications Authority (ACA) and
the ACCC; and the
                                             
1 The CRU is a research unit within the Commonwealth Department of Communications,
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•   inclusion of contributions by new carriers to the funding of the Universal
Service Obligation (USO), in addition to funding by Telstra.
The scope for competition was increased by the removal of regulatory barriers to
entry and the introduction of telecommunications specific access arrangements.
This liberalisation was introduced by two main pieces of legislation — the
Telecommunications Act 1991 and the Telecommunications Act 1997.
Prior to the 1991 legislation, Telecom had a monopoly on the installation,
maintenance, and operation of the telecommunications network and the supply of
basic telecommunications services within Australia.2 However, the provision of
value added services, private networks, customer equipment and cable installation,
was subject to competition. This meant that although alternative service providers
could compete with Telecom to provide value added services, they relied on
Telecom’s network to deliver these services.
The Telecommunications Act 1991 established a general carrier duopoly with Optus
entering the market in competition with Telstra. Initially, Optus only competed in
the provision of long-distance services and the effect of competition on
long-distance call charges was soon evident. Optus (and, since 1997, other carriers)
now compete with Telstra for the provision of local calls and other
telecommunications services.
The 1991 Act also provided the legislative foundation for competition in mobile
telecommunications services. Optus and Vodafone entered the market in
competition with Telecom in 1992 and 1993 respectively (PC 2001c).
One important feature of telecommunications is that services rely on
interconnectivity with the network of each carrier. There cannot be effective
competition without each carrier being able to access the network of each of the
other carriers. As a result, the introduction of the regulated duopoly on the fixed line
network required the introduction of arrangements enabling Optus to access
Telecom’s network. The new mobile telecommunications providers also required
access to the fixed line network.
The second period of market reform in the telecommunications industry followed
the introduction of the Telecommunications Act 1997 which remains the governing
legislation of the industry. This Act provided for unrestricted entry into the
telecommunications market.
                                             
2 Telecom began trading as Telstra in 1995.234 INFRASTRUCTURE
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In conjunction with the opening up of the industry to competition, new legislative
provisions for access were inserted in the Trade Practices Act 1974 under Part XIC.
These provisions provide for carriers to gain access to ‘declared’
telecommunications services such as originating and terminating access for the
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). In addition, specific
telecommunications anti-competitive conduct provisions were established in
Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act 1974.
When a service is declared, the access supplier has obligations to ensure that the
operation and technical quality provided to the competing carrier are equivalent to
that of the service provided to itself. Access arrangements between carriers may be
governed by agreements between the access provider and the access seeker, through
undertakings offered by the access provider, or by the ACCC through arbitration
(DCITA 2000).
Universal service obligation and retail price controls
There are two main areas of reform which have directly affected the prices of
telecommunications services in the last decade — the USO and retail price controls.
The telecommunications industry must comply with a number of regulatory
requirements under the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service
Standards) Act 1999, which affect telecommunications prices. This Act imposes a
USO, price controls, obligations under the customer service guarantee, and
obligations in relation to the provision of emergency call services and directory
assistance services.
Universal service obligation
The telecommunications USO is similar to community service obligations (CSOs)
operating in other infrastructure industries. However, it is broader in that services
must be available to all customers on an equitable basis, whereas CSOs typically
relate to services provided to targeted customer groups.
Telstra (and formerly Telecom) has always been the universal service provider.
Although the current legislation allows for alternative providers of the USO, Telstra
remains the only declared universal service provider.
Given Telstra’s practice of imposing uniform charges across the country, the USO
will often necessitate the provision of services at a price below the cost of supplying
the service, particularly in rural and remote areas.TELECOMMUNICATIONS 235
During the period of the regulated duopoly, Telstra and Optus contributed to the
cost of the USO in proportion to their shares of timed telecommunications traffic.
Following the introduction of open competition and the entry of new carriers, the
USO is now funded by a levy on each carrier in proportion to its revenue share.
In 1999, a digital data service obligation was imposed on the industry in addition to
the voice USO.3 The current USO requires that standard telephone services,
payphone services and digital data services are reasonably accessible to all
Australians on an equitable basis.
The net cost of the USO to the universal service provider is the cost to providing the
USO, minus the revenue it receives for providing the service. In recent years, the
net cost to Telstra of fulfilling the USO has been set by legislation at amounts below
what Telstra and the ACA have estimated it to be. That amount forms the basis for
calculating contributions by other carriers.
Retail price controls
Typically, telecommunications price structures include access and usage charges.
Basic access fees are typically flat fees levied periodically which do not reflect
actual usage. Call charges are usage charges which range from a flat fee per call
(local calls) to two-part charges consisting of a flagfall and a variable charge which
may vary by time-of-day, distance and call duration (long-distance and mobile
calls).
The complexity of telecommunications price structures has been increased,
particularly in recent years, through the introduction of pricing plans, discounts and
special offers.
With the introduction of new services, service types and pricing structures, there has
been some rebalancing of tariffs between different services, classes of customer or
between customer access charges and usage charges to make them more reflective
of costs. However, the imposition of regulatory price controls has restricted the
extent to which rebalancing is possible.
The telecommunications industry is subject to regulatory price controls including an
untimed local call requirement and retail price caps on service charges. The
requirement that local calls be untimed applies to all carriers and to both household
and business voice services as well as household data, facsimile and Internet access.
                                             
3 The digital data service obligation requires reasonable and equitable access on a 64 kbps ISDN
service or a broadly comparable satellite downlink service be provided to at least 96 per cent of
the Australian population.236 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Telstra’s services have been subject to price caps since 1989. Under the (CPI-X)
formula, average rates of change in service prices over a period must be kept below
the change in the consumer price index (CPI) by a specified amount (X) related to
expected productivity improvements. These regulatory price controls are designed
to ensure that savings from improved efficiency are passed on to customers. The
price controls imposed on Telstra over the past decade are summarised in table 7.1.4
An overall price cap has always applied to a comprehensive basket of services.
Currently, this basket comprises connections, line rentals, local, trunk and
international calls, leased lines and mobile services.
Table 7.1 Price caps on Telstra’s retail charges
1989–2001










CPI – 5.5 per cent Connections: CPI – 2 per centa
Rentals: CPI – 2 per centa
Untimed local calls: CPI – 2 per centa
STD calls: CPI – 5.5 per centa




CPI – 7.5 per cent Untimed local calls: 25 cents (household and
business)
Local calls from public payphones: 40 cents
Connections: CPI – 1 per cent
Line rentals: CPI – 1 per cent
Trunk calls: CPI – 1 per cent




CPI – 5.5 per centc Basket of local calls and line rentals: CPI
Basket of connection services: CPI
Untimed local calls: 25 cents, 22 cents (from July
2000)
Local calls from public payphones: 40 cents
(40 cents from July 2000)
a  Yearly increases were limited to CPI. b  These arrangements have been extended to June 2002. c A
low-spending household sub-cap of CPI – 1 per  cent also applies to a basket of services comprising
connections, line rentals, local, trunk and international call services, with revenue weights based on the
average bill size of the bottom 50 per cent of Telstra’s pre-selected customers. In addition, Telstra must obtain
consent from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission for a line rental increase of more than
CPI where that increase would affect the bottom 10 per cent of Telstra’s pre-selected customers.
Sources: ACCC (2001a); DCITA, Canberra, pers. comm., 2 May 2002; PC (1999c; 2001c).
                                             
4 The Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts recently announced
changes to these price controls to take effect in July 2002 (Alston 2002).TELECOMMUNICATIONS 237
There are also price sub-caps on some services and sub-sets of services. Sub-caps
have taken the form of maximum charges (for example, caps of 25 cents on local
calls) or maximum increases to charges in a given period. These sub-caps have
varied over the decade and are also summarised in table 7.1.
In addition to imposing the above price caps, the ACCC may also impose tariff
filing directions and record keeping rules under Part XIB of the Trade Practices
Act 1974. Under the tariff filing provisions, the ACCC may require a carrier or
carriage service provider with a substantial degree of market power to file certain
tariff information with the ACCC. There are also specific tariff filing provisions
applicable to Telstra. Under the record keeping provisions, the ACCC may impose
rules specifying what records are kept, how reports are prepared and when reports
are provided.
Other regulatory obligations
In addition to the USO and price control arrangements, there are a number of other
regulatory obligations affecting the telecommunications industry. These obligations
are aimed at achieving social objectives or promoting competition in the industry.
Under the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act
1999, the industry is required to provide certain services in accordance with
government social policy. These include emergency call services, operator services
and directory assistance. The Act also establishes the National Relay Service, which
enables people with hearing or speech impairments to access telecommunications
services using a combination of voice, modem, speech-to-speech or telephone
typewriter applications (ACA 2001a).
The telecommunications industry is also subject to carrier pre-selection and number
portability requirements. Carrier pre-selection allows customers to change carriers
without dialling extra digits each time a call is made. Number portability enables
customers to change carriers without changing their telephone number. These
requirements have been introduced to facilitate competition between carriers and
carriage service providers by promoting customer choice and reducing transaction
costs for customers (PC 1999c).
7.2 Price outcomes for metropolitan households
The telecommunications component of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)
CPI was used to indicate the trend in telecommunications prices over the study
period.238 INFRASTRUCTURE
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This price index has been adjusted by the ABS to accommodate substantial changes
in telecommunications services, including the introduction of new services and
changes in the importance of individual services.
Until the March quarter of 1998, the telecommunications services priced for the CPI
included telephone rental, connection and call charges (local, STD and
international). From 1998, the ABS also included calls from payphones and mobile
phones and from fixed phones to mobile phones, and a selection of pricing plans
and discount arrangements. In 1999, Internet services were also added to the index
(ABS, Canberra, pers. comm., 29 November 2001).
Calls are priced at varying times of the day and for a variety of distances. In
addition, the ABS now prices services from a number of providers, whereas at the
beginning of the period Telstra was the sole provider (ABS, Canberra, pers. comm.,
29 November 2001).
The real price of telecommunications services in Australia dropped by more than
20 per cent over the period, representing an average of 2 per cent each year (see
figure 7.1). This decline continues a downward trend in real telecommunications
prices which occurred during the 1970s and 1980s.
The downward trend in telecommunications prices may be attributable to a number
of factors including the introduction of competition, regulatory price caps, and
technology developments. It is likely that each factor has had a different influence
on each of the individual telecommunications services.TELECOMMUNICATIONS 239
Figure 7.1 Real telecommunications price trends — metropolitan
households




























Note The real price index was obtained by rebasing the CPI (telecommunications) price index to a base year
of 1990-91 and then deflating the rebased index by the rebased CPI (All groups) price index.  In 1998,
payphone and mobile phone services were introduced into the series and in 1999 the index changed again to
include Internet services. The price index for 2000-01 includes the Goods and Services Tax.
Data source: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).
Although it is not possible to determine the effect of regulatory price controls on
Telstra’s prices, the ACCC has published data which compares nominal price
changes in a basket of Telstra’s services with the regulatory price caps on the same
basket of services (see table 7.2) (ACCC 2001a). In recent years, nominal changes
in Telstra’s prices have closely matched the changes allowed under the price control
arrangements.240 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table 7.2 A comparison of nominal price changes with allowed changes
under regulatory price controls
1989-90 to 1999 (per cent)




1989-90 7.3 4.0 3.3 0.0
1990-91 8.0 4.0 7.3 3.5
1991-92 5.3 4.0 5.1 5.1
1992-93 1.9 5.5 -3.6 -3.6
1993-94 1.0 5.5 -4.5 -3.7
1994-95 1.8 5.5 -4.5 -5.6
1995b 1.6 2.8 -0.1 -1.4
1996 4.6 7.5 -2.9 -4.3
1997 2.6 7.5 -3.5 -3.9
1998 0.3 7.5 -6.7 -6.8
1999c 0.5 3.8 -3.3 -3.4
a Maximum nominal increase is calculated as CPI-X plus any allowance carried forward from the previous
year. b Year from July only. c Year to June only — allowance carried forward is 0.06/2 = 0.03 per cent
Source: ACCC (2001a).
Real price changes of individual services between 1996-97 and 1999-2000 have
varied (see table 7.3). The ACCC noted that the increase in the basic access price
and the sharp decrease in the price of local calls in 1999-2000 were evidence of
rebalancing within the PSTN basket of services (ACCC 2001b).
Table 7.3 Changes in real prices of telecommunications services
1996-97 to 1999-2000 (per cent)
Telecommunications service Real price change
Local calls -13.0




Note A negative sign means that real prices declined over the period. a Most of this change occurred between
1998-99 and 1999-2000, when the price of mobile services decreased by around 13 per cent. b Between
1998-99 and 1999-2000, basic access charges increased by around 10 per cent.
Source: ACCC (2001b).
Implications for household expenditure
Telecommunications prices have a direct effect on household expenditure. They
also have an indirect effect when changes in telecommunications prices paid by
businesses, are passed on to customers in the form of higher or lower prices for finalTELECOMMUNICATIONS 241
products and services. These indirect effects will be examined in a forthcoming
Productivity Commission research study.
The direct impact of changes in the price of telecommunications over the decade on
real household expenditure in 2000-01 was estimated. This was done by multiplying
the actual household expenditure on telecommunications in 2000-01, by the
difference between the movement in its price over the ten years to 2000-01 and the
movement in the CPI over the same ten year period. For this calculation, the impact
of price changes on consumption was ignored.
In 2000-01, Australian households spent around $7.5 billion on telecommunications
services.5
Telecommunications price trends were such that prices generally declined faster
than the CPI (All groups) in most capital cities. Accordingly, household expenditure
decreased relative to the expenditure that would have occurred, if prices had
changed by the CPI (All groups) (see table 7.4).
The expenditure changes in 2000-01, arising from price changes over the previous
decade and measured in dollars per year per household, were largest for households
in the highest income quintile (see table 7.4). However, the changes were more
significant, when measured as a percentage of household expenditure per year, for
those households in the lowest income quintile (see table 7.4).
Table 7.4 Real changes to household telecommunications expenditure
arising from price changes over the previous decade, by
income quintile
Weighted average of all capital city households, 2000-01
Income quintile $ per household % household expenditure
Lowest 20% -193.28 -1.01
Second quintile -240.23 -0.87
Third quintile -284.97 -0.76
Fourth quintile -335.47 -0.68
Highest 20% -386.85 -0.56
All households -295.01 -0.70
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease in telecommunications expenditure
because real prices declined over the period.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0).
                                             
5 Actual household expenditure in 2000-01 was derived by taking the proportion of total household
expenditure that was spent on telecommunications in the 1998-99 Household Expenditure Survey
(ABS 2000a). The proportion or expenditure weight from the survey was then multiplied by total
household expenditure in 1998-99 and inflated to 2000-01 prices using the CPI deflator, to obtain
an estimate of actual household expenditure on telecommunications in 2000-01.242 INFRASTRUCTURE
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The real decrease in household telecommunications expenditure across all capitals
was approximately $2 billion in 2000-01 (see table 7.5).
Table 7.5 Total change to household telecommunications expenditure
arising from price changes over the previous decade
2000-01
Households Change per household Total change
No. $ $’000
All capital cities 4 533 000 -295.01 -1 337 276
Total Australiaa 7 122 800 -274.78 -1 957 208a
Note A negative sign means that households incurred a real decrease in telecommunications expenditure
because real prices declined over the period. a The total change for Australia is based on the assumption that
price changes in the capital cities are the same as price changes in other areas.
Source: PC estimates based on ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0).
The preceding estimate is indicative only of the general magnitude of the change to
household expenditure resulting from prices changes over the previous decade.
There are a number of simplifications in these calculations such as overlooking the
effects of changes in demand.
Overlooking demand is a particularly simplifying assumption in the case of
telecommunications. As technology has changed and the range of available services
has expanded, household expenditure on telecommunications has increased
(see table 7.6). Further, as just demonstrated, real telecommunications prices have
fallen, so that increases in expenditure can be at least partially attributed to price-
induced increases in consumption. The rapid growth in demand may be due to a
combination of factors, including reductions in real prices, the introduction of new
services and improved marketing, together with increases in real household income.
The percentage increase in telecommunications expenditure between 1988-89 and
1998-99 (as measured by the Household Expenditure Survey and expressed in
2000-01 dollars) tended to be greater for households in higher income brackets.
Households in rural areas did not increase their telecommunications expenditure by
as much as households in urban areas, particularly capital city households
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Table 7.6 Real increases in average weekly household expenditure on
telecommunications between 1988-89 and 1998-99
In 2000-01 dollars
Income quintile All capital cities      Other urban     Rural Total Australia
$% $% $% $ %
Lowest 20% 4.70 49.43 3.54 41.19 2.99 29.46 4.20 45.37
Second quintile 6.17 53.66 5.64 53.28 1.71 13.05 5.43 47.58
Third quintile 7.60 56.93 6.47 50.12 1.45 9.91 6.70 50.18
Fourth quintile 10.37 72.56 5.56 38.98 5.80 38.34 8.84 61.67
Highest 20% 11.06 63.67 8.77 51.35 6.15 36.74 10.36 59.90
All households 8.22 61.08 5.77 47.25 2.90 21.17 7.06 53.79
Note This is the difference between the average weekly household expenditure on telecommunications
published in the 1988-89 and 1998-99 ABS Household Expenditure Surveys (inflated to 2000-01 dollars). For
example, the average weekly household expenditure of all capital city households increased by $8.22 (or
61 per cent) between 1988-89 and 1998-99 (as measured in 2000-01 dollars).
Source: ABS (Household Expenditure Survey Australia 1988-89, Cat. no. 6535.0); ABS (Household
Expenditure Survey Australia 1998-99, Cat. no. 6535.0).
7.3 Price variations
The ACCC released a report in April 2001 in which changes in the prices paid for
telecommunications services in Australia from 1996-97 to 1999-2000 were
presented (ACCC 2001a). The report was produced as part of the ACCC’s reporting
obligations under the Trade Practices Act 1974.
The ACCC report included price indexes for PSTN services used by both household
and business customers, as well as a separate index for mobile telephony. Separate
price indexes were also presented for services used in metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas.
Household and business customers
The ACCC reported separate price indexes for household and business customers.
The indexes were constructed using prices for a basket of PSTN services   basic
access, local calls, national long-distance calls, international calls and calls from
fixed to mobile phones. The composition of each basket used in the index was
different for each customer group to reflect their different consumption patterns.
The resulting indexes reflect changes in real prices, with all data expressed in
1999-2000 dollars (see table 7.7). The results indicate broadly similar rates of price
reduction since 1996-97 for both household and business customers.244 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table 7.7 Real telecommunications price trends — households and
businesses
In 1999-2000 dollars (per cent)
Customer type June 1998a June 1999a June 2000a
Household -5.3 -5.2 -7.7
Business -3.4 -5.6 -7.4
a Year ended.
Source: ACCC (2001b).
Metropolitan and non-metropolitan customers
The price indexes used to compare household and business customers were
constructed using population data. However, in comparing metropolitan and
non-metropolitan customer groups, a different methodology was used.
The metropolitan and non-metropolitan indexes were constructed from sample
billing data, because the population data used to construct the household and
business indexes referred to in the previous section could not be disaggregated by
region and customer type. Accordingly, the metropolitan and non-metropolitan
indexes are subject to the variations and errors normally associated with sample
data. Therefore, the results presented by the ACCC are indicative, rather than
conclusive evidence that the prices paid by these two customer groups decreased at
broadly similar rates (see table 7.8).6
Table 7.8 Real telecommunications price trends — metropolitan and
non-metropolitan prices
In 1999-2000 dollars (per cent)
Customer type June 1998 June 1999 June 2000
Metropolitan -3.5 -11.7 -11.9
Non-metropolitan -2.5 -10.9 -10.7
Note Metropolitan and non-metropolitan includes both household and business customers.
Source: ACCC (2001b).
                                             
6 Because the ACCC results were prepared using a different methodology from that used by the
Productivity Commission, the metropolitan price reductions shown in table 7.8, are similar in
direction but different in magnitude, from the price reductions shown (graphically) for the
corresponding years in figure 7.1.TELECOMMUNICATIONS 245
Concessions
Subject to a residence requirement, customers holding a Pensioner Concession Card
or Commonwealth Seniors Card are able to obtain a Telephone Allowance through
Centrelink or the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. Eligible customers receive a
non-taxable payment of $18 per quarter. The payment is not subject to an assets or
income test beyond that applying to the relevant concession card.
The current price sub-caps referred to in note c, table 7.1, are intended to protect
low-spending customers from the effects of price rebalancing.7 Low-spending
customers pay a relatively high proportion of their telecommunications bill as
access charges and a relatively small proportion as call charges. Consequently, any
price rebalancing that increases access charges vis a vis call charges, will have a
proportionately greater impact on this group of customers.
7.4 Service quality
Quality of service was examined to see if price trends might be explained by
changes in the quality and reliability of services. Lower prices can be achieved by
lowering expenditure below that required to maintain service standards. That said,
improvements in technology may also lead to lower prices.
In the telecommunications industry, quality of service standards are being
maintained and improved through codes of practice and legislation. Quality of
service standards are legislated through the Telecommunications (Consumer
Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999. The Act imposes obligations that
affect quality of service in a number of areas.
The most significant of these provisions are embodied in the customer service
guarantee (CSG). The CSG applies to PSTN services to household and business
customers and covers service connection, repair of faults and service difficulties,
and the making and keeping of appointments. Under the CSG, carriers and carriage
service providers are required to pay compensation to customers if they do not meet
specified minimum standards. Quality of service indicators for payphone services
form part of the USO.
                                             
7 The Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts recently announced new
price control arrangements to take effect in July 2002. Among the new arrangements is a package
of measures to protect low-income (rather than low-spending) customers from line rental
increases or provide offsetting benefits (see Alston 2002).246 INFRASTRUCTURE
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In addition to quality of service standards, there are legislative requirements for the
ACA (under s105 of the Telecommunications Act 1997) to monitor and report
annually on certain aspects of the telecommunications industry, including quality of
service. The ACA (formerly AUSTEL) also publishes quality of service data in
quarterly performance monitoring bulletins. The following aspects of service
quality are subject to regulation or monitoring:
•   service provision;
•   fault clearance;
•   network performance;
•   payphone services;
•   mobile services;
•   call centre performance; and
•   complaints.
Over the past decade, a significant amount of data on each of these aspects of
quality of service has been published by AUSTEL and the ACA in the annual and
quarterly publications. However, some service indicators have only been reported in
recent years. Also, there have been changes in definitions of indicators and
reporting methods, particularly as a result of the introduction of the CSG. These
difficulties limit the analysis of quality of service trends over the whole period.
Trends in four quality of service indicators, for which generally consistent data were
available for most of the study period, are discussed below.
Service provision
Service provision refers to the speed of connection of a standard telephone service
and is typically measured by the proportion of services connected within a specified
timeframe. Service connections are also disaggregated by the CSG standard into
‘new services’ (where no infrastructure is available) and ‘in-place’ services (where
a service has previously been operating).
Prior to 1997, connection performance was measured by the proportion of services
connected on or before an agreed commitment date (ACD). The ACD refers to the
date by which Telstra agrees with the customer to connect the particular service.
Telstra’s performance against the ACD for connection of new and in-place services
fluctuated between 1991 and 1998. Although it improved over the period for in-TELECOMMUNICATIONS 247
place services, it was generally worse at the end of the period for connection of new
services (see figures 7.2 and 7.3).
Figure 7.2 Provision of in-place services before the agreed commitment
date — Telstra
























































































































































































National Metropolitan business Metropolitan household Country
Data sources: ACA (1998); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra, pers. comm., 29 October 2001.248 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 7.3 Provision of new services on or before the agreed commitment
date — Telstra


























































































































































































National Metropolitan business Metropolitan household Country
Data sources: ACA (1998); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra, pers. comm., 29 October 2001.
The introduction of the CSG in 1997 meant that the government specified standard
timeframes for the connection of new services. Since then, performance has been
measured by the proportion of services connected within the CSG timeframes rather
than by an ACD. New service connection performance, as measured by the CSG
timeframes, has improved since 1998 for all customer groups (ACA 2001b and
previous issues).
Fault clearance
Fault clearance indicators provide a measure of service responsiveness.
Performance is typically measured by the proportion of faults repaired within a
specified period after the fault is reported. From September 1991 to June 1998,
Telstra’s fault clearance performance was measured as the proportion of faults
repaired within one working day of notification.
Telstra’s performance against this indicator declined for each of the customer
groups reported (see figure 7.4), with the biggest decline in fault clearance reported
for metropolitan household customers.TELECOMMUNICATIONS 249
Adverse weather conditions have been cited by Telstra as a factor contributing to
reduced fault performance (AUSTEL  1996). Increasing demand for new service
connections may also put pressure on fault clearance performance because of the
need to reallocate staff from fault repair tasks to service connection tasks.
Figure 7.4 Faults cleared within one working day of notification — Telstra























































































































































































National Metropolitan business Metropolitan household Country
Note Although the method of reporting Telstra’s connection performance changed in 1997, there was an
overlap period from December 1997 to June 1998 where performance was measured under both the old and
new reporting methods.
Data sources: ACA (1998); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra, pers. comm., 29 October 2001.
From the June quarter 1998, fault clearance performance has been measured by the
proportion of faults repaired within the CSG timeframes (see figure 7.5). Following
the introduction of the CSG, Telstra has been required to either repair faults within a
given timeframe or pay compensation to customers. The timeframes vary between
geographic regions and in 2002 were one working day for urban, two days for rural
and three days for remote areas.8
Telstra’s fault clearance performance improved between December 1997 and June
2001 in each of the three areas (see figure 7.5).
                                             
8 Urban areas are those with a population greater than 10 000 people. Rural areas are those other
than urban and remote areas. Remote areas are those with a population less than 200 people.250 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 7.5 Faults cleared within the customer service guarantee
timeframes — Telstra










































































































Note Urban areas are those with a population greater than 10 000 people. Rural areas are those other than
urban and remote areas. Remote areas are those with a population less than 200 people. The customer
service guarantee timeframes in 2002 were one full working day for urban, two full working days for rural and
three full working days for remote areas. Although the method of reporting Telstra’s connection performance
changed in 1997, there was an overlap period from December 1997 to June 1998 where performance was
measured under both the old and new reporting methods.
Data sources: ACA (2001b and previous issues).
Fault restoration times are influenced by a range of factors. For example, the overall
workload and skill of the service staff determine, in part, how quickly a fault can be
identified and repaired. Environmental factors, such as weather and geographical
network density, influence the time taken to locate and access the fault before repair
can begin. Similarly, the level of network intelligence and redundancy determine
the ability to restore services. The CSG standard also recognises that other
circumstances beyond the control of the provider may affect performance. These
include where there has been wilful damage to facilities or a need to obtain access
to the land or facilities of a third party.
Network performance
Network performance, or call congestion, is normally measured as the proportion of
local and long-distance calls where a connection cannot be established due toTELECOMMUNICATIONS 251
congestion. Congestion occurs when the capacity of the PSTN is exceeded,
resulting in some call attempts being unsuccessful. Network loss may vary with
time-of-day and distance of call.
Telstra’s call connection performance has improved significantly over the period for
both local and STD weekday calls (see figures 7.6 and 7.7). From June 2000,
Telstra has been required to report network loss only if it rose above one per cent,
which has not occurred.
Figure 7.6 Telstra’s local call connection












































































































































Note  From June 2000, the Australian Communications Authority has only required telecommunications
providers to report network loss above one per cent.
Data sources: ACA (1998; 2000a and previous issues); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra,
pers. comm., 29 October 2001.252 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 7.7 Telstra’s long-distance STD weekday call connection

















































































































































Note From June 2000, the Australian Communications Authority has only required telecommunications
carriers to report network loss above one per cent.
Data sources: ACA (1998; 2000a and previous issues); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra,
pers. comm., 29 October 2001.
Payphone serviceability
There are several indicators used by the ACA to measure quality of payphone
services. However, the only indicator that has been reported consistently over the
whole study period is the proportion of payphones operating at any one time. The
series extends until June 2000 when Telstra began reporting on a different measure.
The proportion of payphones operating was higher at the end of the period than at
the beginning (see figure 7.8). However, Telstra’s performance for the provision of
payphone services has fluctuated over the period, which it partly attributes to
vandalism and other external factors. The ACA also notes that the decline in
payphone serviceability between June 1997 and June 1999 coincided with the
rollout of the new Smart Payphone which commenced in 1997 (ACA 2000b).TELECOMMUNICATIONS 253
Figure 7.8 Percentage of public payphones operating at any one time






























































































































































Note A payphone is said to be operable if transmission and reception are adequate and a successful call can
be made using each of the available modes (coin, phonecard). Telstra stopped reporting on this indicator in
June 2000.
Data sources: ACA (1998; 2000a and previous issues); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra,
pers. comm., 29 October 2001.
There does not appear to have been a significant decline in performance for any of
the indicators examined above. This suggests that price reductions have not been
achieved at the expense of service quality.
7.5 Shareholder outcomes
Telstra was 100 per cent publicly-owned until November 1997 when it became one
third privatised through a public share offering. A further public share offering was
made in 1999 and it is now 49.9  per  cent privately-owned. Consequently, the
Commonwealth Government is no longer the sole bearer of potential financial risks
involved in operating the business. Further, it no longer receives all the benefits of
Telstra’s dividend payments.
The financial performance of Telstra was examined to provide information on the
relationship between price trends and financial outcomes, such as the return on
assets over the study period. Low prices relative to costs may not achieve a254 INFRASTRUCTURE
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satisfactory return on assets, nor provide sufficient revenue to maintain and replace
long-lived infrastructure assets.
The data used in calculating the shareholder outcomes presented in this section were
generally taken from two sources:
•   Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government
Trading Enterprises; and
•   Productivity Commission reports on Financial Performance of Government
Trading Enterprises.
There may be inconsistencies between these two data sets and the information
published in Telstra’s annual reports. These inconsistencies arise because of
definitional differences.
During the period that Telstra was 100 per  cent publicly owned (1990-91 to
1996-97), Telstra earned a return on assets of over 10 per cent in all years except
1991-92 (see figure 7.9).
Since the partial privatisation of Telstra in November 1997, shareholders have
earned a return on assets of over 20 per cent in all years except 1997-98. During the
period of part private ownership (1997-98 to 2000-01), return on assets has
averaged 21  per  cent, compared with 13  per  cent for the period of full public
ownership (1990-91 to 1996-97).
The trend and level of return on assets over the study period suggests that declining
real prices for customers did not come at the expense of returns on assets.
Comparisons of performance over time that are based on indicators that include an
estimate of asset values, have to be interpreted with care. Differences in asset
valuation procedures and changes in the size of the asset base can affect the return
on assets. Over the study period, there have been significant changes in asset values
as a result of asset transfers, revaluations and changes in asset valuation
methodologies.TELECOMMUNICATIONS 255

















Note Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is
calculated by subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross
interest expense. Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of each
financial year. Prior to 1993, returns were affected by the merger with the Overseas Telecommunications
Commission.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); Telstra, Sydney,
pers. comm., 6 May 2002.
Telstra has paid a dividend in each year over the study period. Up until 1997-98, all
of these dividends were paid to the Commonwealth Government. Special dividends
were paid in 1996-97 ($3.0  billion) and 1998-99 ($2.1  billion) to restructure
Telstra’s capital base prior to each privatisation sale (Telstra 1997 and 1999).
The relative size of dividend payments is represented by the dividend payout ratio
(dividends as a proportion of profit after tax) and the dividend to equity ratio
(dividends as a proportion of average total equity).
The dividend payout ratio has fluctuated from year-to-year (see figure 7.10). Part of
this variability is due to the payment of special dividends in 1996-97 and 1998-99.
In the absence of special dividends, the dividend payout ratio has averaged
39  per  cent over the study period. In 1999-2000, the dividend payout ratios of
private sector telecommunications utilities averaged around 55 per cent, and ranged
from 0 to 100 per cent (PC 2001a).256 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Note Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. Prior to 1993, ratios were affected by the merger with the Overseas Telecommunications
Commission. a Telstra paid special dividends in 1996-97 ($3.0 billion) and 1998-99 ($2.1 billion) related to
financial restructuring prior to the sale of part of the business by the Commonwealth Government. If these
dividend payments are excluded, the dividend payout ratio would be approximately 59 per cent in 1996-97 and
approximately 62 per cent in 1998-99.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); Telstra, Sydney,
pers. comm., 6 May 2002.
The dividend to equity ratio has steadily increased in most years over the study
period (see figure 7.11). Excluding the special dividend payments in 1996-97 and
1998-99, the dividend to equity ratio has averaged around 12 per  cent. This is
consistent with the dividend to equity ratio of private sector utilities, which
averaged around 15 per cent, and ranged from 0 to 60 per cent (PC 2001a).TELECOMMUNICATIONS 257



















Note Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity. Dividends paid or
provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and revenues. Equity is
calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets.  Prior to 1993, ratios were affected by the merger
with the Overseas Telecommunications Commission. a Telstra paid special dividends in 1996-97 ($3.0 billion)
and 1998-99 ($2.1 billion) related to financial restructuring prior to the sale of part of the business by the
Commonwealth Government. If these dividend payments are excluded, the dividend to equity ratio would be
around 8 per cent in 1996-97 and 20 per cent in 1998-99.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); Telstra, Sydney,
pers. comm., 6 May 2002.
The indicators presented here suggest that the substantial real price reductions over
the last ten years have been achieved without affecting Telstra’s financial
performance.258 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Attachment A – Data tables
Table A7.1 Real telecommunications price trends — metropolitan
households
1990-91 to 2000-01 (index 1990-91=100)












Note The real price index was obtained by rebasing the CPI (telecommunications) index to a base year of
1990-91 and then deflating the rebased index by the rebased CPI (All groups) price index. The price index for
2000-2001 includes the Goods and Services Tax.
Data sources: PC estimates based on ABS (Consumer Price Index, Australia, Cat. no. 6401.0).TELECOMMUNICATIONS 259
Table A7.2 Provision of in-place services before the agreed commitment
date — Telstra






September 1991 85 86 83 85
December 1991 86 87 83 85
March 1992 87 87 83 86
June 1992 89 90 86 89
September 1992 90 91 87 90
December 1992 91 92 85 89
March 1993 89 92 81 88
June 1993 88 92 82 88
September 1993 80 90 81 87
December 1993 79 88 81 86
March 1994 82 87 83 85
June 1994 82 84 84 84
September 1994 82 82 83 83
December 1994 81 79 82 80
March 1995 80 79 83 80
June 1995 80 80 85 82
September 1995 76 81 87 83
December 1995 80 82 87 84
March 1996 81 84 88 86
June 1996 78 84 87 85
September 1996 76 84 88 85
December 1996 79 87 88 87
March 1997 80 89 88 88
June 1997 81 90 87 88
September 1997 81 90 90 89
December 1997 81 93 90 90
March 1998 82 95 92 92
June 1998 88 95 93 93
Data sources: ACA (1998); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra, pers. comm., 29 October 2001.260 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A7.3 Provision of new services on or before the agreed commitment
date — Telstra






September 1991 87 88 71 81
December 1991 88 89 75 83
March 1992 88 88 73 82
June 1992 87 90 76 83
September 1992 89 92 75 82
December 1992 89 92 73 83
March 1993 84 94 66 78
June 1993 83 91 65 79
September 1993 72 86 67 79
December 1993 80 78 69 80
March 1994 81 85 70 79
June 1994 81 82 70 77
September 1994 81 81 73 78
December 1994 79 79 74 78
March 1995 80 78 73 78
June 1995 78 84 76 79
September 1995 72 84 80 80
December 1995 76 87 81 82
March 1996 77 88 79 83
June 1996 76 90 81 84
September 1996 73 89 80 83
December 1996 73 90 82 84
March 1997 75 89 81 82
June 1997 74 89 79 81
September 1997 74 87 75 79
December 1997 73 86 66 74
March 1998 72 88 64 74
June 1998 76 88 73 78
Data sources: ACA (1998); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra, pers. comm., 29 October 2001.TELECOMMUNICATIONS 261
Table A7.4 Faults cleared within one working day of notification — Telstra






September 1991 82 80 76 79
December 1991 85 82 77 80
March 1992 85 77 72 76
June 1992 87 83 78 81
September 1992 79 81 78 79
December 1992 89 81 76 79
March 1993 86 75 71 73
June 1993 89 77 75 76
September 1993 92 73 79 80
December 1993 91 76 77 82
March 1994 88 66 70 75
June 1994 82 63 67 72
September 1994 78 61 68 72
December 1994 84 65 71 76
March 1995 81 58 65 71
June 1995 81 57 70 71
September 1995 82 56 73 72
December 1995 80 53 71 69
March 1996 79 51 67 66
June 1996 79 57 71 69
September 1996 82 64 75 74
December 1996 83 62 74 73
March 1997 82 58 69 69
June 1997 81 56 69 68
September 1997 83 54 68 67
December 1997 80 53 61 64
March 1998 79 54 59 63
June 1998 81 62 62 67
Data sources: ACA (1998); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra, pers. comm., 29 October 2001.262 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A7.5 Faults cleared within the customer service guarantee
timeframes — Telstra
December 1997 to June 2001 (per cent)
Urban Rural Remote
December 1997 72 84 70
March 1998 71 81 64
June 1998 79 82 60
September 1998 80 81 64
December 1998 80 84 72
March 1999 69 79 63
June 1999 77 83 60
September 1999 82 88 66
December 1999 83 86 74
March 2000 78 84 74
June 2000 84 86 75
September 2000 90 94 86
December 2000 82 92 82
March 2001 88 93 83
June 2001 92 95 87
Note Urban areas are those with a population greater than 10 000 people. Rural areas are those other than
urban and remote areas. Remote areas are those with a population less than 200 people. The customer
service guarantee timeframes in 2002 were one full working day for urban, two full working days for rural and
three full working days for remote areas.
Data sources: ACA (2001b and previous issues).TELECOMMUNICATIONS 263
Table A7.6 Telstra’s local call connection
September 1991 to June 2000 (per cent network loss)
Metropolitan Country National
September 1991 0.90 0.70 0.90
December 1991 0.90 0.70 0.90
March 1992 0.80 0.60 0.80
June 1992 0.70 0.90 0.70
September 1992 0.70 0.90 0.80
December 1992 0.90 1.40 1.10
March 1993 0.70 1.20 0.80
June 1993 0.50 0.90 0.60
September 1993 0.40 0.90 0.50
December 1993 0.30 0.70 0.40
March 1994 0.30 0.60 0.40
June 1994 0.20 0.50 0.30
September 1994 0.20 0.40 0.20
December 1994 0.14 0.32 0.18
March 1995 0.10 0.22 0.13
June 1995 0.09 0.17 0.11
September 1995 0.08 0.14 0.10
December 1995 0.08 0.12 0.09
March 1996 0.07 0.13 0.09
June 1996 0.08 0.12 0.09
September 1996 0.08 0.10 0.09
December 1996 0.08 0.08 0.08
March 1997 0.07 0.10 0.08
June 1997 0.07 0.09 0.07
September 1997 0.07 0.10 0.08
December 1997 0.10 0.08 0.09
March 1998 0.18 0.06 0.14
June 1998 0.11 0.05 0.09
September 1998 0.14 0.05 0.11
December 1998 0.10 0.05 0.09
March 1999 0.13 0.04 0.10
June 1999 0.14 0.05 0.11
September 1999 0.16 0.06 0.12
December 1999 0.22 0.04 0.16
March 2000 0.14 0.06 0.12
June 2000 0.14 0.04 0.11
Data sources: ACA (1998; 2000a and previous issues); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra,
pers. comm., 29 October 2001.264 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A7.7 Telstra’s long-distance STD weekday call connection
September 1991 to June 2000 (per cent network loss)
Metropolitan Country National
September 1991 2.20 1.60 1.80
December 1991 2.20 1.40 1.80
March 1992 1.70 1.20 1.50
June 1992 1.80 2.10 1.90
September 1992 1.60 2.30 1.90
December 1992 1.90 2.30 2.10
March 1993 1.30 1.90 1.60
June 1993 1.10 1.60 1.30
September 1993 1.00 1.50 1.20
December 1993 1.20 1.30 1.20
March 1994 1.20 1.10 1.20
June 1994 0.90 1.00 1.00
September 1994 0.90 0.80 0.90
December 1994 0.89 0.76 0.83
March 1995 0.63 0.51 0.57
June 1995 0.57 0.39 0.49
September 1995 0.32 0.21 0.28
December 1995 0.47 0.21 0.35
March 1996 0.27 0.19 0.24
June 1996 0.25 0.15 0.21
September 1996 0.20 0.15 0.17
December 1996 0.20 0.20 0.20
March 1997 0.14 0.15 0.14
June 1997 0.15 0.11 0.13
September 1997 0.11 0.15 0.13
December 1997 0.29 0.22 0.25
March 1998 0.40 0.13 0.25
June 1998 0.09 0.11 0.10
September 1998 0.13 0.09 0.11
December 1998 0.07 0.08 0.08
March 1999 0.25 0.16 0.20
June 1999 0.07 0.12 0.10
September 1999 0.08 0.10 0.09
December 1999 0.14 0.16 0.15
March 2000 0.26 0.21 0.23
June 2000 0.29 0.18 0.23
Data sources: ACA (1998; 2000a and previous issues); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra,
pers. comm., 29 October 2001.TELECOMMUNICATIONS 265
Table A7.8 Percentage of public payphones operating at any one time



































Note A payphone is said to be operable if transmission and reception are adequate and a successful call can
be made using each of the available modes (coin, phonecard).
Data sources: ACA (1998; 2000a and previous issues); Australian Communications Authority, Canberra,
pers. comm., 29 October 2001.266 INFRASTRUCTURE
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Table A7.9 Return on assets, dividend payout ratio, dividend to equity ratio
— Telstra
1990-91 to 2000-01 (per cent)
Return on assetsa Dividend payout ratiob Dividend to equity ratioc
1990-91 13.5 26.0 2.8
1991-92 8.2 152.5 4.8
1992-93 12.7 74.5 6.5
1993-94 14.8 43.3 6.8
1994-95 12.9 53.8 8.4
1995-96 16.4 59.4 11.2
1996-97 10.3 257.7 36.7
1997-98 19.5 55.3 17.1
1998-99 21.8 121.8 39.7
1999-00 20.6 63.1 21.2
2000-01 20.8 60.2 19.3
Note Telstra paid ‘special’ dividends in 1996-97 ($3.0 billion) and 1998-99 ($2.1 billion) related to financial
restructuring prior to the sale of part of the business by the Commonwealth Government. If these dividend
payments are excluded, the dividend payout ratio would be 58.8 per cent in 1996-97 and 61.6 per cent in
1998-99. The dividend to equity ratio would be 8.4 per cent in 1996-97 and 20.1 per cent in 1998-99. Prior to
1993, figures were affected by the merger with the Overseas Telecommunications Commission. a Return on
assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to average total assets. EBIT is calculated by
subtracting total expenses from total revenue (including abnormals) and adding back gross interest expense.
Average total assets are the average of the value of assets at the beginning and end of the reporting period.
b Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to operating profit after tax (including
abnormals). Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits
and revenues. c  Dividend to equity is the ratio of dividends paid or provided for, to average total equity.
Dividends paid or provided for include normal and special dividends and special levies on profits and
revenues. Equity is calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets.
Data sources: PC (2002 forthcoming); SCNPMGTE (1998 and previous issues); Telstra, Sydney,
pers. comm., 6 May 2002.REFERENCES 267
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